Adalberto Fiandor-Fuentes v. Warden, Florida Soft Side South, U.S. Attorney General

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

ADALBERTO FIANDOR-

FUENTES, Case No. 2:26-cv-00482-KCD-DNF

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Defendants, /

ORDER Petitioner Adalberto Fiandor-Fuentes is a Cuban citizen who is subject to a final order of removal. (Doc. 3-1 at 7.)1 He was recently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment as interpreted by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 1.) The Government opposes the petition. (Doc. 5.) Petitioner replied. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. I. Background Fiandor-Fuentes entered the United States as a refugee in 1972 and

became a lawful permanent resident. (Doc. 5-1 at 2.) He then served a federal prison sentence in the 1990s (see Doc. 1) and was ordered removed on March 28, 2007. (Doc. 5-1 at 2, 4). When that deportation stalled, he was placed on an order of supervision.2 (Doc. 5-1 at 6.)

Fiandor-Fuentes was placed in immigration custody on November 6, 2025, and served on a Notice of Revocation of Release. (Id. at 2, 4.) A few weeks later, an immigration judge denied his request for bond because of the outstanding removal order. (Id. at 4.) Fiandor-Fuentes received a Notice of

Removal to Mexico on January 11, 2026. (Id. at 15.) A month later, he filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).

2 Fiandor-Fuentes says his supervision started in 2007 (Doc. 1 at 1), but that order is actually dated 2009. (Doc. 5-1 at 6-8.) “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at

*2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025). III. Discussion A. Jurisdiction The analysis begins with a jurisdictional challenge. Respondents argue

that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips this Court of jurisdiction to even hear Fiando- Fuentes’s plea because it arises from the “execution” of a removal order. (Doc. 5 at 3.) We need not spend long here. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that § 1252(g) is narrowly tailored to three discrete actions, and it

does not operate as a blanket ban on habeas review for prolonged detention. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018). Indeed, if the Government’s sweeping interpretation were correct, Zadvydas v. Davis—the seminal case where the Supreme Court held it could consider a habeas

challenge to unlawful, prolonged immigration detention—would have been stopped in its tracks before ever reaching the merits. The Court is satisfied it has jurisdiction to decide whether Fiandor-Fuentes’s detention is lawful. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 683, 688 (2001) (citing § 1252(g) yet concluding “that §

2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention”). Respondents also argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) bars judicial review. (Doc. 5 at 4.) Not so. The Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1252(b)(9) “only

affects cases that involve[] review of an order of removal.” Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2020). Fiandor-Fuentes is not challenging his removal proceedings—he is challenging the antecedent detention. So “the

Government’s reliance on § 1252(b)(9) is misplaced.” Fernandez-Garcia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 1-20-CV-23599-UU, 2021 WL 8821923, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2021). B. Zadvydas

That leaves the merits. The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days

pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to

detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems, the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is

presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v.

Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Applied here, Fiandor-Fuentes cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on November 6, 2025. (Doc. 3-1 at 2, 4.) Because he has been detained for just shy of six months, he remains

within the window in which his detention is presumptively reasonable. Seemingly recognizing this problem, his petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, claiming that his removal to Cuba is not likely. (Doc. 1 at 4.)3 This argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas

period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process

3 The habeas petition is not paginated, so the Court uses the page numbering generated by its electronic filing system. claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enf’t and

Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487- GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than

six months”). Fiandor-Fuentes attempts another workaround. He argues that the six- month reasonable detention period is cumulative, starting when his supervision began back in 2007. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Using that calculus, the six-

month period has long since passed. This argument makes little sense. Zadvydas was aimed at the severe, physical deprivation of liberty that comes from sitting in a jail cell indefinitely. The Court “used the words ‘detain’ and ‘custody’ to refer

exclusively to physical confinement and restraint.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 311. Against that backdrop, it is illogical to run a clock designed to prevent indefinite imprisonment while a person is out living freely in the community. “Because Zadvydas clearly involved detention of a petitioner during the

presumptively reasonable period, it defies common sense to suggest that Zadvydas time can run while a petitioner is not in custody.” Cheng Ke Chen v. Holder, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192 (N.D. Ala. 2011). The six-month clock measures actual lockup, not supervised freedom. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d at 1052 (“[I]n order to state a claim under Zadvydas the alien ... must show

post-removal order detention in excess of six months [and] also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (emphasis added).) Fiandor-Fuentes also seeks to sidestep the six-month requirement by

pointing to an earlier, five-month detention, arguing that the Court should aggregate his past and present stints in ICE custody. (Doc. 12 at 1.) By combining these distinct periods of confinement, Fiandor-Fuentes contends that his total time in civil immigration detention exceeds the six-month

threshold, which he asserts is sufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness and trigger Zadvydas review. District courts are split on whether prior time in ICE custody should be aggregated to satisfy the six-month Zadvydas clock. Some have firmly

rejected this cumulative approach. They reason that if “detentions [are counted] in the aggregate, any subsequent period of detention, even one day, would raise constitutional concerns.” Barrios v. Ripa, No. 1:25-CV-22644, 2025 WL 2280485, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2025). Because the executive

branch is tasked with great deference in effectuating removals, these courts warn that constantly adjudicating the constitutionality of every brief re- detention would improperly obstruct that statutory discretion. Meskini v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., No. 4:14-CV-42 (CDL), 2018 WL 1321576, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2018). Under this view, Zadvydas does not function as a “Get Out of

Jail Free Card that may be redeemed at any time just because an alien was detained too long in the past.” Id.; see also Flores-Reyes v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., No. 26-CV-20226, 2026 WL 406708, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2026). Conversely, other courts have treated the Zadvydas period as

cumulative. Chen v. Holder, No. CV 6:14-2530, 2015 WL 13236635, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015). This approach is driven by the constitutional imperative to prevent the government from indefinitely detaining noncitizens through a loophole of release and re-detention. Krechmar v. Parra, No. 2:25-

CV-01095-SPC-DNF, 2025 WL 3620802, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2025). To consider only the current, isolated period of confinement—ignoring all prior custody—would allow the government to bypass Zadvydas through successive detentions. For these courts, aggregation is the only way to safeguard against

the precise danger of indefinite detention that the Supreme Court sought to prevent. See Rodriguez Romero v. Ladwig, No. CV 25-1106-JWD-EWD, 2026 WL 321437, at *12 (M.D. La. Feb. 6, 2026). This Court declines to endorse a blanket rule that all prior periods of

confinement automatically aggregate to satisfy the Zadvydas six-month clock. Such a categorical approach is practically unworkable and effectively penalizes the government for its past lawful actions. If every prior day spent in immigration custody simply rolled over into the present calculus, the government’s statutory authority to briefly re-detain a noncitizen to finalize a

removal would be severely restricted, if not eliminated entirely. The six- month period established in Zadvydas was designed to provide the government a functional window to negotiate with foreign nations, secure travel documents, and coordinate the complex logistics of deportation. A strict

aggregation rule ignores the reality that diplomatic circumstances evolve. If a foreign government that previously refused repatriation suddenly agrees to issue travel documents, the United States needs a practical opportunity to effectuate that newly viable removal. Mandating an automatic rollover of all

past detention would force the immediate release of a noncitizen even when their current custody is driven by an imminent, foreseeable deportation, ultimately frustrating the core purpose of the removal statute. Instead, the better approach is to afford the government a new six-

month presumptively reasonable period for each discrete detention, unless there are facts suggesting the government is acting with an improper motive. If the record reveals a calculated pattern of catch-and-release designed merely to reset the Zadvydas clock or evade judicial review, aggregation may

be entirely appropriate. But absent evidence of such bad faith or a deliberate strategy of looping confinement, courts should presume that a subsequent detention is a genuine, independent effort to effectuate removal. This standard strikes the appropriate balance. It alleviates constitutional concerns regarding indefinite, cyclical detention by providing a safeguard against

abuse, while simultaneously protecting the government’s legitimate, statutory interest in finalizing deportations when logistical or diplomatic circumstances finally permit. This approach finds support in both Zadvydas’s reasoning, and the

historical foundations of the vehicle Fiandor-Fuentes employs (habeas corpus). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court eschewed a rigid, mechanical formula, focusing instead on whether the length of detention remains “reasonably necessary to secure removal.” 533 U.S. at 699. The Court

explicitly instructed lower courts to measure reasonableness in light of the specific circumstances of the case and the actual likelihood of a future deportation. Id. (“It should measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence at the moment

of removal.”). That directive undermines the logic of a blind, automatic aggregation of prior custody days here. See also Meskini, 2018 WL 1321576, at *3. A flexible standard also aligns with the fundamental principle that

habeas corpus is “at its core, an equitable remedy.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). Because habeas relief is governed by equitable principles, courts are empowered to look beyond a mere mathematical tally to examine the totality of the circumstances. Id.; see also Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 213 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court has long recognized

that habeas corpus [is] . . . governed by equitable principles[.]”). By inquiring into whether the government has engaged in a deliberate cycle of release and re-detention, the court exercises its equitable discretion to prevent gamesmanship, all while preserving the executive branch’s necessary

flexibility to enforce the immigration laws. Applying this standard here, Fiandor-Fuentes’s argument for aggregation falls short. While he points to his prior period of ICE custody, the record is devoid of evidence that immigration officials manipulated his

release and rearrest to bypass the six-month presumption or avoid judicial oversight. Without proof of such tactical maneuvering, this Court treats his present custody as an independent, good-faith endeavor to secure his deportation.

As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. So the executive branch gets a presumptively reasonable six-month runway to do its job, negotiate with

foreign governments, and execute a final removal order. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Because Fiandor-Fuentes remains inside that window, his current custody does not cross the line into the kind of indefinite, arbitrary lockup the Fifth Amendment forbids. Until that clock actually runs out, the Government retains the constitutional authority to hold him.

C. Supervision Record Fiandor-Fuentes also seemingly argues that his clean supervision record precludes ICE from revoking his supervision. (Doc. 1 at 4.) This argument fails. He is subject to a final removal order that stands

uncontested. The INA explicitly authorizes a return to detention to effectuate such orders. Under the rules, ICE may revoke a noncitizen’s release to effectuate removal. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). And the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in doing exactly that—enforcing its laws, ensuring

individuals do not flee, and protecting the public. See Malam v. Adducci, 469 F. Supp. 3d 767, 790 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Here, the Government revoked Fiando-Fuentes’s release specifically to enforce his outstanding removal order, gave him notice that they were doing so, and afforded him an informal

interview. Returning him to custody thus serves a recognized, legitimate government objective and was done in compliance with the INA’s regulations. Fiandor-Fuentes also mentions that he suffers from multiple serious medical conditions for which ICE has failed to provide adequate medical care.

(Doc. 1 at 5.) To the extent this is an argument for habeas relief, it is summarily rejected. Challenges to conditions of confinement are not appropriately raised in the habeas context. See Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a claim

challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of that confinement.”). D. Warrant In passing, Fiandor-Fuentes states that he was taken into custody

without a warrant. (Doc. 1 at 2.) To the extent this raises a due process claim, it is not cognizable under § 2241. A writ of habeas corpus is the remedy for someone seeking release from unlawful confinement. It challenges the fact or duration of detention. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th

Cir. 2006). It is not a catch-all bucket for complaints about police misconduct, past mistreatment, or the conditions of confinement. See Houston v. Pearce, No. 1:21-CV-0582-LMM-CMS, 2021 WL 11718540, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2021). In any event, this Court lacks jurisdiction to address Petitioner’s

arguments about the Government’s decision to arrest and hold him. See Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding no jurisdiction to address detainee’s claims that police “illegally procured an arrest warrant, that the agents illegally arrested him, and that the agents

illegally detained him”); see also Alvarez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 818 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2016). E. Convention Against Torture Finally, Fiandor-Fuentes claims that his removal to Mexico would be

contrary to the United Nations Convention Against Torture due to widespread cartel warfare and instability in the country. (Doc. 12 at 2, 3.) Because there is no evidence that Fiandor-Fuentes raised, let alone exhausted all available administrative remedies on such a claim, 8 U.S.C. §

1252(d) precludes this Court’s consideration. See De La Teja v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1357, 1366 (11th Cir. 2003); Murray v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 853 F. App’x 336, 340 (11th Cir. 2021). Even though Fiandor-Fuentes was provided the opportunity, there is no evidence that he disputed his removal to Mexico before now. On

February 27, 2026, ICE provided him notice that it is attempting to send him to Mexico and that he would be afforded an informal interview, “at which you will be given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for [your] revocation. You may submit any evidence or information you wish to be reviewed in

support of your release.” (Doc. 5-1 at 17.) The informal interview was held that day. (Id. at 16.) At the interview, Fiandor-Fuentes did not provide a written statement or any documents. (Id.) At bottom, Fiandor-Fuentes has failed to seek relief under the Convention Against Torture before an

immigration judge, making the argument “unexhausted and unreviewable” here. Murray, 853 F. App’x at 340; Julce v. Smith, No. CV 18-10163-FDS, 2018 WL 1083734, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2018) (“[S]ection 1252 also provides that ‘a petition for review with an appropriate court of appeals ... shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any ... claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture.”’). IV. Conclusion Fiandor-Fuentes’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a

new petition should his current detention exceed the six-month mark, and he

can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. All other requested relief is DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on April 21, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek os ot United States District Judge