Adams v. Larson

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided October 15, 2020·No. 2:17-cv-00699·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________

PAUL ALLEN ADAMS,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 17-cv-0699-bhl

RANDALL R. HEPP, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________ DECISION AND ORDER ______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Allen Adams filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, suing nine defendants he alleges were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. (ECF No. 48 at 8-9.) On June 7, 2019, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which is now fully briefed. For the reasons explained in this order, the Court will grant defendants’ motion as to seven of the defendants — Randal Hepp, Regina De Trana-Hinrichs, Dawn Proehl, Candace Whitman, Jeff DeVries, Rebecca Trewyn, and Samantha Floeter — but will deny the motion as to the remaining two defendants — Robert Frank and Charles Larson. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2011). “Material facts” are those under the applicable substantive law that “might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute over a “material fact” is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: 1 (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). EXHAUSTION OF AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES Before turning to the merits of Adams’ claims, the Court will address defendants’ argument that Adams did not exhaust the available administrative remedies with regard to two of his claims. Adams sued DeVries for failing to provide a private area to self-administer an enema, and he sued Floeter for failing to timely schedule his surgery. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which applies to this case because Adams was incarcerated when he filed his complaint, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before he can sue a prison official under federal law. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Accordingly, Adams cannot pursue his deliberate-indifference claims against DeVries or Floeter if, as they argue, he did not first exhaust the available administrative remedies. To properly exhaust administrative remedies, prisoners must file their inmate complaints and appeals in the place, at the time, and in the manner that the institution’s administrative rules require. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). The Supreme Court has advised that a prisoner’s efforts to exhaust are “not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievance.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). But it is well settled that an inmate’s grievance must “alert[] the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Wis. Admin. Code §DOC 310.09(1)(e)1 (a complaint “shall clearly identify the issue”).

1 References to the Wis. Admin. Code DOC 310 are to the December 2014 version, which was in effect at the relevant time. 2 With regard to DeVries, Adams does not dispute that he did not file any grievances about DeVries not providing him with a private area to self-administer an enema. (ECF No. 93 at ¶154; ECF No. 129 at ¶154.) His failure to do so is fatal to his claim against DeVries, who is entitled to summary judgment. With regard to his claim against Floeter, Adams points out that he filed a grievance about the “un[necess]ary infliction of pain and suffering and a failure to treat easily reco[g]nizable sta[]ge 3 hemor[rho]ids.” (ECF No. 98-2 at 8.) Even assuming this could be construed to encompass a claim about delayed scheduling, that grievance was rejected as untimely because Adams filed it “well beyond the 14-day time limit to file a complaint with respect to hemorrhoid surgery on 9/20/16.” (Id. at 98-2.) Thus, Adams’ claim against Floeter must be dismissed because he failed to file his grievance “in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Palmore v. Litscher, 47 F. App’x 777, 778 (7th Cir. 2002). Adams tries to save his claim against Floeter by pointing to a second grievance he filed on November 10, 2016, in which he claims he complained about the scheduling delay and which he insists was addressed on the merits. (ECF No. 130 at 1; ECF No. 133 at 16.) But Adams mischaracterizes both the grievance itself and the examiner’s handling of the grievance. When prompted by the grievance form to “Briefly state who or what is the one issue of this complaint,” Adams wrote, “Refusal of HSU, Warde[n], PRC, PSCY [sic], Madison dietitian, Greg Phal, to properly treat my c[h]ronic IBS per-DAI/DOC Policy, and provide me with the right diet/foods.” (ECF No. 133 at 16.) When prompted by the grievance form to provide the details surrounding the complaint, Adams wrote a two-page, single-spaced narrative that included numerous details that are irrelevant to the issue he identified. (Id. at 16-17.) Tucked in this narrative is the sentence, “I then was made to wait[] until Sept 20, 2016 to have the surgery because the person in charge of scheduling with the hospital forgot to do it.” (Id. at 17.) Adams argues that, in light of this sentence, the Court should find that he exhausted the available administrative remedies on the scheduling issue because he raised this issue in his grievance. The Court disagrees. The inmate complaint examiner summarized Adams’ grievance as follows: “Inmate complains HSU is refusing to properly treat his IBS and provide him with the right diet which is no soy.” (ECF No.

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