Acton Academy v. Apogee Humbolt LLC, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ACTON ACADEMY, Case No. 25-cv-09688-MMC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. MOTION TO REMAND

10 APOGEE HUMBOLT LLC, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court is plaintiff Acton Academy’s “Motion to Remand to State Court,” 13 14 filed December 5, 2025, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendants Apogee Humbolt 15 LLC, Tim Kennedy, and Matt Beaudreau have filed a single opposition, to which plaintiff 16 has replied. The Court, having read and considered the parties’ respective written 17 submissions, hereby rules as follows. 18 BACKGROUND 19 20 On August 20, 2025, plaintiff filed the instant action against defendants in the 21 Superior Court of California, County of Humboldt (see Doc. No. 1-3), asserting ten state 22 law causes of action (see Doc. No. 1-2 (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 62-156). 23 On November 10, 2025, defendants filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), a 24 “Notice of Removal” predicated on federal question jurisdiction. In particular, defendants 25 assert, plaintiff’s claims fall “squarely within the purview of the Lanham Act,” a federal 26 27 statute. (See Doc. No. 1 at 2:12-16.) the Superior Court of California, County of Humboldt, based on “lack of subject matter 1 2 jurisdiction.” (See Motion at 1:2-3.) 3 LEGAL STANDARD 4 “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an action filed in state court to 5 federal court if the federal court would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the 6 action.” See Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2009). 7 8 District courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 9 laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 10 “A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” See Moore- 11 Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (providing “[i]f at any time 12 before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 13 case shall be remanded”). “The removal statute is strictly construed,” with “any doubt 14 15 about the right of removal requir[ing] resolution in favor of remand,” and “the defendant 16 always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” See Moore-Thomas, 553 17 F.3d. at 1244. 18 DISCUSSION 19 “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the well- 20 21 pleaded complaint rule, which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal 22 question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. See 23 Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 24 quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether the requisite showing has been 25 made, courts apply a two-pronged test, under which, as applicable to the instant removal, 26 “federal jurisdiction extends only to those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint 27 the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of 1 2 federal [trademark] law, in that federal [trademark] law is a necessary element of one of 3 the well-pleaded claims.” See Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1996) 4 (internal quotation and citation omitted; alterations in original). 5 As to the first prong, defendants, citing plaintiff’s allegations of trademark 6 infringement, contend plaintiff “has clearly pled a federal trademark infringement cause of 7 action.” (See Opp. at 9:23-26.) Contrary to defendants’ contention, however, all of 8 plaintiff’s causes of action are, as noted, asserted under state law, not federal law. (See 9 10 Complaint ¶¶ 62-156). In particular, plaintiff alleges six substantive causes of action, 11 namely, “Breach of Written Contract,” “Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 12 Dealing,” “Unfair Competition—Common Law, California Business and Professions Code 13 §§ 17200 et seq.” “Misappropriation of Trade Secrets; Cal. Civ. Code § 3426 et seq.,” 14 “Aiding and Abetting Tortious Conduct,” and “Civil Conspiracy,” with the remaining 15 causes of action asserting claims for relief, namely, “Restitution,” “Preliminary Injunction,” 16 “Permanent Injunction,” and “Declaratory Relief.” In short, “[b]ecause the face of 17 18 [plaintiff’s] complaint does not clearly establish that the Lanham Act creates any of the 19 [ten] claims found in [its] complaint, the first prong of [the above-discussed] test is not 20 met.” See Duncan, 76 F.3d. at 1486. 21 As to the second prong, defendants contend “federal trademark law is necessary 22 for resolving” plaintiff’s claims. (See Opp. at 11:24.) Where, however, a “state-law based 23 theory of relief can be offered for each of the [alleged] causes of action in the 24 25 complaint,…the exercise of removal jurisdiction [is] improper.” See Duncan, 76 F.3d. at 26 1486. Here, plaintiff has alleged a viable state law theory of liability in support of each of 27 its claims. In particular, each of plaintiff’s causes of action is predicated, either expressly 1 also upon misappropriation of “trade secrets,” misappropriation of “confidential and 2 || proprietary materials,”! and/or misappropriation of “goodwill” (see, e.g., Complaint J] 65, 3 68, 77, 81, 86, 91, 92, 95, 103, 114, 117), and, as the Ninth Circuit has noted, “the 4 || plaintiff is the ‘master’ of [its] case,” see Duncan, 76 F.3d. at 1485 (holding where plaintiff “can maintain [its] claims on both state and federal grounds, [it] may ignore the federal 6 question, assert only state claims, and defeat removal’). In sum, defendants having failed 7 3 to show “resolution of a federal trademark law question is essential to each of the

9 alternative [state law] theories,” the second prong of the above-discussed test is not met. 10 || See id. at 1486. 11 CONCLUSION 12 = For the reasons stated above, plaintiff's Motion to Remand is hereby GRANTED, 1 3 and the above-titled action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, O 14 County of Humboldt.

5 1 The Clerk shall close the file.

16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 : Dated: April 27, 2026 : 18 MAXKINE M. CHESNEY United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ' Defendants’ argument that a representative of plaintiff in a different lawsuit “admitted...Acton’s proprietary material is limited to the federal trademarks” (see Opp. at 26 || 7:9-10) is unavailing. See Wayne, 294 F.3d at 1183 (holding “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face” the complaint). Moreover, a 97 || trademark claim can be brought under California law as well as federal law. See Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing “claim 2g || based on the California common law of trademarks’).