1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 HENRY D. ADAMS, 4 Case No. 19-cv-02977-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 6 FBI SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE 7 SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS, 8 Defendant.
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 11 against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) San Francisco Field Office supervisor and 12 agents. Plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in a separate written 13 Order. 14 For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and 15 fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the complaint is not cognizable 16 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is DISMISSED. 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se 24 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 25 Cir. 1988). 26 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 27 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the 1 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The first step in raising a section 1983 claim is therefore to identify the 2 specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). To 3 satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually named defendants 4 caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the complaint. See Arnold v. 5 IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A claim that is totally incomprehensible may be 6 dismissed as frivolous as it is without an arguable basis in law. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 7 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989). 8 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 9 Plaintiff has filed a section 1983 complaint in which he names as Defendants FBI San 10 Francisco Field Office supervisor and agents alleging a violation of his due process rights. See 11 Dkt. 1 at 2.1 12 As mentioned above, a prerequisite to recovery under section 1983 is that the plaintiff 13 prove that the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the 14 United States. West, 487 U.S. at 48; see also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980); 15 Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, Plaintiff does not allege the 16 deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The basis of 17 Plaintiff’s complaint arises out of Defendants’ collective failure to investigate to his numerous 18 grievances of alleged corruption and mistreatment by various law enforcement entities while in 19 custody. Dkt. 1 at 4-8. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that, between the dates of May 2017 and 20 May 14, 2019, he wrote the San Francisco FBI Field Office over thirty letters explaining that: 21 (1) Contra Costa County medical staff gave him the wrong medication while in custody at the 22 Martinez Detention Facility in retaliation for his refusal to take a plea deal and to cooperate with 23 an ongoing investigation; (2) he was targeted by the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department 24 and the Richmond Police Department, as well as a victim of assault by these agencies; (3) these 25 same law enforcement agencies, along with Contra Costa County Deputy District Attorney Kabu 26 Adodojaji and Public Defenders Julian Ross and Zack Linowitz, had Plaintiff illegally sentenced 27 1 to 24 years in prison by participating in such illegal activities as falsifying documents in his arrest 2 records and tampering with and hiding evidence; (4) Plaintiff was threatened by numerous 3 deputies at the county jail to take a plea deal for his conviction offense; (5) while in custody, 4 associates of the aforementioned investigating agencies opened up numerous credit lines in 5 Plaintiff’s name and property left to him by a deceased relative was stolen; (6) Plaintiff was denied 6 serious medical attention for long periods of time and placed around informants while 7 incarcerated; and (7) multiple law enforcement agencies have engaged in a large amount of 8 criminal activity in an attempt to frame Plaintiff for crimes he did not commit. Id. at 3–6. In sum, 9 Plaintiff alleges that the FBI San Francisco Field Office supervisor’s and agents’ failure to 10 investigate these grievances constitutes a violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 Id. at 6, 8. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “release[] from this current false imprisonment 12 [and] illegal sentence.” Id. at 3. 13 However, “[t]here is . . . no constitutional right to an investigation by government 14 officials.” Stone v. Department of Investigation of New York, 1992 WL 25202 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 15 1992) (citing Gomez, 757 F.2d at 1006); see also Chapman v. Musich, 726 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 16 1984). There is “no instance where the courts have recognized inadequate investigation as 17 sufficient to state a civil rights claim unless there was another recognized constitutional right 18 involved.” Gomez, 757 F.2d at 1006. Thus, the Court finds that in the instant matter, Plaintiff’s 19 allegations—that the aforementioned Defendants were under an obligation to investigate his 20 grievances—fail to state a cognizable claim. 21 A claim is frivolous if it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or is clearly 22 lacking any factual basis. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Although a 23 complaint is not “frivolous” within the meaning of sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2) because it fails 24 to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 331, 25 failure to state a claim is a separate basis for dismissal under sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2). A 26 dismissal as legally frivolous is proper only if the legal theory lacks an arguable basis, while under 27 Rule 12(b)(6) a court may dismiss a claim on a dispositive issue of law without regard to whether 1 Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2) accord judges the unusual power to pierce the veil of the 2 complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss as frivolous those claims whose factual contentions are 3 clearly baseless. See Denton v.
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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 HENRY D. ADAMS, 4 Case No. 19-cv-02977-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 5 ORDER OF DISMISSAL v. 6 FBI SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE 7 SUPERVISOR AND AGENTS, 8 Defendant.
9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 11 against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) San Francisco Field Office supervisor and 12 agents. Plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in a separate written 13 Order. 14 For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous and 15 fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, the complaint is not cognizable 16 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and is DISMISSED. 17 II. DISCUSSION 18 A. Standard of Review 19 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 22 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 23 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se 24 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 25 Cir. 1988). 26 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 27 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the 1 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The first step in raising a section 1983 claim is therefore to identify the 2 specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). To 3 satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts showing how individually named defendants 4 caused, or personally participated in causing, the harm alleged in the complaint. See Arnold v. 5 IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). A claim that is totally incomprehensible may be 6 dismissed as frivolous as it is without an arguable basis in law. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 7 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989). 8 B. Plaintiff’s Claims 9 Plaintiff has filed a section 1983 complaint in which he names as Defendants FBI San 10 Francisco Field Office supervisor and agents alleging a violation of his due process rights. See 11 Dkt. 1 at 2.1 12 As mentioned above, a prerequisite to recovery under section 1983 is that the plaintiff 13 prove that the defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the 14 United States. West, 487 U.S. at 48; see also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980); 15 Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, Plaintiff does not allege the 16 deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The basis of 17 Plaintiff’s complaint arises out of Defendants’ collective failure to investigate to his numerous 18 grievances of alleged corruption and mistreatment by various law enforcement entities while in 19 custody. Dkt. 1 at 4-8. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that, between the dates of May 2017 and 20 May 14, 2019, he wrote the San Francisco FBI Field Office over thirty letters explaining that: 21 (1) Contra Costa County medical staff gave him the wrong medication while in custody at the 22 Martinez Detention Facility in retaliation for his refusal to take a plea deal and to cooperate with 23 an ongoing investigation; (2) he was targeted by the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Department 24 and the Richmond Police Department, as well as a victim of assault by these agencies; (3) these 25 same law enforcement agencies, along with Contra Costa County Deputy District Attorney Kabu 26 Adodojaji and Public Defenders Julian Ross and Zack Linowitz, had Plaintiff illegally sentenced 27 1 to 24 years in prison by participating in such illegal activities as falsifying documents in his arrest 2 records and tampering with and hiding evidence; (4) Plaintiff was threatened by numerous 3 deputies at the county jail to take a plea deal for his conviction offense; (5) while in custody, 4 associates of the aforementioned investigating agencies opened up numerous credit lines in 5 Plaintiff’s name and property left to him by a deceased relative was stolen; (6) Plaintiff was denied 6 serious medical attention for long periods of time and placed around informants while 7 incarcerated; and (7) multiple law enforcement agencies have engaged in a large amount of 8 criminal activity in an attempt to frame Plaintiff for crimes he did not commit. Id. at 3–6. In sum, 9 Plaintiff alleges that the FBI San Francisco Field Office supervisor’s and agents’ failure to 10 investigate these grievances constitutes a violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 Id. at 6, 8. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “release[] from this current false imprisonment 12 [and] illegal sentence.” Id. at 3. 13 However, “[t]here is . . . no constitutional right to an investigation by government 14 officials.” Stone v. Department of Investigation of New York, 1992 WL 25202 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 15 1992) (citing Gomez, 757 F.2d at 1006); see also Chapman v. Musich, 726 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 16 1984). There is “no instance where the courts have recognized inadequate investigation as 17 sufficient to state a civil rights claim unless there was another recognized constitutional right 18 involved.” Gomez, 757 F.2d at 1006. Thus, the Court finds that in the instant matter, Plaintiff’s 19 allegations—that the aforementioned Defendants were under an obligation to investigate his 20 grievances—fail to state a cognizable claim. 21 A claim is frivolous if it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or is clearly 22 lacking any factual basis. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Although a 23 complaint is not “frivolous” within the meaning of sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2) because it fails 24 to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 331, 25 failure to state a claim is a separate basis for dismissal under sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2). A 26 dismissal as legally frivolous is proper only if the legal theory lacks an arguable basis, while under 27 Rule 12(b)(6) a court may dismiss a claim on a dispositive issue of law without regard to whether 1 Sections 1915A and 1915(e)(2) accord judges the unusual power to pierce the veil of the 2 complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss as frivolous those claims whose factual contentions are 3 clearly baseless. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Examples are claims 4 describing fantastic or delusional scenarios with which federal district judges are all too familiar. 5 See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328. To pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations means that a 6 court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to 7 accept without question the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. But, 8 this initial assessment of the plaintiff’s factual allegations must be weighted in favor of the 9 plaintiff. See id. A frivolousness determination cannot serve as a factfinding process for the 10 resolution of disputed facts. See id. A finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the 11 facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are 12 judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them. See id. at 32–33. But the complaint may 13 not be dismissed simply because the court finds the plaintiff’s allegations unlikely or improbable. 14 See id. at 33. 15 Even applying the liberal interpretation standard afforded to pro se litigants, the Court 16 finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are presented in a conclusory manner, with no factual support 17 given to substantiate the allegations, and that the claims are legally frivolous within the meaning 18 of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Nietzke, 490 U.S. at 327. In any event, Plaintiff cannot sue 19 Defendants based on a conclusory allegation of their failure to investigate. Moreover, Plaintiff has 20 failed to allege facts demonstrating each individual’s personal involvement in a constitutional 21 violation. See Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), 22 abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). To warrant relief under 23 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must show that Defendants’ acts or omissions, under color of state 24 authority, caused the deprivation of his constitutionally protected rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 25 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1993); Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991). “A person 26 deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 27 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is 1 must be an actual causal connection or link between the actions of each Defendant and the 2 || deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 3 658, 691-692 (1978) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 432 U.S. 362, 370-71(1976)). Here, no such link 4 exists because the basis of Plaintiff's complaint, as discussed above, arises out of Defendants’ 5 collective failure to investigate his grievances, which Defendants were not legally required to do. 6 Wl. CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons outlined above, the complaint is DISMISSED as frivolous and failing to 8 state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and therefore, it is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. 9 § 1983. Further, this Court CERTIFIES that any IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken 10 “in good faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 11 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted 12 || to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous). 13 The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all pending motions and close the file. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 Dated: October 31, 2019 16 Lpent Haptelflcc,— VONNE GONZALEZ ROGER 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28