Ader O.L. v. Warden, California City Immigration Center, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ADER O.L.,

12 Petitioner, No. 1:26-cv-03385-TLN-AC 13 v. A # 221-489-564 14 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY IMMIGRATION CENTER, et al. 15 ORDER Respondents. 16 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Ader O.L.’s1 (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ 19 of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On 20 May 5, 2026, the Court issued a Minute Order stating that it intends to rule directly on the habeas 21 petition due to the urgent nature of the requested relief and directed Respondents to file a 22 response. (ECF No. 4.) 23 On May 6, 2026, in response, Respondents filed a notice of related cases and motion to 24 dismiss. (ECF Nos. 7, 8.) Respondents assert that under Local Rule 123, this case is related to

25 1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits Petitioner’s full name, using only 26 his first name and last initial, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum re: 27 Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018), 28 https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf. 1 No. 1:26-cv-01372-JLT-HBK, as each action arises from Petitioner’s detention in immigration 2 custody. (ECF No. 7 at 1.) Respondents note that in the first action, the habeas petition was 3 granted, judgment was entered in his favor on April 17, 2026, and Petitioner received a bond 4 hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) (who found Petitioner constituted a flight risk and 5 denied bond). (ECF No. 8 at 1, 3, 7.) Respondents assert that in the instant second action, 6 Petitioner raises precisely the same kind of issues as presented before—whether he should be 7 granted immediate release or a bond hearing based on constitutional or statutory claims. (Id. at 8 1–2.) 9 “Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), ‘[n]o circuit or district judge shall be required to 10 entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person 11 pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States if it appears that the legality of such 12 detention has been determined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application for a 13 writ of habeas corpus[.]” Tate v. Borla, No. 1:25-cv-01704 JLT SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3769421, 14 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025). Further, the Ninth Circuit has clarified that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) 15 “prevents a federal inmate from using § 2241 ‘to call into question the validity of a conviction or 16 sentence that has already been subject to collateral review,’” as “§ 2244(a) bars successive 17 petitions seeking review of the propriety of a detention ‘pursuant to a judgment of a court of the 18 United States.’” Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Valona v. 19 United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1988); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. at 651, 662–63 20 (1996)). 21 Here, the Court agrees with Respondents that Petitioner presents in the instant petition the 22 same issues that were decided in the first action. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) In the first action, Petitioner 23 alleged he entered the United States without inspection in February 2022, was never detained by 24 immigration officials upon entry, and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) is the appropriate authority governing 25 his detention. (No. 1:26-cv-01372-JLT-HBK, ECF No. 1 at 7.) Petitioner alleged the following 26 claims: (1) a violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); (2) a violation of the 27 bond regulations, 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19; (3) a violation of the suspension clause 28 of the United States Constitution; (4) a violation of substantive due process; and (5) violation of 1 procedural due process. (Id. at 14–23.) Judge Jennifer L. Thurston ultimately adopted Magistrate 2 Judge Helena M. Barch-Kuchta’s recommendation to grant the habeas petition as to the INA 3 claim and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 4 § 1226(a). (No. 1:26-cv-01372-JLT-HBK, ECF No. 15 at 2.) In the instant second action, 5 Petitioner alleges similar facts and claims for violation of due process (noting that under 8 U.S.C. 6 § 1226(a), the government must provide an individualized bond hearing where the government 7 bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen poses a flight 8 risk or danger to the community), prolonged detention,2 and deliberate indifference to Petitioner’s 9 medical needs. (ECF No. 1 at 3–6.) As Petitioner raises the same claims raised in the first habeas 10 petition, the instant second petition must be dismissed. See Del Raine v. Adams, 58 F. App’x 762 11 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the “district court properly dismissed Del Raine’s [§ 2241] petition as 12 successive because he raises the same claims raised in a prior habeas petition, and denied on the 13 merits by the Middle District of Pennsylvania”).3 14 For the foregoing reasons, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED 15 and Petitioner’s Motion for TRO (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot. The Petition for Writ of 16 Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is dismissed. Petitioner’s Count Two for prolonged detention is 17 dismissed without prejudice. Petitioner may raise this claim at a later date. The Clerk of the 18 Court shall close the case. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 //

21 2 The Court notes Petitioner did not assert a prolonged detention claim in the first action. Petitioner has been detained since January 21, 2026, and he recently received a bond hearing on 22 April 28, 2026. (ECF No. 8 at 7, 16.) To raise a Fifth Amendment Due Process prolonged 23 detention claim pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–701 (2001), Petitioner must demonstrate his removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable. See also Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 24 534 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying Zadvydas to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). As detention continues, due process may require additional procedural protections to ensure 25 adequate justification for detention. Here, Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months, which is a presumptively reasonable period of detention. Thus, this claim is premature. 26

27 3 Further, to the extent Petitioner raises issues with the conditions of his confinement, those claims are not properly before the Court on a habeas petition and must instead be brought as a 28 civil rights action. 1 | Date: May 11, 2026 7, 2 TROY L. NUNLEY 3 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28