Adan Dahir Mohamed v. Kevin Raycraft et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

ADAN DAHIR MOHAMED,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-1974

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,

Respondents. ____________________________/

OPINION Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12.) In an order entered on July 2, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on July 8, 2026, (ECF No. 4.)1

1 On July 15, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file his reply brief (ECF No. 5) and proposed reply (ECF No. 6). Because the Court will grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as set forth herein, Petitioner’s motion is moot. II. Factual Background Petitioner is a native of Kenya and a citizen of Somalia. (Wynns Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.28.) Petitioner entered the United States as a refugee on February 24, 2004, and, that same day, adjusted his status to a lawful permanent resident. (Id.) On June 19, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, Notice to Appear (NTA), charging

Petitioner with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) concerning a prior aggravated felony theft offense. (Id., ¶ 9.) On October 19, 2019, an Immigration Judge in the Detroit Immigration Court ordered Petitioner removed to Somalia or, in the alternative, Kenya. (Id., ¶ 10.) Petitioner did not appeal the order of removal, (id.), making Petitioner’s order of removal administratively final on or about November 18, 2019.2 In 2019, the Detroit ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) learned that Petitioner could not be removed to Kenya. (Wynns Decl. ¶¶ 11–12, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.29–30.) On February 18, 2020, ICE released Petitioner on an Order of Supervision. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID.30.) On December 15, 2025, ICE agents arrested Petitioner when Petitioner reported to the Detroit ICE office. (Id., ¶ 18.)

On January 12, 2026, Detroit ICE ERO contacted ICE Headquarters to request third country removal for Petitioner. (Id., ¶ 19, PageID.31.) ICE issued Petitioner a second Notice of Revocation of Release over two months after his arrest, on February 28, 2026. (Id., ¶ 22.) That same say, ICE provided Petitioner with an informal interview. (Id.)

2 For the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Petitioner had 30 days from which to file an appeal of the October 19, 2019, order of removal. 8 CFR § 1003.38 On May 15, 2026, ICE scheduled Petitioner for a third country removal mission to Cameroon but, due to ICE “operational oversight,” Petitioner was not removed at this time. (Id., ¶ 23, PageID.31–32.) On June 4, 2026, ICE Detroit ERO contacted ICE Headquarters to inquire about another removal flight. (Id., ¶ 25.) III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard

The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025). IV. Merits Discussion Petitioner contends that Respondents have unlawfully detained Petitioner in violation of the INA and Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment rights. Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), following Petitioner’s final order of removal entered

on November 18, 2019. Ordinarily, when an individual is issued a final order of removal, that person must be removed from the country within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Except for situations where the person is “detained or confined” in a case other than the “immigration process,” or where a court orders a stay of removal, the 90-day removal period begins when the removal order becomes administratively final. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner’s order of removal is administratively final. Under § 1231(a)(6), the government is permitted to continue to detain individuals who are deemed “inadmissible” beyond the removal period, or it may release them under specified terms of supervision. Id. § 1231(a)(6). However, once that time passes and after “removal is no longer

reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute,” and the noncitizen must be released. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001); see 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) (“If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the [90-day] removal period, the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”). Consistent with § 1231(a)(6), Petitioner was released from detention with an Order of Supervision on February 18, 2020. The government has promulgated regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations concerning the release of noncitizens who are subject to a final removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4; 8 C.F.R. § 241.13. These regulations—specifically, §§ 241.4 and 241.13—

also govern the revocation of such noncitizens’ release. The agency must comply with the applicable regulatory and statutory requirements. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as recognized in Dept. of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 135 (2020) (“[A]s long as the regulations remain operative, the Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep” those regulations.). As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: “The Supreme Court has long recognized that a federal agency is obliged to abide by the regulations it promulgates. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954). An agency’s failure to follow its own regulations ‘tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice’ and consequently may result in a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process. Where a prescribed procedure is intended to protect the interests of a party before the agency, ‘even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed.’ Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 629, 630 (1974) (observing that agency violations of regulations promulgated to provide parties with procedural safeguards generally have been invalidated by courts).” Wilson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. United States Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1998)). 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 generally governs the continued detention of noncitizens under a final order of removal. Section 241.4(l)(2) provides: The Executive Associate Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke release and return to Service custody an alien previously approved for release under the procedures in this section. A district director may also revoke release of an alien when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Executive Associate Commissioner. Release may be revoked in the exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official: (i) The purposes of release have been served; (ii) The alien violates any condition of release; (iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal proceedings against an alien; or (iv) The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release would no longer be appropriate. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. Section 241.13 governs the detention of noncitizens under a final order of removal where “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(b). If the noncitizen was released pursuant to § 241.13, release may be revoked if, “on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the [noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(i)(2). Further, the regulations governing release provide that, “[u]pon revocation of release,” the noncitizen “will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release,” and will be given “an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien

an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). “The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). Courts examining the requirements for revocation of release following a final order of removal have consistently held that the procedural requirements of notice and an interview are required for revocation of a noncitizen’s release. Constantinovici v. Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases; citations omitted). This Court agrees. Here, Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner was not provided with notice of the reasons

for the revocation of his release “[u]pon revocation” on December 15, 2025. He was also not provided with an informal interview promptly thereafter. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). Instead, Respondents did not provide Petitioner with notice and an informal interview until over two months after Petitioner’s arrest. Two months is “cannot reasonably be construed as a ‘prompt’ informal interview.” Constantinovici, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1165 (holding that the respondents violated the INA by failing to hold an informal interview within six weeks of the petitioner’s arrest). Moreover, “even if the government has the discretion to revoke [Petitioner’s] supervision, his constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by his re-detention.” Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation omitted). The Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to Fifth Amendment due process protections for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.

Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025) 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13, described above, were intended “to provide due process protections to [noncitizens] following the removal period as they are considered for continued detention, release, and then possible revocation of release.” Santamaria Orellana v. Baker, Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025). “The opportunity to

contest detention through an informal interview is not some ticky-tacky procedural requirement; it strikes at the heart of what due process demands.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“At one level, today’s dispute may seem semantic, focused on a single word, a small one at that. But words are how the law constrains power.”)). In its most elemental formulation, “the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The Court, therefore, agrees with courts around the country in concluding that the failure to provide Petitioner with notice upon revocation and an informal interview promptly after his detention with a meaningful opportunity to contest the reasons for revocation in accordance with

8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13 violates Petitioner’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and requires release. See, e.g., Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2017); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV- 01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *10–12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 774 (D. Minn. 2025); Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 704; Grigorian, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9; Ghafouri v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02675-RBM-BLM, 2025 WL 3085726, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL 1696526, at *3 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025). V. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does

not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. VI. Proper Respondents Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent in this action. They seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding habeas relief will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred outside the area under the authority of the ICE Detroit Field Office, the Court will retain all of the remaining Respondents.

Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under Petitioner’s Order of Supervision. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment.

Dated: July 16, 2026 /s/ Paul L. Maloney Paul L. Maloney United States District Judge