Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedNovember 22, 2019
Docket2:19-cv-07900
StatusUnknown

This text of Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, (C.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:19-CV-07900-RGK Date November 22, 2019 Title Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO

Present: The Honorable R. GARY KLAUSNER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Sharon L. Williams (Not Present) Not Reported N/A Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendant: Not Present Not Present Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion to Remand

I. INTRODUCTION On August 8, 2019, Adam Acosta (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court against District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (“DC36”), Andreas Jung (“Jung”), and Rodney Fowler (“Fowler”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges the following against DC36 only: (1) discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin and ancestry (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a)); (2) failure to remedy and prevent discrimination and harassment (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k)); (3) prohibition of retaliation (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h)); (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (5) breach of contract. Against all Defendants, Plaintiff alleges: (6) prohibition of harassment in employment on the basis of race, color, national origin and ancestry (Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(j)); and (7) violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). Lastly, against Jung and Fowler, Plaintiff alleges conspiracy to interfere with civil rights (42 § 1985(3)). On September 12, 2019, Defendants removed the action to federal court based on federal question. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) removing the only federal claim, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges the following facts: Plaintiff was the Assistant Executive Director (“AED”) of District Council 36 at the time of his termination. DC36 1s a regional council of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal

JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:19-CV-07900-RGK Date November 22, 2019 Title Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO Employees that represents 60 local unions and has approximately 25,000 members. Defendant Jung and Fowler are DC36’s president and vice president, respectively. Plaintiff began working for DC36 in 1993 and eventually became the AED on April 1, 2006. As the AED, Plaintiff began receiving disparaging remarks from Defendant Fowler. For example, prior to a board meeting, Fowler told Plaintiff, “there are too many of you,” referring to his Latino race. In that same meeting, while appointing an interim president, Fowler urged the board to vote against Plaintiff— despite Plaintiff's prior experience as acting executive director. Plaintiff lost by one vote, and on the next day Fowler told Plaintiff the appointment was an act of “ethnic cleansing at DC36.” In another instance, at a meeting with fifty-six leaders of local unions, Fowler repeatedly made race-based comments such as DC36 needing a “cultural change.” Two days after the meeting, on August 13, 2018, Plaintiff was abruptly terminated without notice or explanation. Ii. JUDICIAL STANDARD A defendant may remove a case from state court when the federal court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, there are two bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Section 1331 provides federal courts with jurisdiction over actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Section 1332 provides federal courts with jurisdiction over actions that arise between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Following removal from state court, a motion to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be brought “at any time before final judgment” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where no claims remain over which the district court has original jurisdiction. However, this “discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . is informed by the . . . values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri v. Varian Assocs., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997). Additionally, “if the plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the forum, the court should take this behavior into account in determining whether the balance of factors . . . support a remand in the case.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff contends the action should be remanded to state court because the FAC alleges only state claims and the interests of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity favor remand. The Court agrees. A. Balance of Factors

JS-6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. 2:19-CV-07900-RGK Date November 22, 2019 Title Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO “{I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of all factors .. . will pot toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Acri, 114 F.3d at 1001 “It is generally preferable for a district court to remand remaining [supplemental] claims to state court.” Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991). The aforementioned factors greatly weigh towards remanding the case back to state court. This action is in its earliest stage of litigation and the Court has expended minimal resources. Thus, remand would not adversely affect judicial economy. See Horne v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 969 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (declined to retain jurisdiction when the case was in the beginning stages of litigation); Millar v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (N_D. Cal. 2002) (same).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
George Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc.
114 F.3d 999 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)
Millar v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District
236 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. California, 2002)
Hernandez v. City of El Monte
138 F.3d 393 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Perez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
929 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. California, 2013)
Horne v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
969 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. California, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Adam Acosta v. District Council 36 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adam-acosta-v-district-council-36-of-the-american-federation-of-state-cacd-2019.