Addie Thweatt v. Ronald Rhodes

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: June 28, 2023
• Docket: 21-1242
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-1242

ADDIE E. THWEATT,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

RONALD T. RHODES, individually; ALVIN F. JONES, individually,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:20-cv-00548-HEH)

Argued: May 5, 2023 Decided: June 28, 2023

Before NIEMEYER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and Max O. COGBURN, Jr., United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Cogburn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Heytens joined.

ARGUED: James B. Thorsen, THORSENALLEN, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Randy Carl Sparks, Jr., KAUFMAN & CANOLES, PC, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee Alvin F. Jones. Melissa Yvonne York, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Glen Allen, Virginia, for Appellee Ronald T. Rhodes. ON BRIEF: Judson R. Peverall, THORSENALLEN, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. David P. Corrigan, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, USCA4 Appeal: 21-1242 Doc: 34 Filed: 06/28/2023 Pg: 2 of 9

for Appellee Ronald T. Rhodes.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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MAX O. COGBURN, Jr., District Judge:

Appellant Addie Thweatt appeals the district court’s dismissal of Thweatt’s claim

for malicious prosecution against Appellees Ronald Rhodes and Alvin Jones. For the

following reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court.

I.

A.

Plaintiff Addie Thweatt worked as a bus driver for Prince George County Public

Schools. On May 9, 2018, at approximately 7:06 a.m., two female students walked onto a

bus Thweatt was driving. J.A. 8, at ¶ 14; J.A. 14–15; J.A. Vol. II. As the students walked

onto the bus, one of the students said, “I will hit her straight in the face.” The other student

responded, “No, you’re not.” Thweatt then interjected herself into the conversation, saying,

“You going to hit who in the face?” J.A. Vol. II. One of the female students then sat against

the window in the first row of the passenger side of the bus and replied, “Who you think?”

Id. Thweatt then said, “Aw naw. You talking to me? You going to hit who in the face?” Id.

Thweatt said this while unbuckling her seatbelt and exiting the driver’s seat of the school

bus to approach the student in her seat. Id.

When Thweatt reached the student’s seat, she yelled at the student, “Me? Bring it

on. You going to hit me in the face?” Id. While making these statements, Thweatt gestured

with her hands. Id. The student replied, “Did I say I was going to hit you?” Id. Thweatt

then said, “Naw. You got on the bus running your mouth, who you going to hit in the face?”

Id. The student sat silently, and Thweatt proceeded to yell, “Who you talking to, me or

who?” Id. After the student asked Thweatt, “You going to drive the bus?”, Thweatt moved 3 USCA4 Appeal: 21-1242 Doc: 34 Filed: 06/28/2023 Pg: 4 of 9

into the student’s seat, stood over the student, and shook her finger, while stating “Naw,

you’re going to tell me who you’re talking to.” Id.

The student then stood in an effort to exit the seat and the bus while Thweatt said,

“I’m going to call somebody so you can get off the bus.” Id. The student ultimately

disembarked from the bus. Id. Video footage showed that, during the incident, Thweatt

unbuckled her seatbelt to stand over the student, threw up her arms during the altercation,

and blocked the student in her seat so that the student had to push past Thweatt to leave the

bus.

The student reported the incident to the School Board Office on May 9, 2018. J.A.

14–15. On May 10, 2018, Ronald Rhodes, Director of Operations for Prince George

County Public Schools, met with Thweatt regarding the incident. Id. During the meeting,

Rhodes advised Thweatt that Officer Alvin Jones of the Prince George County Police

Department would be pressing charges against her for disorderly conduct, and that she

would be placed on administrative leave without pay pending the outcome of those charges.

J.A. 9, at ¶ 15; J.A. 14–15. Officer Jones appeared before and made sworn statements to a

magistrate on May 11, 2018, at which time the magistrate issued an arrest warrant for

Thweatt for disorderly conduct under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-415, which states:

A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he . . . willfully . . . disrupts the operation of any school or activity conducted or sponsored by the school, if the disruption has a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person . . . at whom . .. the disruption is directed.

J.A. 9, at ¶¶ 18–19, 21; J.A. 16–17.

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Officer Jones served the arrest warrant on Thweatt on May 11, 2018, and she was

released on her own recognizance. J.A. 9–10, at ¶ 22; J.A. 16–17. Rhodes never appeared

before, or spoke to, the magistrate. Thweatt claims that Jones only made an oral statement

to the magistrate and that Jones did not interview the student before bringing the charges.

Thweatt was ultimately found not guilty. J.A. 10, at ¶ 24; J.A. 16–17.

Thweatt filed a lawsuit against Rhodes and Jones for malicious prosecution pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. J.A. 6–17. In response, Rhodes filed a motion to dismiss, and Jones

filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Rhodes and Jones argued that: (1) they

enjoyed qualified immunity; (2) they did not cause Thweatt’s arrest because the

magistrate’s signature on the warrant was a sufficient intervening cause; and (3) a

reasonable officer could find that Thweatt’s conduct was disorderly. Thweatt responded

that Rhodes and Jones made numerous critical misrepresentations of the altercation such

that the magistrate’s issuance of the warrant did not break the causal chain for the malicious

prosecution claim, and that no reasonable officer could have found that Thweatt’s conduct

was disorderly.

On February 4, 2021, the district court granted Rhodes’ motion to dismiss and

Jones’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the claims against Rhodes and

Jones based on the court’s finding that neither Rhodes nor Jones violated Thweatt’s

constitutional rights. J.A. 37–50. The district court relied on two pieces of extrinsic

evidence: the video of the altercation and a letter Rhodes wrote to Thweatt about the

incident. J.A. 30-34; J.A. Vol. II.

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In its dismissal order, the district court noted that to state a claim for malicious

prosecution, Thweatt had to show that (1) defendants caused a (2) seizure of plaintiff

pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause and (3) criminal proceedings

terminated in plaintiff’s favor. The court found that Thweatt did not show that either

defendant caused her seizure or that her arrest lacked probable cause. The court found that

the magistrate judge’s order was an intervening cause that broke that causal chain such that

neither Rhodes nor Jones could be held liable. The court noted that the causal chain would

not be broken if Thweatt could show that Rhodes or Jones misled, pressured, or lied to the

magistrate when applying for the arrest warrant, but the court held that Thweatt did not

show this. Therefore, the warrant broke the causal chain, and Rhodes and Jones did not

cause Thweatt’s arrest. The court also found that Rhodes did not cause Jones to obtain the

warrant by lying to Jones.

The court further found that there was probable cause for the arrest. In support of

this finding, the court noted that, while words alone are not enough to show disorderly

conduct, Thweatt’s actions of unbuckling her seat belt, rising out of her seat, approaching

a teenage girl, and loudly shouting and waving her arms, while leaning over the girl’s seat

and blocking her entrance, were enough to show disorderly conduct. Finally, the court

stated that because Rhodes and Jones did not violate Thweatt’s constitutional rights, the

court would not consider whether Thweatt’s constitutional rights were clearly established

for purposes of qualified immunity.

Thweatt timely appealed to this Court. On appeal, she argues that probable cause

was lacking to arrest her for disorderly conduct. Thweatt also argues that Rhodes and Jones

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caused Thweatt’s arrest, and the officers knew there was no probable cause when applying

for the warrant, thus violating Thweatt’s clearly established rights. For the following

reasons, we disagree with both contentions.

B.

We review the district court’s decision de novo. See Affinity Living Grp., LLC v.

StarStone Specialty Ins., 959 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2020); E.I. du Pont de Nemours and

Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).

At the outset, we note that Rhodes filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and Jones

filed a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings before the district court. However,

the standard of review is the same. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) allows a party to

move for judgment on the pleadings when it would not delay trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c).

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is assessed under the same

standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738

F.3d 107, 115 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th

Cir. 1999)). Therefore, under Rule 12(c), a claim must be dismissed when a claimant’s

allegations fail to set forth a set of facts which, if true, would entitle the claimant to relief.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

(2009) (holding that a claim must be facially plausible in order to survive a motion to

dismiss). When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, as with a motion to

dismiss, the Court is “obliged to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.” Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley,

911 F.3d 674, 685 (4th Cir. 2018). “However, the court need not accept the legal

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conclusions drawn from the facts, and need not accept as true unwarranted inferences,

unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, Va., 579 F.3d

380, 385–86 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The district court correctly found that neither Rhodes nor Jones violated Thweatt’s

constitutional rights. As to Thweatt’s argument that Rhodes and Jones lacked probable

cause to seek an arrest warrant for disorderly conduct, probable cause arises “when the

facts and circumstances known to the officer ‘would warrant the belief of a prudent person

that the arrestee had committed or was committing an offense.’” Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d

429, 434 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59–60 (4th Cir.

1988)). This “is an objective standard of probability that reasonable and prudent persons

apply in everyday life.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th Cir. 1998). Probable

cause is not a high bar. Spivey v. Norris, 731 F. App’x 171, 175 (4th Cir. 2018). While it

“requires more than ‘bare suspicion’, it requires less than that evidence necessary to

convict.” Id. at 175–76 (quoting United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998)).

We agree with the district court that Thweatt’s conduct sufficiently fell within the

definition of “disorderly conduct” under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-415. Therefore, Officer

Jones had probable cause for seeking the arrest warrant from the magistrate for disorderly

conduct.

Additionally, the magistrate judge’s order was an intervening cause that broke that

causal chain such that neither Rhodes nor Jones “caused” Thweatt’s arrest. The first

element of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires that defendants “caused” the

allegedly unlawful seizure. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012). The

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intervening acts of a decision maker such as a magistrate can act as a superseding cause

that breaks the causal chain and shields an investigating officer from liability. Id. Police

officers can be held liable, however, if they have misled, unduly pressured, or lied to a

magistrate. Id. Here, however, Thweatt did not allege that Officer Jones misled, unduly

pressured, or lied to the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant.

For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Thweatt’s malicious

prosecution claim. ∗

AFFIRMED

∗ We note that while the district court concluded that Rhodes and Jones enjoyed qualified immunity, the district court simultaneously found that neither Rhodes nor Jones violated Thweatt’s constitutional rights in the first instance. As a matter of law, if there is no constitutional violation in the first instance, then technically the issue of qualified immunity does not even come into play. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 194 (2001) (“The initial inquiry is whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged, for if no right would have been violated, there is no need for further inquiry into immunity.”). In other words, if there is no constitutional violation in the first instance, a court does not need to determine whether a constitutional right was “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity. In any event, because we agree with the district court that neither Rhodes nor Jones violated Thweatt’s constitutional rights, we affirm.