A.C.M. v. Minga Wofford, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 A.C.M. No. 1:26-cv-00220-DJC-EFB (HC) 11 Petitioner, 12 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 MINGA WOFFORD, et al., 14 Respondents. 15 16 Petitioner, who is proceeding under a pseudonym (ECF No. 12), entered the United States 17 in 2022. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 25. Petitioner was subsequently contacted and released by Department 18 of Homeland Security (DHS) officials. Id. DHS granted petitioner employment authorization 19 and a social security card. Id. at ¶ 26. Petitioner worked and provided for his family and was 20 never arrested or convicted of any crime. Id. During a routine check-in with Immigration and 21 Customs Enforcement (ICE) in December 2025, petitioner was re-detained; petitioner was not 22 afforded a bond hearing at that time. Id. at ¶¶ 28-29.1 23 Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) and a 24 motion for temporary restraining order. ECF No. 2. The district court converted the motion to a 25

26 1 Petitioner’s verified petition establishes the facts articulated in this section. A court “may treat the allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. 27 v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197–98 (9th Cir. 1987). 28 1 motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and granted it in part, ordering a constitutionally 2 adequate bond hearing for petitioner within five days. ECF No. 12. The matter was also referred 3 to the undersigned for all future proceedings. Id. Petitioner subsequently received a bond 4 hearing and was granted release on a bond of $7500. ECF No. 13. 5 This court ordered respondents to file an answer to the petition. ECF No. 14. 6 Respondents filed an answer and petitioner filed a traverse. ECF Nos. 15, 16. For the following 7 reasons, the court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED. 8 LEGAL STANDARD 9 The federal court should grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when the 10 petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See, e.g., Dominguez v. 11 Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018). The petitioner bears the burden to prove the 12 unlawfulness of his detention by a preponderance of evidence. Sepulveda Ayala v. Bondi, 794 F. 13 Supp. 3d 901, 911 (W.D. Wash. 2025). 14 DISCUSSION 15 I. Mootness 16 Respondents’ sole opposition to the petition for writ of habeas corpus is that the petition is 17 moot because petitioner has been released from custody. ECF No. 15. According to respondents, 18 because the bond decision was not appealed, petitioner has received the relief he requested, and 19 this court no longer has jurisdiction. Id. (citing Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 20 2003)). 21 Respondents are incorrect. Release of a petitioner pursuant to a preliminary injunction 22 does not adjudicate the section 2241 petition on the merits. Cruz v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3443146, at 23 *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2025). And as respondents acknowledge, even if an individual is released 24 from custody while a habeas petition is pending, the petition is not moot if there are “collateral 25 consequence[s] that may be redressed by success on the petition.” Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 26 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover, multiple decisions in the Ninth Circuit have held that a 27 grant of preliminary injunction does not render a habeas petition moot. See, e.g., N.Y.V.D. v. 28 Ernesto Santracruz et al, 2026 WL 45268, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026); Min v. Santacruz, 2025 1 WL 3764071, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025). 2 Here, petitioner has demonstrated that he continues to suffer collateral consequences even 3 though he has been released on bond pursuant to the district court’s preliminary injunctive relief. 4 Most critically, he remains subject to re-detention without due process. Although they maintain 5 that the petition is moot, respondents have not agreed to not re-detain petitioner without a hearing. 6 As such, the petition is not moot, and this court will address it on the merits. 7 II. Merits of the Petition 8 Petitioner brings two claims for relief in his petition for writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 9 1. In claim one, he maintains that his detention without a hearing violates his procedural due 10 process rights, and that prior to any detention or re-arrest, he is entitled to a hearing before a 11 neutral adjudicator. Id. at ¶¶ 63-67. In claim two, petitioner maintains that his detention without 12 a hearing violates his substantive due process rights, and that prior to any detention or re-arrest, 13 he is entitled to a hearing before a neutral adjudicator. Id. at ¶¶ 68-73. 14 The federal court should grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when the 15 petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See, e.g., Dominguez v. 16 Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2018). The petitioner bears the burden to prove the 17 unlawfulness of his detention by a preponderance of evidence. Sepulveda Ayala v. Bondi, 794 F. 18 Supp. 3d 901, 911 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Here, petitioner has met that burden on both claims. In 19 the district judge’s January 22, 2026 order, the court found petitioner had shown a likelihood of 20 success on the merits of the due process claims. ECF No. 12. Specifically, the court found as 21 follows:

22 The Court’s prior orders are dispositive on the issues raised in the Motion. Specifically, as stated in the Court’s recent order in M.B. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv- 23 00005-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 74155 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2026), due process entitles a petitioner released on Section 1182 parole to notice and an opportunity to be heard 24 in the revocation of their parole. Id. at *2. While the alleged violations of identified by Respondents may qualify as changed circumstances, they do not 25 permit Respondents to revoke Petitioner’s parole without first providing Petitioner with notice and a hearing. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-01824-GPC-MSB, 26 2025 WL 2800149, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (holding “Petitioner was entitled to due process in his parole revocation [including] notification of 27 revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an opportunity to be heard and contest the determination”); Araujo v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02942-BTM- 28 MMP, 2025 WL 3278016, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (explaining “[d]ue 1 process for parole terminations requires (1) a decision by an appropriate official on whether the purpose of parole has been served; (2) written notice of the reasons for 2 the termination; and (3) an opportunity to rebut the reasons given for the termination”). 3 For this reason, Petitioner has established that she has a likelihood of success on 4 the merits. Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in his continued release. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); see also M.B., 2026 WL 74155, at 5 *3. Applying the balancing test described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and for the reasons identified in the Court’s prior orders, see M.B., 2026 6 WL 74155, at *4, the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private interest in maintaining his out-of-custody status and the risk of erroneous deprivation here is 7 considerable. Certainly, Respondents’ interest in detention is heightened in the face of alleged violations of the terms of release. However, given the effort and 8 costs required to provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal, these interests do not outweigh Petitioner’s interest and the risk of erroneous 9 deprivation. 10 ECF No. 12 at 2-3. 11 As discussed supra, respondents’ answer to the petition did not address the merits of the 12 petition and maintained solely that the petition should be dismissed as moot. Respondents have 13 offered no additional factual nor legal challenges to the court’s analysis and conclusions 14 contained in its January 22, 2026 order. See ECF No. 15. Accordingly, petitioner has shown by a 15 preponderance of evidence that he is entitled to relief.2 16 III. Final Removal Order 17 It is not disputed that although petitioner is in removal proceedings, petitioner is not yet 18 subject to a final removal order. ECF No. 1. Respondents maintain that, even if the court is 19 inclined to grant the petition, it should also order that respondents are allowed to re-detain 20 petitioner without a bond hearing should a final order of removal be entered. ECF No. 15. See 8 21 U.S.C. § 1231(a); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (allowing mandatory detention of 22 a certain length without a bond hearing pursuant to a final removal order). As petitioner correctly 23 2 The undersigned notes that, in addition to the cases cited by the district court in its 24 January 22, 2026 order, multiple other courts have come to the same conclusion regarding the process due to non-citizens released on section 1182 parole. See Hall v. Nessinger, No. 25-CV- 25 667-JJM-PAS, 2026 WL 18583, at *7 (D.R.I. Jan. 2, 2026); Hernandez-Castro v. Lyons, No. 1:25-CV-01574 JLT SAB, 2025 WL 3771344, at *8, n.10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025); Tran v. 26 Hyde, No. 25-CV-12546-ADB, 2025 WL 3724853, at *2 & n.2 (D. Mass. Dec. 24, 2025); Pham v. Noem et al., No. 5:25-CV-03373-MEMF-PD, 2025 WL 3763374, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 27 2025); Nguyen v. Noem, et al., No. 8:25-CV-02654-HDV-DSR, 2025 WL 3898489, at *4 & n.3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025); Asfestani v. Current or Acting Field Off., No. 1:25-CV-1562-SCR, 28 2025 WL 3677321, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 1 | points out, however, respondents’ argument regarding detention pursuant to a final removal order 2 || 1s not relevant here. The petition does not address petitioner’s future status under a not-yet-in- 3 || place final removal order and does not address the constitutionality of any future detention 4 | pursuant to section 1231. Rather, the petition only challenges the constitutionality of petitioner’s 5 || detention during removal proceedings. ECF No. 1. As such, the court need not address what is 6 || constitutionally permitted when and if petitioner is subject to a final removal order. 7 IV. Recommendations 8 For the foregoing reasons, the cour. RECOMMENDS that: 9 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED. 10 2. Respondents be ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner 11 without a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator, who possesses 12 authority to order release, at which the Government must prove by clear and 13 convincing evidence that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such 14 that his physical custody is required. 15 3. Any fee petition should be filed within the deadlines set by the Equal Access to Justice 16 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 18 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 19 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 20 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 21 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 22 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 23 || Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 || Dated: May 4, 2026

26 EDMUND F. BRENNAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE