Adams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

Michigan Court of Appeals

Adams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

265 N.W.2d 53, 81 Mich. App. 91, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2112

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedFebruary 6, 1978

DocketDocket 27709

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 265 N.W.2d 53 (Adams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Adams v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 265 N.W.2d 53, 81 Mich. App. 91, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2112 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).

Pincite

Opinions

Bashara, J.

The pertinent facts of this case are delineated in Judge Mahinske’s concurring opinion. We conclude that procedural policy mandates reversal of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board determination and reinstatement of the referee’s order.

[94]*94Whether a dispute or controversy persists after an employer agrees to make voluntary payments, is an issue that exceeds the scope of inquiry required for the resolution of this case. A dispute or controversy within the meaning of MCLA 418.847; MSA 17.237(847) is a jurisdictional element. Its existence at the time a claim is properly filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau vests the bureau with jurisdiction over the claim. That jurisdiction cannot be unilaterally divested by either party to the dispute.

Policy considerations congruent to those underlying the restrictions upon voluntary dismissals embodied in GCR 1963, 504.1, require that a forum with jurisdiction over a controversy be permitted to proceed to a final resolution. See, e.g., African Methodist Episcopal Church v Shoulders, 38 Mich App 210; 196 NW2d 16 (1972). That resolution may derive from a full adversary proceeding on the merits, stipulation by the parties to a determination, or summary resolution where a party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Whatever mode is employed, the purpose is the same — a final resolution of the controversy.

A contrary result would leave the litigants susceptible to multiple commencements and terminations of the same proceedings depending upon the vagaries of an opponent inclined to frustrate final resolution of the case. The adverse consequences to the administration of justice are evident. Therefore, once an adjudicatory proceeding has properly commenced, the forum must be permitted to render an ultimate resolution.

In the case under review, the proceedings were commenced by plaintiff to determine his disputed right to compensation payments from defendant. Defendant cannot, by an agreement to pay com[95]*95pensation, divest the referee of authority to render a final order settling the rights of the parties.

Reversed, and the order of the referee is reinstated. Costs to plaintiff.

D. C. Riley, P. J., concurred.

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Bashara, J.

The pertinent facts of this case are delineated in Judge Mahinske’s concurring opinion. We conclude that procedural policy mandates reversal of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board determination and reinstatement of the referee’s order.

[94]*94Whether a dispute or controversy persists after an employer agrees to make voluntary payments, is an issue that exceeds the scope of inquiry required for the resolution of this case. A dispute or controversy within the meaning of MCLA 418.847; MSA 17.237(847) is a jurisdictional element. Its existence at the time a claim is properly filed with the Workmen’s Compensation Bureau vests the bureau with jurisdiction over the claim. That jurisdiction cannot be unilaterally divested by either party to the dispute.

Policy considerations congruent to those underlying the restrictions upon voluntary dismissals embodied in GCR 1963, 504.1, require that a forum with jurisdiction over a controversy be permitted to proceed to a final resolution. See, e.g., African Methodist Episcopal Church v Shoulders, 38 Mich App 210; 196 NW2d 16 (1972). That resolution may derive from a full adversary proceeding on the merits, stipulation by the parties to a determination, or summary resolution where a party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Whatever mode is employed, the purpose is the same — a final resolution of the controversy.

A contrary result would leave the litigants susceptible to multiple commencements and terminations of the same proceedings depending upon the vagaries of an opponent inclined to frustrate final resolution of the case. The adverse consequences to the administration of justice are evident. Therefore, once an adjudicatory proceeding has properly commenced, the forum must be permitted to render an ultimate resolution.

In the case under review, the proceedings were commenced by plaintiff to determine his disputed right to compensation payments from defendant. Defendant cannot, by an agreement to pay com[95]*95pensation, divest the referee of authority to render a final order settling the rights of the parties.

Reversed, and the order of the referee is reinstated. Costs to plaintiff.

D. C. Riley, P. J., concurred.

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Bluebook (online)

265 N.W.2d 53, 81 Mich. App. 91, 1978 Mich. App. LEXIS 2112, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-great-atlantic-pacific-tea-co-michctapp-1978.

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