Adeniji v. New York City Police

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided February 19, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-00664·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK OLUSEYI ADENIJI, Plaintiff, 21-CV-0664 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action against the New York City Police Department (NYPD). The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as arising under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff paid the $402.00 in filing fees for this action. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff Oluseyi Adeniji pleads the following facts in his complaint. On March 10, 1991, Plaintiff drove his wife and two children to Riverside Church to attend a 10:00 a.m. service. He was parking the car near 490 Riverside Drive, when three police officers appeared and began to physically assault him, without any provocation or reason for doing so. Plaintiff’s family

watched the assault. Plaintiff suffered a head injury and bruises to his face and left arm from the police batons. The officers then took Plaintiff to the police precinct at 126th Street in Harlem. Plaintiff alleges that at the time, a black man risked being killed by police officers if he filed a complaint. Later, on an unspecified date, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the NYPD’s internal affairs bureau, and the NYPD acknowledged the incident. Plaintiff continues to suffer headaches from the head injury, and he seeks damages. DISCUSSION It appears that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure,

488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s claims accrued in 1991, when the incident took place. The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.’” In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides by statute for other circumstances in which a limitations period may be tolled. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (where commencement of an

action has been stayed by court order), id. at § 204 (where a dispute has been submitted to arbitration but is ultimately determined to be non-arbitrable), id. at § 207(3) (defendant is outside New York at the time the claim accrues), id. at § 208 (plaintiff is disabled by infancy or insanity), id. at § 210 (death of plaintiff or defendant). Although Plaintiff suggests that he could not file suit at the time of the incident because it would have been dangerous for him to do so, he alleges that he eventually filed an internal complaint, and the NYPD acknowledged the incident. Plaintiff thus does not provide any facts showing that the statute of limitations can be equitably tolled in this case for more than 25 years. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v.

Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See Walters v. Indus. and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss an action sua sponte on limitations grounds in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on statute of limitations grounds); see also Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (concluding that district court should grant notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing complaint sua sponte on statute of limitations grounds). The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to plead facts showing that the statute of limitations can be equitably tolled. Plaintiff’s complaint also suffers from other defects. First, as an agency of the City of New York, the NYPD cannot be sued in its own name and must instead be sued in the name of

the City of New York. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007). Moreover, when a plaintiff sues a municipality such as the City of New York under § 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of its employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing.

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