MlKELL, Judge.
These appeals arise out of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to numerous defendants, all of whom were sued in connection with the false arrests of Brenda Adams and Sharon Elliott (“appellants”) at the North Georgia Premium Outlet Mall (the “Mall”) in Dawson County. In their complaint, Adams and Elliott alleged several causes of action, including, but not limited to, false arrest, [778]*778false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, and tortious misconduct, and they sought punitive damages in connection therewith. In Case No. A05A1836, the appellees are Corporal P. Chase Johns, individually and in his official capacity, Investigator William Miller, individually and in his official capacity, and Billy Carlisle, in his official capacity as Dawson County Sheriff. In Case No. A05A1837, Le Gourmet Chef (“LGC”) and its employees, Glenda K. Evans and Gabriel Blackburn, are the named appellees. Finally, in Case No. A05A1838, the appellees are CPG Partners, L.P, d/b/a North Georgia Premium Outlet Mall (“CPG”) and its security guards, Jerry M. (“Bobby”) Wallace and Michael D. Grayson. We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Johns, Miller, and Carlisle in Case No. A05A1836. In Case No. A05A1837, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Blackburn as to all of appellants’ claims and to LGC and Evans on appellants’ claims of negligence, slander, tortious misconduct, and punitive damages but reverse as to appellants’ claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution as to LGC and Evans. Finally, in Case No. A05A1838, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Wallace as to all of appellants’ claims and to CPG and Grayson on appellants’ claims of negligence but reverse on appellants’ false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages claims as to CPG and Grayson.
To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA§ 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA§ 9-11-56 (c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of the plaintiffs case Our review of an appeal from summary judgment is de novo.1
Viewed most favorably to Adams and Elliott, the record shows that appellants were shopping at LGC (appellee in Case No. A05A1837) at the Mall on March 3, 2002, when Elliott used a $20 bill to pay for [779]*779some items. Evans (also an appellee in Case No. A05A1837), who was a cashier at LGC on the day in question, deposed that she was required to mark all $20, $50, and $100 bills with a counterfeit detection pen; that Elliott’s $20 bill looked suspicious; that she marked the bill with the pen and based upon the color of the mark on the bill, which was either black or dark brown, she concluded that it was counterfeit; and that she told Elliott that she could not accept the bill because it was counterfeit. Elliott then gave her another bill, which Evans also marked and determined was counterfeit. Elliott then summoned the store manager, Blackburn (also an appellee in Case No. A05A1837).
Blackburn deposed that he was not sure that the money was counterfeit so he asked Elliott for her name and address and informed her that he would keep the merchandise and the money and would mail the items to her if the bank verified that the bills were authentic. In his statement to police, however, Blackburn stated that he told Elliott that the bill appeared to be counterfeit and that the store could not accept it; that his suspicions were based upon the fact that the pen’s mark on the bill turned brown; and that Elliott insisted that the bills were authentic.
Elliott deposed that Blackburn informed her that he would have to take the money to the bank to verify its authenticity; that she told him that the money was not counterfeit but gave him her name and phone number to contact her after going to the bank so that she could return to pick up her money; and that she and Adams left the store without objection from Blackburn or Evans. Elliott further deposed that she and Adams continued to shop until they noticed security guards following them. Once Adams and Elliott reached their car, the security guards and the police approached them.
Evans testified that after the appellants left the store, she called the Mali’s security personnel, pursuant to Blackburn’s instructions, and advised them that the women were passing counterfeit bills. Security guards Grayson and Wallace (appellees in Case No. A05A1838) responded to the call, and Evans pointed out the two women to them. Grayson told Evans to call the police, followed the women, and told Wallace to go to the food court to wait on the police. When the sheriff s deputy arrived, Grayson pointed to the car that Adams and Elliott were entering, and Corporal Chase Johns (appellee in Case No. A05A1836) pulled up behind the car. A video camera in Corporal Johns’s car recorded the entire incident.
The transcript of the ensuing conversation shows that after Corporal Johns asks Adams and Elliott for their identification, he asks who has the money, and Elliott replies that she does. Elliott explains that the bills are old and had belonged to her 86-year-old father-in-law; and she gives the officer her remaining $20 bills. [780]*780Grayson then interjects: “I’m having the woman from Gourmet Chef meet us at the information booth. She’s got the counterfeit pencil and the other bills.”2 Corporal Johns responds, “Man, I hate this because I’m not an expert at this” then explains to Adams and Elliott that he has to investigate the matter. Corporal Johns radios the investigator on call, Miller (also an appellee in Case No. A05A1836), reports to him that there are “different sizes between the ink line and the edge of the paper,” repeats that he is not an expert on counterfeit bills, then reiterates that his only concern is that the bill is offset. Miller advises Johns to arrest Elliott. By this time, Evans is at the scene.
Johns states to Miller: “Okay. Just go on what I’ve said, on the size?” Johns then inquires as to whether anyone present has a $20 bill, and Grayson replies that he does. Miller instructs Johns to gather all of the bills, then Johns asks Miller if he can use one of the markers to check the bills. At that point, Evans interjects to instruct Johns on how the pen works. Grayson suggests that Johns use the pen on one of Grayson’s bills and then asks Johns if he sees the difference. Miller asks who kept the marker. Johns then tells him that Evans is with them outside and that she wrote on the security guard’s bills and the mark was yellow, and then on Elliott’s bills, and the mark was brown. Miller then says, “What does that mean, the brown is counterfeit?” and then tells Johns that he has probable cause to arrest Elliott for forgery. Miller also advises Johns to ask Adams to consent to a search of her purse.
Before Johns arrests Elliott, however, Evans continues to talk to Johns, telling him that the colors on the bills appear funny. Evans then calls Grayson over to where she is talking to Johns and the following conversation ensues:
CORPORAL JOHNS: [S]ee it’s offset on the printing and everything.
MS. EVANS: Uh-huh.
CORPORAL JOHNS: Tell Mike—Mike, let me see your wad of money, Mike.
MS. EVANS: Look at the dates on them. All right. These are
CORPORAL JOHNS: Give me any bills, just any two or three bills, just don’t — separate which ones are which.
MS. EVANS: All right. These are the ones she gave me. CORPORAL JOHNS: Okay. Yeah, they’re all identical, every one of them you gave me.
[781]*781MS. EVANS: Right. How many twenty-dollar bills will you find with the 1950 dates on them?
CORPORAL JOHNS: Well, see, she said he’s been saving them but — okay.
MS. EVANS: Damn, Chase . . .
CORPORAL JOHNS: Well, I’m just trying to make sure I got all my ducks in a row.
MS. EVANS: Well, I understand that.
Johns asks Evans and Blackburn to give him written statements about the incident and then places Elliott under arrest.
Corporal Johns asks Adams to look at the bills in her wallet, and she consents.
Johns then sends Wallace, the other security guard, into the store to get a detection pen from Evans, who had left the scene by that time. Johns reports to an unidentified officer that Adams’s money also appears to be counterfeit based on the color of ink from the pen and that it does not feel right, is not square, and has a strange watermark. He then radios Miller and asks him to come to the scene.
When Miller arrives, he looks at the bills and says “they’re bogus as hell.” Miller also searches Adams’s purse and finds prescription medications that were not contained in their original containers. Adams and Elliott were charged with forgery, and Adams was also charged with violating OCGA § 16-13-75, which requires that prescription drugs be kept in their original containers.
On April 24,2002, Captain Steven Hawk, the evidence custodian and expert on counterfeit bills for the Dawson County Sheriff s Office, inspected the bills for their authenticity and found that the bills were genuine. Consequently, all of the charges against Adams and Elliott were dropped on September 13, 2002.
Case No. A05A1836
The trial court granted summary judgment to Carlisle, Johns, and Miller on appellants’ federal claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest, and failure to train and supervise as well as their state claims for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest. The trial court also found that the claims against the officers in their individual and official capacities were barred by the doctrines of qualified and official immunity, respectively. On appeal, however, appellants assert only two enumerations of error: (1) they were arrested without probable cause; and (2) the trial court failed to consider Sheriff Carlisle’s failure to train his deputies in its probable [782]*782cause analysis, which, from the content of appellants’ brief, appear to relate to their state claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment.
1. Appellants argue that they were arrested without probable cause. For the reasons stated below, we disagree.
The focus in a probable cause inquiry is “ ‘whether the facts as they appeared at the time of instituting the prosecution were such as to lead a person of ordinary caution to entertain a belief that the accused was guilty of the offense charged.’ ” In other words, the question is, not whether plaintiff was guilty, but whether defendants had reasonable cause to so believe — whether the circumstances were such as to create in the mind of defendants a reasonable belief that there was probable cause for the arrest and prosecution. Probable cause is defined to be the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was arrested and prosecuted.3
“Conversely, lack of probable cause shall exist when the circumstances are such as to satisfy a reasonable man that the accuser had no ground for proceeding but his desire to injure the accused.”4 Though a jury ordinarily decides whether probable cause exists in malicious prosecution actions, a judge may determine the issue when the material facts are undisputed.5 Here, the material facts as to the determination of probable cause are undisputed.
In accordance with the standard set forth above in McNeely v. Home Depot,6 the officers had reasonable cause to believe that there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute the appellants based on the facts as they appeared at the time of the institution of the prosecution against them. The officers did not rely solely upon the results of the pen test. Johns and Miller both deposed that they had received some on-the-job training on the detection of counterfeit bills. Miller stated that he was aware that the color of the mark made on a suspected bill by a counterfeit pen was an indication of the bill’s [783]*783authenticity, but that he was also concerned that the bill was counterfeit because the layout was not centered and the bills had a funny color. On the videotape, Johns repeatedly voiced his concern that the bill was not centered, which was one of the things he had been trained to consider when attempting to detect counterfeit currency. There was also evidence that Johns and Miller had been advised by investigators from the Dawson County Sheriffs Department that counterfeit currency was being passed in the county, frequently at the Mall.
The appellants focus on the fact that neither Johns nor Miller knew that the drimark pens did not work on bills older than 1959, as evidence of a lack of probable cause. However, we do not find this fact particularly pertinent to our analysis as it, standing alone, does not rule out the possibility that the bills appeared counterfeit. In other words, a savvy counterfeiter could present bills that predated 1959 to a retailer and use this argument to his or her benefit to explain the color of the mark produced by the pen.
Regarding the charge against Adams for possessing prescription medications that were not in their original containers, Adams consented to the search, and consent eliminates the need for a finding of probable cause.7 Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion as a matter of law that probable cause for the arrest existed at the time of the incident and its consequent decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Carlisle, Johns, and Miller.8
2. Appellants also argue that the trial court failed to consider Carlisle’s failure to train his deputies as a part of its probable cause analysis. As stated earlier, in these instances, the probable cause determination depends upon the facts as they existed at the initiation of the prosecution.9 In light of the finding in Division 1 that probable cause existed to make the arrest, the issue of whether the officers were properly trained on the detection of counterfeit bills is rendered moot.
In sum, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to the appellees on plaintiff s’claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
[784]*784
Case No. A05A1837
The trial court granted summary judgment to LGC, Evans, and Blackburn (collectively referred to herein as the “LGC Defendants”) on plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious misconduct, conversion, and punitive damages. We reverse as to all claims except negligence, slander, tortious misconduct, and conversion.
3. Appellants argue that summary judgment is inappropriate on their claims for negligence, false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution because there is evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact, specifically, the impact of Evans’s exhortations on the officers’ decision to make an arrest. We note, at the outset, that appellants present no evidence that Blackburn did or said anything to directly or indirectly urge the officers to prosecute the appellants. Therefore, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment to Blackburn on appellants’ claims. However, with regard to Evans, and by virtue of vicarious liability, LGC, we agree with appellants that summary judgment was inappropriate on these claims.
(a) “Although similar, the elements that must be proved for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, and the circumstances which give rise to each, vary to some degree.”10 “In each case, the law draws a fine line of demarcation between cases where a party directly or indirectly urges a law enforcement official to begin criminal proceedings and cases where a party merely relays facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to arrest or prosecute.”11 “In the former case there is potential liability...; in the latter case there is not. It is clear, though, that initiation of the criminal action need not be expressly directed by the party to be held liable.”12
In this case, the trial court concluded that the officers’ decision to arrest was based on their independent investigation. In support of its conclusion, the trial court pointed to the officers’ sworn testimony that their decisions to arrest were made independently.13 In Jacobs v. [785]*785Shaw,14 we held that these causes of action “may successfully be defended by an uncontroverted affidavit of the arresting officer that the decision to arrest plaintiff was made solely by him in the exercise of his professional judgment and independently of any exhortations hy the defendants.”15 However, this case is distinguishable on two fronts. First, the arresting officers in this case are parties to the case, not disinterested witnesses. Therefore, their deposition testimony that the arrest was based solely upon their professional judgment constitutes a mere statement of self-serving opinion and a legal conclusion that cannot support the grant of summary judgment.16 “[W]e must give full weight to the rule that a jury, not a judge, may construe the facts upon which such opinion is based and reach a diametrically different conclusion to that reached by the witness.... Thus, on opinion evidence alone, a summary judgment is not demanded as a matter of law.”17
Second, even if the officers were not parties, their sworn testimony here is controverted by conversations among the parties during the investigation at the scene of the incident, which were captured on the videotape. At one point during the videotape, Evans calls Grayson over to where she’s talking to Johns and the following conversation ensues:
CORPORAL JOHNS: [S]ee it’s offset on the printing and everything.
MS. EVANS: Uh-huh.
CORPORAL JOHNS: Tell Mike—Mike, let me seeyourwad of money, Mike.
MS. EVANS: Look at the dates on them. All right. These are
CORPORAL JOHNS: Give me any bills, just any two or three bills, just don’t — separate which ones are which.
MS. EVANS: All right. These are the ones she gave me.
CORPORAL JOHNS: Okay. Yeah, they’re all identical, every one of them you gave me.
MS. EVANS: Right. How many twenty-dollar bills will you [786]*786find with the 1950 dates on them?
CORPORAL JOHNS: Well, see, she said he’s been saving them but •— okay.
MS. EVANS: Damn, Chase . . .
CORPORAL JOHNS: Well, I’m just trying to make sure I got all my ducks in a row.
MS. EVANS: Well, I understand that.
A jury could conclude from this exchange that Evans’s comments went beyond merely relaying the facts to the officers and that her intent was to challenge or question any inclination that Johns may have had to believe Elliott’s explanation as to how she came to be in possession of the bills. Accordingly, we agree with appellants that this evidence creates a genuine issue of fact as to Evans, and consequently LGC’s, liability for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.18
In his dissent, Judge Andrews concludes that the same probable cause for the arrest and prosecution that entitled the police officer defendants to summary judgment on the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, also entitles Evans and LGC as well as Grayson and CPG (appellees in Case No. A05A1838) to summary judgment on those claims. We disagree.19
For the purpose of assessing probable cause, Evans and Gray-son’s involvement in the arrest of the plaintiffs can be analogized to a citizen’s arrest. At common law, when a felony actually had been committed, a private person was authorized to arrest the person whom he reasonably believed committed the felony, and could arrest for a misdemeanor if it was committed in his presence and involved a breach of the peace.20 Nonetheless, the private person’s authority to arrest was more limited than an officer’s.21 “If called upon to justify his act, some courts [found] that [the private person] must show that the felony had actually been committed, and that he had reasonable grounds for believing the person arrested to be guilty; while other [787]*787courts have gone further, and held that he must show that the person arrested was actually guilty.”22 In other words, the private citizen who made an arrest was strictly liable for the arrestee’s damages if the arrestee was innocent.23 Therefore, the distinction between the privileges afforded a police officer as opposed to a citizen in this regard pertained to the personal liability in the event of a false arrest.24 The officer could not be sued personally if it were later determined, as in this case, that there had been in actuality no probable cause.
In view of the wide divergence between the two special concurrences, we leave it to the commentators to decide whether Georgia law has approached, or should approach, probable cause differently when analyzing whether an officer had probable cause to interfere with a subject’s liberty, or whether a citizen had the right to remain secure in his home and papers, or whether an officer should be sued after making a good faith arrest based on apparent probable cause, or whether one citizen can vindicate his rights against another citizen after an unjust arrest. In any event, based on Georgia case law, it is for a jury to decide in the present instance whether Evans, LGC, Grayson, and CPG may be liable.25
(b) Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the LGC defendants on their negligence claim because “factual disputes remain regarding probable cause.” As discussed in Case No. A05A1836, we find no error in the trial court’s [788]*788conclusion that at the time the prosecution was instituted, the facts could have led a reasonable person to believe that probable cause existed to arrest the appellants for passing counterfeit bills. This finding applies to the LGC defendants as well. Thus, this argument fails.
Appellants also argue that their negligence claim should have survived summary judgment because the LGC defendants failed to abide by their promise to verify the authenticity of the bills at the bank on the next business day. But appellants have not established that the LGC defendants had a duty to do so. “In the analysis of a negligence action, the plaintiff must show a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.”26 As appellants have failed to establish any of these elements, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on their negligence claim.
4. Appellants argue that the trial court erroneously concluded that Evans’s and Blackburn’s statements were not slanderous and were nonetheless privileged because they were made in good faith in compliance with a law enforcement investigation. We find no error.
Pursuant to OCGA § 51-5-4, a person slanders another when he imputes to him a crime punishable by law; charges him with having some contagious disorder or with being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from society; makes charges against the person in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure the person in those areas; or utters any disparaging words productive of special damage which flows naturally from the statement. In order to recover for slander, however, appellants must also show the publication of the alleged statement to another,27 which appellants in the case sub judice fail to establish.
Appellants argue that Evans told Elliott that the bills were counterfeit in the presence of other individuals in the store, but Elliott’s own testimony belies this argument. Elliott deposed that Evans marked the bills and then repeatedly yelled for the manager, but that Evans did not yell that the money was counterfeit; that after Blackburn appeared, Evans continued to talk loudly but that Elliott did not know what Evans said; and that Blackburn handled the situation in a courteous manner. Appellants presented no evidence that the LGC defendants actually accused them of committing a crime. Therefore, pretermitting whether there was a publication of the statements, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the statements made in the store were not slanderous.
[789]*789Regarding the statements made to initiate the prosecution of appellants, we have held that
statements made in good faith pursuant to investigation by police or other officers authorized to investigate crime or criminal activity are made in the performance of a public duty and are privileged. OCGA§ 51-5-7 (1). If such were not the case these officers would find it virtually impossible to ferret out the facts and prosecute those who have violated the criminal laws. It is difficult at best, but the law does not put roadblocks before those who may have information and prevent the communication of it to the officers. Indeed, it is made the duty of one having such information to report it to those in authority.28
“To make the defense of privilege complete, in an action of slander or libel, good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement properly limited in its scope, a proper occasion, and publication to proper persons must all appear.”29 Based on the record, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the statements made, even if slanderous, were privileged.30
5. The trial court also granted summary judgment on appellants’ tortious misconduct claim.
Tortious misconduct is based upon the principle that one who owns a mercantile establishment and sells goods owes a duty to a customer who is lawfully in his store by his implied invitation for the purpose of transacting business, to protect the customer against the use of any unprovoked and unjustifiable opprobrious and insulting and abusive words by a clerk employed by him to deal with customers, tending to humiliate, mortify, and wound the feelings of the customer.31
In light of the testimony discussed in Division 4 as to Elliott’s conversations with Evans and Blackburn as well as the complete lack [790]*790of evidence as to comments either Blackburn or Evans made to Adams, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the LGC defendants on the appellants’ tortious misconduct claim.32
6. Appellants do not enumerate as error the trial court’s ruling that defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ claims for conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Therefore, the trial court’s rulings thereon stand.
In sum, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to appellee Blackburn on all of plaintiff s’ claims. As to appellees Evans and LGC, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, slander, tortious misconduct, negligence, conversion, and punitive damages, but reverse as to the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution.
Case No. A05A1838
The trial court granted summary judgment to CPG, Wallace, and Grayson (collectively referred to herein as the “CPG defendants”) on appellants’ claims for negligence, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Appellants abandoned their slander claim against these defendants at oral argument on the motion for summary judgment.
7. Relying on Melton v. LaCalamito,33 a malicious prosecution and false imprisonment case, appellants argue that the CPG defendants are civilly liable to them because Grayson told Evans to call the police without investigating the incident. Melton, however, does not support the appellants’ position. There, the defendant, an owner and operator of a U-Haul Company, contacted the police after accusing the plaintiff of illegally possessing U-Haul furniture pads. After the defendant engaged in a 30 to 40-minute discussion with the police wherein he insisted on the surrender of the pads, the police arrested the plaintiff.34 The case was tried and the jury found in favor of the [791]*791plaintiff.35 Affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim, we found that “the jury was authorized to conclude that [the defendant’s] insistence that the pads were U-Haul property was the determining factor leading to appellee’s arrest and prosecution,”36 not the fact that the defendant called the police.
Although Grayson’s instruction to Evans to call the police does not render the CPG defendants liable to appellants, Grayson’s subsequent conduct constitutes evidence from which a jury could conclude that Grayson, and consequently, CPG, are liable for malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment. The following colloquy occurred at the scene after Johns attempted to explain to Elliott that he needed to investigate the matter.
GRAYSON: Chase?
CORPORAL JOHNS: Yeah, yeah.
GRAYSON: She took the three bills and marked — she took two bills and marked them. She said I can’t accept these, they’re coming up as counterfeit— She said, I can’t give you these bills because they’re — and she just walked away. Now that’s kind of suspicious. I don’t think if I gave somebody 60 bucks in cash I’d just walk out without saying there’s a problem.
CORPORAL JOHNS: Yeah.
GRAYSON: I didn’t realize — I don’t know if she told you that. That’s something I just heard and that sounds awfully odd to me.
The evidence of record does not comport with Grayson’s statement that Elliott gave Evans $60, then made the statement that Grayson attributed to her and exited the store. Instead, the record shows that Grayson was called to the scene after the women left the store and that Evans told him that the women passed counterfeit bills and pointed them out to him. Additionally, both Evans and Blackburn deposed that after the exchange of the bills, Elliott gave them her name and address, as opposed to immediately fleeing the store, as arguably insinuated by Grayson. Also evidenced on the videotape are statements made by Grayson in which he points out factors that he believed were relevant in the determination of whether the money was counterfeit.
[792]*792As stated earlier, in cases involving false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, the law draws a fine distinction between occasions wherein a party directly or indirectly urges law enforcement officials to begin criminal proceedings, which result in potential liability, and incidents wherein a party merely relays facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to arrest, which does not result in liability.37 Based on Grayson’s conversations with Johns during Johns’s investigation, the jury could conclude that Grayson communicated facts to Johns which were false or misleading, with the intent to influence Johns to prosecute.38 Accordingly, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to CPG and Grayson is reversed. As appellants have presented no evidence from which a jury could determine that Wallace directly or indirectly urged their arrest, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Wallace on these claims is affirmed.
8. Appellants argue that Grayson’s conduct of interjecting himself into the investigation constituted a wanton and reckless disregard for appellants’ rights, which precludes the entry of summary judgment on their claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages. “To recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the [appellants] were required to prove the following elements: (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) which is extreme and outrageous, (3) and caused the emotional distress, (4) which is severe.”39 In our view, a rational and impartial jury could conclude that Grayson relayed misleading or false information to the investigating officer, which constituted reckless conduct of an extreme and outrageous nature and consequently caused Adams and Elliott severe emotional distress. Therefore, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to CPG and Grayson on this claim. Consequently, [793]*793we also reverse the grant of summary judgment to CPG and Grayson on the appellants’ punitive damages claim.
In an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff is not restricted to actual damages but may recover such damages as are authorized under all the circumstances in the case. A jury may award additional damages in a tort action where there are aggravating circumstances, either in the act or the intention. To authorize the imposition of. . . punitive damages ...[,] there must be evidence of wilful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences.40
The same evidence from which a jury could conclude that Grayson’s conduct was extreme and outrageous could cause it to infer that he acted maliciously and with a conscious disregard of the consequences the appellants might suffer.
9. Lastly, appellants maintain that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on their claim for negligence against the CPG defendants. We disagree.
As stated earlier, to sustain a negligence action, “the plaintiff must show a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.”41 Appellants argue that the CPG defendants had a duty to ensure that their patrons were not injured in the course of their lawful business activities and that the CPG defendants breached this duty when they allowed erroneous or inaccurate accusations of criminal activity to injure its patrons. In essence, appellants are indirectly arguing that the CPG defendants are liable in negligence because appellants were arrested. As stated earlier, we find no error in the institution of the criminal proceeding against the appellants. Accordingly, this error fails as well.
In sum, in Case No. A05A1836, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Carlisle, Johns, and Miller on all of plaintiffs’ claims. In Case No. A05A1837, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Blackburn on all of plaintiffs’ claims and reverse as to LGC and Evans only on plaintiffs’ claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment. Finally, in Case No. A05A1838, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Wallace on all of plaintiffs’ claims but reverse as to CPG and Grayson only on plaintiffs’ claims of malicious [794]*794prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages.
In conclusion, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to appellee Wallace on all of plaintiffs’ claims. As to appellees Grayson and CPG, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim of negligence but reverse as to the claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. A0SA1836.
Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., concur. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur in the judgment only.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. A05A1837 as to appellee Blackburn on plaintiffs’ claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, slander, tortious misconduct, conversion, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages.
Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., concur. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., dissent on plaintiffs’ negligence claim and concur in the judgment only as to the remaining claims. Judgment reversed as to appellees Evans and LGC on plaintiff s’ claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur in the judgment only. Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., dissent. Judgment affirmed as to appellees Evans and LGC as to plaintiff s’ claims of slander and tortious misconduct. Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., concur. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur in the judgment only. Judgment affirmed as to appellees Evans and LGC as to plaintiffs’ claims of conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Ruffin, C. J., Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., Blackburn, P. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed in Case No. A0SA1838 as to appellee Wallace on plaintiffs’ claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages.
Ruffin, C. J., Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., Blackburn, P. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed as to appellee Wallace on plaintiffs’ claim of negligence. Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., concur. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur in the judgment only. Judgment reversed as to appellees Grayson and CPG on plaintiffs’ claims of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur. Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., dissent. Judgment affirmed as to appellees Grayson and CPG as to plaintiffs’ claim of negligence. Andrews, P. J., Johnson, P. J., and Blackburn, P. J., concur. Ruffin, C. J., Barnes and Phipps, JJ., concur in the judgment only.