1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Alysha ADAMS, et al., Case No.: 23-cv-1220-AGS-DDL 4 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 5 v. REMAND (ECF 7) AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 2) 6 GROSSMONT CUYAMACA COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, 7 et al., 8 Defendants. 9 10 Plaintiffs sued their community-college employers over COVID-19 vaccine 11 mandates. The defense removed the case here, and plaintiffs now seek remand back to state 12 court. The defense meanwhile moves to dismiss based on mootness and failure to state a 13 claim. 14 BACKGROUND 15 This case’s 31 defendants include three community-college districts, their governing 16 boards, and various presidents, chancellors, and employees sued “in their official 17 capacities only.” (ECF 1, at 11–13.) In late 2021, defendants “adopted a COVID-19 18 vaccine requirement” compelling employees to “obtain the vaccine or submit an exemption 19 thereto.” (Id. at 14, 17, 35–36.) Of the six plaintiffs, five requested religious exemptions, 20 which were granted, and one sought a medical exemption, which was not. (Id. at 14–40.) 21 All six claim they were denied reasonable accommodations. (Id.) 22 In March 2023, plaintiffs sued in state court, just a few months before defendants 23 repealed their vaccine mandates. (See ECF 1, at 58; ECF 2-2 at 16, 24, 33.) They allege 24 that: the vaccine mandate is preempted by state law (claim 1); the vaccine rules were ultra 25 vires acts (claim 2); the mandate amounts to religious discrimination under the 26 First Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claims 3 and 4); and defendants failed 27 to accommodate—and subjected them to disparate treatment because of—their religious 28 beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (claims 5–9). (See ECF 1, at 41–55.) 1 DISCUSSION 2 MOTION TO REMAND 3 Plaintiffs move to remand this case to state court, arguing: (1) defendants’ 4 Eleventh Amendment immunity deprives this Court of original jurisdiction; (2) the 5 removal was untimely; and (3) the state-law claims predominate over the federal ones. 6 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 7 Plaintiffs reason that if defendants have Eleventh Amendment immunity, as the 8 defense insists, then this Court has “no subject matter or original jurisdiction” and removal 9 was “improper.” (ECF 7, at 4.) That premise is flawed. Eleventh Amendment immunity is 10 “an affirmative defense,” not an assertion of “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Miles v. 11 State of California, 320 F.3d 986, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2003). And federal courts have 12 “jurisdiction” over “all civil actions arising under” federal law, such as many claims here. 13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Any immunity defense does not affect this Court’s jurisdiction. The 14 remand motion on that ground is denied. 15 B. Timeliness of Removal 16 Next, plaintiffs maintain that the removal was late. A removal notice must be filed 17 “within 30 days” of service, as “governed by state law.” Whidbee v. Pierce County, 18 857 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). The issue here is when 19 “service” was complete. More precisely, the question is: If the defense waives standard 20 service, when is service effective? 21 In this case, plaintiffs requested that defense counsel “accept service upon you by 22 email.” (ECF 13-1, at 4.) All counsel agreed, though one attorney asked that plaintiffs “also 23 provide notice(s) of acknowledgment.” (Id. at 6, 8, 11.) On May 10, 2023, plaintiffs 24 emailed defense counsel the state-court summons and complaint. (ECF 7-1, at 1–4.) Three 25 weeks later, on May 31, each defense counsel signed and returned a “Notice and 26 Acknowledgment of Receipt.” (ECF 1, at 83, 85, 87; ECF 11, at 11.) The case was 27 removed on June 30, 2023. 28 1 According to plaintiffs, service was complete when the defense accepted the emailed 2 pleadings on May 10, and thus the 30-day deadline expired weeks before the June 30 3 removal. (See ECF 13, at 1–3.) Defendants, on the other hand, contend that service was not 4 effective until they “signed and returned” the acknowledgment on May 31, which means 5 they timely removed this action exactly 30 days later. (ECF 1, at 83, 85, 87; ECF 11, at 11.) 6 It is “axiomatic that defects in service may be waived by a responding party either 7 expressly or by appearing in an action.” Ammec Invs., Inc. v. Ifaomilekun, LLC, No. 8 B314854, 2023 WL 3473663, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2023). But when service 9 becomes effective after such a waiver is a matter of debate in California. Relying on 10 California’s “Service by mail” rules, the defense believes that service is effective “when a 11 Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt [of summons] is executed and returned.” (See 12 ECF 11, at 12 (citing, among others, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30).) But those rules cover 13 service by “first-class mail or airmail,” not by email. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(a). 14 The reality is that statutory law offers little guidance here, because California lacks formal 15 procedures for email service or for waiving service. Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 16 §§ 415.10–415.95 (California’s summons rules, which do not mention waiver) with Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 4(d) (federal summons rule, which provides procedure to “waive service of a 18 summons”). And the state courts have not yet resolved how to deal with service-by-email 19 agreements like the one here. 20 “Absent controlling authority from the state supreme court, a federal court must 21 predict how the highest state court would decide the state law issue . . . .” Camenzind v. 22 California Exposition & State Fair, 84 F.4th 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). 23 Happily, this Court need not hazard such a prediction. There are only two ways that the 24 California Supreme Court is likely to resolve this legal dispute, and both support removal. 25 First, California may conclude that agreeing to “email” service—without more—is a 26 limited waiver of the “Service by mail” rules. That is, it waives the requirement of delivery 27 by “first-class mail or airmail” (in favor of email), but it retains the other procedural 28 provisions for mail service. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(a). Under this scenario, then, 1 service would be “deemed complete on the date a written acknowledgement of receipt of 2 summons [wa]s executed” and “returned to the sender,” which was May 31, 2023. See 3 § 415.30(c). At least one federal court has adopted this view. See Hillman v. PacifiCorp, 4 No. 2:21-cv-00848-MCE-CKD, 2022 WL 597583, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2022) (holding 5 that email service was effective “on the date the ‘acknowledgment of receipt of summons 6 [wa]s executed and returned’” (citing, in part, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(c))). 7 On the other hand, the state Supreme Court may decide that an email-service 8 agreement completely waives the “Service by mail” rules, and thus the effective date of 9 service is governed by the terms of the waiver itself.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 Alysha ADAMS, et al., Case No.: 23-cv-1220-AGS-DDL 4 Plaintiffs, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 5 v. REMAND (ECF 7) AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF 2) 6 GROSSMONT CUYAMACA COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, 7 et al., 8 Defendants. 9 10 Plaintiffs sued their community-college employers over COVID-19 vaccine 11 mandates. The defense removed the case here, and plaintiffs now seek remand back to state 12 court. The defense meanwhile moves to dismiss based on mootness and failure to state a 13 claim. 14 BACKGROUND 15 This case’s 31 defendants include three community-college districts, their governing 16 boards, and various presidents, chancellors, and employees sued “in their official 17 capacities only.” (ECF 1, at 11–13.) In late 2021, defendants “adopted a COVID-19 18 vaccine requirement” compelling employees to “obtain the vaccine or submit an exemption 19 thereto.” (Id. at 14, 17, 35–36.) Of the six plaintiffs, five requested religious exemptions, 20 which were granted, and one sought a medical exemption, which was not. (Id. at 14–40.) 21 All six claim they were denied reasonable accommodations. (Id.) 22 In March 2023, plaintiffs sued in state court, just a few months before defendants 23 repealed their vaccine mandates. (See ECF 1, at 58; ECF 2-2 at 16, 24, 33.) They allege 24 that: the vaccine mandate is preempted by state law (claim 1); the vaccine rules were ultra 25 vires acts (claim 2); the mandate amounts to religious discrimination under the 26 First Amendment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claims 3 and 4); and defendants failed 27 to accommodate—and subjected them to disparate treatment because of—their religious 28 beliefs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (claims 5–9). (See ECF 1, at 41–55.) 1 DISCUSSION 2 MOTION TO REMAND 3 Plaintiffs move to remand this case to state court, arguing: (1) defendants’ 4 Eleventh Amendment immunity deprives this Court of original jurisdiction; (2) the 5 removal was untimely; and (3) the state-law claims predominate over the federal ones. 6 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 7 Plaintiffs reason that if defendants have Eleventh Amendment immunity, as the 8 defense insists, then this Court has “no subject matter or original jurisdiction” and removal 9 was “improper.” (ECF 7, at 4.) That premise is flawed. Eleventh Amendment immunity is 10 “an affirmative defense,” not an assertion of “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Miles v. 11 State of California, 320 F.3d 986, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2003). And federal courts have 12 “jurisdiction” over “all civil actions arising under” federal law, such as many claims here. 13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Any immunity defense does not affect this Court’s jurisdiction. The 14 remand motion on that ground is denied. 15 B. Timeliness of Removal 16 Next, plaintiffs maintain that the removal was late. A removal notice must be filed 17 “within 30 days” of service, as “governed by state law.” Whidbee v. Pierce County, 18 857 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)). The issue here is when 19 “service” was complete. More precisely, the question is: If the defense waives standard 20 service, when is service effective? 21 In this case, plaintiffs requested that defense counsel “accept service upon you by 22 email.” (ECF 13-1, at 4.) All counsel agreed, though one attorney asked that plaintiffs “also 23 provide notice(s) of acknowledgment.” (Id. at 6, 8, 11.) On May 10, 2023, plaintiffs 24 emailed defense counsel the state-court summons and complaint. (ECF 7-1, at 1–4.) Three 25 weeks later, on May 31, each defense counsel signed and returned a “Notice and 26 Acknowledgment of Receipt.” (ECF 1, at 83, 85, 87; ECF 11, at 11.) The case was 27 removed on June 30, 2023. 28 1 According to plaintiffs, service was complete when the defense accepted the emailed 2 pleadings on May 10, and thus the 30-day deadline expired weeks before the June 30 3 removal. (See ECF 13, at 1–3.) Defendants, on the other hand, contend that service was not 4 effective until they “signed and returned” the acknowledgment on May 31, which means 5 they timely removed this action exactly 30 days later. (ECF 1, at 83, 85, 87; ECF 11, at 11.) 6 It is “axiomatic that defects in service may be waived by a responding party either 7 expressly or by appearing in an action.” Ammec Invs., Inc. v. Ifaomilekun, LLC, No. 8 B314854, 2023 WL 3473663, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 16, 2023). But when service 9 becomes effective after such a waiver is a matter of debate in California. Relying on 10 California’s “Service by mail” rules, the defense believes that service is effective “when a 11 Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt [of summons] is executed and returned.” (See 12 ECF 11, at 12 (citing, among others, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30).) But those rules cover 13 service by “first-class mail or airmail,” not by email. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(a). 14 The reality is that statutory law offers little guidance here, because California lacks formal 15 procedures for email service or for waiving service. Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 16 §§ 415.10–415.95 (California’s summons rules, which do not mention waiver) with Fed. 17 R. Civ. P. 4(d) (federal summons rule, which provides procedure to “waive service of a 18 summons”). And the state courts have not yet resolved how to deal with service-by-email 19 agreements like the one here. 20 “Absent controlling authority from the state supreme court, a federal court must 21 predict how the highest state court would decide the state law issue . . . .” Camenzind v. 22 California Exposition & State Fair, 84 F.4th 1102, 1114 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). 23 Happily, this Court need not hazard such a prediction. There are only two ways that the 24 California Supreme Court is likely to resolve this legal dispute, and both support removal. 25 First, California may conclude that agreeing to “email” service—without more—is a 26 limited waiver of the “Service by mail” rules. That is, it waives the requirement of delivery 27 by “first-class mail or airmail” (in favor of email), but it retains the other procedural 28 provisions for mail service. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(a). Under this scenario, then, 1 service would be “deemed complete on the date a written acknowledgement of receipt of 2 summons [wa]s executed” and “returned to the sender,” which was May 31, 2023. See 3 § 415.30(c). At least one federal court has adopted this view. See Hillman v. PacifiCorp, 4 No. 2:21-cv-00848-MCE-CKD, 2022 WL 597583, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2022) (holding 5 that email service was effective “on the date the ‘acknowledgment of receipt of summons 6 [wa]s executed and returned’” (citing, in part, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.30(c))). 7 On the other hand, the state Supreme Court may decide that an email-service 8 agreement completely waives the “Service by mail” rules, and thus the effective date of 9 service is governed by the terms of the waiver itself. What were those terms here? One 10 defense counsel agreed to email service with the caveat that plaintiffs “provide notice(s) of 11 acknowledgment,” which plaintiffs duly supplied. (See ECF 13-1, at 6.) Those notices, in 12 turn, stated that “service of a summons is deemed complete on the day you sign the 13 acknowledgment of receipt below.” (See, e.g., ECF 1, at 83.) So, service here would again 14 be effective on May 31, 2023—the date of signing.1 At least one federal court has taken 15 this other path. See National Foam, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 23-cv-03873-LB, 2023 16 WL 7164914, at *1, *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2023) (noting that even though “plaintiff’s 17 counsel” agreed “to accept service of the complaint as of” its emailing, service was not 18 effective until the notice-and-acknowledgement date because “counsel prompted the 19 plaintiff’s counsel” “to send him [a] written acknowledgement”). 20 In short, the removal was timely. 21 C. Predominance of State Law 22 Finally, plaintiffs argue that the state claims predominate here and urge this Court to 23 remand at least those claims. (ECF 7, at 6.) Federal courts may exercise supplemental 24
25 1 If this interpretation prevails, it makes no difference that only one attorney 26 requested an acknowledgment form. Under the “later-served rule,” so long as the last- 27 served defendant’s removal is timely, earlier-served defendants who “join [the] petition for removal” may also be removed. Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011); 28 1 jurisdiction over state-law claims that “form part of the same case or controversy” as the 2 suit’s federal aspects. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). But if a state cause of action “substantially 3 predominates over” the federal ones, the court “may decline to exercise supplemental 4 jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(2). Courts evaluate predomination “in terms of proof, of the 5 scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” United Mine 6 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 7 On each metric this Court must consider, the federal claims are broader. First, the 8 federal issues are more extensive than the state ones. Of the nine causes of action, two are 9 state law-based (alleging legislative preemption and ultra vires action) and seven derive 10 from federal law (including religious discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as 11 failure to accommodate and disparate treatment of religious beliefs under Title VII). (See 12 ECF 1, at 41–55.) Next, consider the proof. Even when there is “substantial overlap 13 between” state and federal claims, “courts generally require a more robust showing of 14 facts” supporting the state cause of action to conclude that it is “the predominant claim.” 15 iSpot.tv, Inc. v. Teyfukova, No. 2:21-cv-06815-MEMF (MARx), 2023 WL 1967958, at *7 16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2023). Yet all claims here arise from the same factual background: the 17 vaccine mandate. The state claims concern whether defendants—as a general 18 proposition—lacked authority for the mandate, regardless of the plaintiffs’ personal 19 circumstances. (See ECF 1, at 41–44.) The federal claims, by contrast, rely extensively on 20 the plaintiffs’ individual experiences or religious beliefs. (See id. at 44–55.) If anything, 21 then, the federal claims predominate in terms of proof. Finally, the federal remedies sought 22 are more expansive than the state ones. Plaintiffs request “declaratory judgments” on all 23 claims, but they also seek “nominal damages, compensatory damages,” and “permanent 24 injunctive relief” on their federal causes of action. (See ECF 1, at 46, 48, 55–58.) 25 Plaintiffs therefore fail to show that their state claims predominate on any front. And 26 they have not established any other basis to return this case to state court. This Court denies 27 the motion to remand. And it likewise declines the request for reimbursement of removal- 28 related fees. 1 MOTION TO DISMISS 2 Defendants move to dismiss, challenging the sufficiency of the complaint and 3 alleging this Court lacks jurisdiction. (ECF 2-1.) “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 4 complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 5 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has 6 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 7 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court 8 accepts “the factual allegations in the complaint as true” and construes them “in the light 9 most favorable to the plaintiff[s].” GP Vincent II v. Estate of Beard, 68 F.4th 508, 514 10 (9th Cir. 2023). 11 A. Intelligibility 12 First, defendants move to dismiss the entire complaint on intelligibility grounds. See 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1); (ECF 2-1, at 18–20). But overall, the complaint is “logically 14 organized, divided into a description of the parties, a chronological factual background, 15 and a presentation of enumerated legal claims, each of which lists the liable Defendants 16 and legal basis therefor.” See Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1132 17 (9th Cir. 2008). Dismissal “is usually confined to instances in which the complaint is so 18 verbose, confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. 19 at 1131. That is not the case here, so the motion is denied as to unintelligibility. 20 B. Religious-Discrimination Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 21 1. Equitable Relief 22 Defendants contend that the requests for declaratory and injunctive relief under 23 § 1983 are moot. (ECF 2-1, at 20–23; see also ECF 1, at 46, 48.) A federal court may only 24 adjudicate a case if an “actual controversy” exists “not only at the time the complaint is 25 filed, but through all stages of the litigation.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90– 26 91 (2013) (cleaned up). “The central question for mootness is whether changes in the 27 circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled any occasion for 28 meaningful relief.” Meland v. WEBER, 2 F.4th 838, 849 (9th Cir. 2021). 1 Defendants have already repealed their vaccine mandates, which normally “moots 2 claims for declaratory or injunctive relief.” See Pilz v. Inslee, No. 22-35508, 2023 WL 3 8866565, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2023); see also Brach v. Newsom, 38 F.4th 6, 11 (9th Cir. 4 2022) (“Bottom line: there is no longer any state order for the court to declare 5 unconstitutional or to enjoin.”). Plaintiffs suggest, however, that the voluntary-cessation 6 exception saves their claims. (See ECF 10, at 15.) That is, “a defendant cannot 7 automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful conduct once sued.” Already, 8 568 U.S. at 91. Yet “in order for this exception to apply, the defendant’s voluntary 9 cessation must have arisen because of the litigation.” Public Utils. Comm’n of State of Cal. 10 v. FERC, 100 F.3d 1451, 1460 (9th Cir. 1996). Not so here. According to the 11 uncontradicted evidence, defendants progressively eased COVID-related restrictions 12 leading up to their recission of the vaccine requirements. (See, e.g., ECF 2-2, at 24, 33 13 (“Throughout the 2021-2022 year, [defendants] implemented a phased-in reopening, 14 resuming in-person work, instruction, and student services districtwide.”).) Defendants 15 then rescinded the vaccine requirement “[b]ased on . . . information” that “vaccine and 16 mask mandates were no longer required for healthcare workers,” and the end of “the 17 COVID-19 State of Emergency for California.” (Id.) So the vaccine requirement was 18 rescinded not because of litigation, but because of the pandemic’s changing landscape. 19 See Brach, 38 F.4th at 12 (finding case moot when the “State did not rescind its school 20 closure orders in response to the litigation—the orders ‘expired by their own terms’ after 21 COVID-19 transmission rates declined and stabilized”). The claims for declaratory and 22 injunctive relief are dismissed. 23 2. Damages 24 In addition, the Court dismisses the remaining § 1983 damages claims against 25 defendants, who are all state entities or individuals sued in their official capacities. See 26 Cerrato v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1994) 27 (“[C]ommunity college districts are dependent instrumentalities of the state of 28 California.”). “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 1 ‘persons’ under § 1983” and thus cannot be sued under that section. Will v. Michigan Dep’t 2 of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); cf. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991) (“A 3 government official in the role of personal-capacity defendant . . . fits comfortably within 4 the statutory term ‘person’” [under § 1983].” (emphasis added)). Given this ruling, the 5 Court need not address the other § 1983 dismissal arguments. 6 C. Title VII Claims 7 1. Administrative Exhaustion 8 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VII claims for failure to exhaust. 9 (ECF 2-1, at 24.) To state “a claim for violation of Title VII,” plaintiffs must allege “that 10 they exhausted their administrative remedies.” Williams v. California, 764 F.3d 1002, 1018 11 (9th Cir. 2014). In particular, Title VII plaintiffs must “file a discrimination charge with 12 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and receive a right-to-sue letter from the 13 Commission.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 14 1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), (f)(1). 15 While some plaintiffs purportedly filed charges with state agencies, only plaintiff 16 Hartman alleges he “received a right-to-sue letter.” (See ECF 1, at 40; see also id. at 20, 17 23.) That letter is a “general requirement” for bringing suit under Title VII. Surrell v. 18 California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, all Title VII 19 claims—save Hartman’s—are dismissed for failing that prerequisite. Because this defect 20 could be cured “with the subsequent receipt of a right to sue letter” or with a valid excuse 21 for failing to obtain it, the Court grants leave to amend. See Greenly v. Sara Lee Corp., 22 No. CIV. S-06-1775 WBS EFB, 2006 WL 3716769, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006). 23 2. Hartman’s Religious-Discrimination Claim 24 Hartman’s Title VII claim for failing to accommodate his religious beliefs doesn’t 25 survive long. (See ECF 1, at 51–52.) The first element of such a claim is that plaintiff “had 26 a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty.” 27 Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004). According to the 28 complaint, Hartman “sought an exemption from the vaccine mandate” “due to a medical 1 || condition.” (See ECF 1, at 51 (emphasis added).) The claim never mentions religious 2 || beliefs. (See id. at 51-52.) So, it too must be dismissed, albeit with leave to amend. 3 ||D. State Claims 4 Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are only for declaratory judgment (see ECF 1, at 55), so 5 are dismissed as moot for the same reason as the § 1983 equitable-relief claims. Now 6 || that the vaccine mandate is rescinded, there is “no longer any state order for the court to 7 || declare” to be preempted or an ultra vires act. See Brach, 38 F.4th at 11. 8 CONCLUSION 9 Plaintiffs’ motion to remand this case to state court is DENIED, and defendants’ 10 || motions to dismiss (ECF 2) and for judicial notice (ECF 2-2) are GRANTED. The Court 11 || orders that: 12 1. The state-law claims (claims | and 2) are DISMISSED as moot. 13 2. The religious-discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claims 3 and 4) are 14 DISMISSED. Specifically, the § 1983 requests for declaratory and injunctive 15 relief are dismissed as moot. The requests for § 1983 damages are dismissed with leave to amend. 16 7 3. The Title VII claims (claims 5—9) are DISMISSED with leave to amend. 18 4. By April 12, 2024, plaintiffs must file any amended complaint. Any amended 19 complaint is limited to only the claims that this Court granted leave to amend. 20 ||Dated: March 15, 2024 21 Hon. Andrew G. Schopler United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28