Acosta v. Parra Perez

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedFebruary 2, 2021
Docket1:19-cv-01224
StatusUnknown

This text of Acosta v. Parra Perez (Acosta v. Parra Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Acosta v. Parra Perez, (E.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JOSE ACOSTA, Case No. 1:19-cv-01224-AWI-EPG 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND 14 MARIA DEL CARMEN PARRA PEREZ, et al., (ECF No. 45) 15 Defendants. 16

18 Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Jose Acosta’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for leave 19 to file a Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 46.) The motion is unopposed. The Court found 20 the matter suitable for decision without the need for oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) 21 and vacated the hearing on the motion set for November 20, 2020. (Doc. No. 46.) Having 22 considered the motion as well as the record in this case, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend 23 shall be GRANTED. 24 I. BACKGROUND 25 Plaintiff filed this action on September 5, 2019, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and related California law, against Defendants Maria 26 Del Carmen Parra Perez, doing business as Lesly’s Gifts and More (“Perez”), Thu Huynh 27 (“Huynh”), and Ngoc Tran (“Tran,” and collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF. No. 1) Plaintiff filed a 28 1 First Amended Complaint as a matter of course pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 15(a)(1) on October 16, 2019. (ECF No. 6.) At Plaintiff’s request, the Clerk of Court entered 3 default against Nuynh and Tran on June 22, 2020. (ECF Nos. 32, 33.) 4 The Court entered a Scheduling Order on July 7, 2020. (ECF No. 35.) The Scheduling Order, in relevant part, required any amendment to the pleadings to be filed by July 17, 2020. 5 (Id.) The Scheduling Order further set a Mid-Discovery Status Conference for October 20, 2020, 6 before the undersigned. (Id.) 7 On July 16, 2020, Plaintiff and Perez filed a stipulated request to allow Plaintiff leave to 8 file a Second Amended Complaint, which the Court approved by order entered on July 17, 2020. 9 (ECF Nos. 36, 37.) The Clerk of Court again entered default against Nuynh and Tran on June 22, 10 2020, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request. (ECF Nos. 39, 40.) Plaintiff and Perez filed a stipulation of 11 dismissal as to Perez only on August 20, 2020. (ECF Nos. 41, 42.) 12 On October 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a status report indicating that he intended to request 13 leave to amend the complaint because he recently learned that Huynh and Tran, who were the 14 owners of the property that is the subject of Plaintiff’s complaint, had transferred ownership of 15 the property to a newly formed company. (ECF No. 43.) The Court accordingly continued the 16 Mid-Discovery Status Conference set for October 20, 2020, to January 27, 2021. (ECF No. 44.) 17 Plaintiff filed the instant motion on October 20, 2020. (ECF No. 46.) According to the 18 motion, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend in order to name THNBT LLC (“THNBT”) as a defendant. 19 (ECF No. 46-1.) Plaintiff alleges that THNBT is an alter ego of Huynh and Tran and was created 20 during the pendency of this litigation in an attempt to evade collection on a default judgment by 21 transferring ownership of the property at issue from Huynh and Tran to THNBT. (Id.; see also 22 ECF Nos. 45-2, 45-4.) The Declaration of Tanya Moore filed in support of the motion states that 23 Plaintiff and his counsel first learned that the subject property had been transferred to THNBT on October 13, 2020. (ECF No. 45-3.) Plaintiff has attached a copy of the proposed Third Amended 24 Complaint as well as a redline version identifying the proposed changes. (ECF Nos. 45-2, 45-4.) 25 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 26 “[O]nce the district court has filed a pretrial scheduling order pursuant to Rule 16 which 27 establishes a timetable for amending pleadings, a motion seeking to amend pleadings is governed 28 1 first by Rule 16(b), and only secondarily by Rule 15(a).” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 2 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. June 16, 1999); see also Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294– 3 95 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding district court correctly addressed motion for leave to amend under 4 Rule 16 because it had issued a pretrial scheduling order that established a timetable for amending the pleadings and the motion was filed after the deadline had expired). 5 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b), a scheduling order “may be modified 6 only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Good cause requires 7 a showing of due diligence. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 8 1992); Sprague v. Fin. Credit Network, Inc., 2018 WL 4616688, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2018) 9 (“[Good cause] requires the party to show that despite due diligence the scheduled deadline could 10 not be met.”)). For example, good cause may be found where the moving party shows that it was 11 diligent in assisting the Court in creating a workable scheduling order, that it is unable to comply 12 with the scheduling order's deadlines due to matters not reasonably foreseeable at the time 13 the scheduling order issued, and that it was diligent in seeking a modification once it became 14 apparent it could not comply with the scheduling order. Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 15 605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999). The party seeking to modify a scheduling order bears the burden of 16 demonstrating good cause. Handel v. Rhoe, 2015 WL 6127271, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015) 17 (citing Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002); Johnson, 974 F.2d at 18 608-609.) 19 Rule 15(a), in turn, permits a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course within 20 21 days of service, or if the pleading is one to which a response is required, 21 days after service 21 of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only 22 with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Granting 23 or denying leave to amend a complaint is in the discretion of the Court, Swanson v. United States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1996), though leave should be “freely give[n] when 24 justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court has stated: 25

26 [i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 27 amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

28 1 allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. —the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.” 2

3 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The intent of the rule is to “facilitate decision on the 4 merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Center of S. Nev., 5 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Related

Foman v. Davis
371 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1962)
United States v. Hiram Webb
655 F.2d 977 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Jackson v. Bank of Hawaii
902 F.2d 1385 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Swanson v. United States Forest Service
87 F.3d 339 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
State of Missouri v. Kamala Harris
847 F.3d 646 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Kurzrok v. United States
1 F.2d 209 (Eighth Circuit, 1924)
Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co.
232 F.3d 1271 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Alexander v. Federal Bureau of Investigation
186 F.R.D. 12 (District of Columbia, 1998)
Lohrenz v. Donnelly
187 F.R.D. 1 (District of Columbia, 1999)

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Bluebook (online)
Acosta v. Parra Perez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/acosta-v-parra-perez-caed-2021.