Ackerman 315935 v. Hooson

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: April 2, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00180
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

MICHAEL W. ACKERMAN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25–cv–180

v. Honorable Maarten Vermaat

UNKNOWN HOOSON et al.,

Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named Defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the

summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all

proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Defendants are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way Defendants are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) in Carson City, Montcalm County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Sgt.

Unknown Hooson and Correctional Officer Olson, naming each in their individual and official capacities. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, at PageID.2.)

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). Plaintiff alleges that on March 19, 2023, he was placed in segregation for disobeying a direct order. He was housed in the shower area from March 19 to March 22, 2023. Plaintiff slept on the shower floor, and was not given a mattress or pillow but was given three blankets. Plaintiff had no access to a toilet and had to urinate in the shower drain. Plaintiff suffered stomach cramps because he was unable to defecate for three days due to the lack of a toilet. Plaintiff seeks

compensatory and punitive damages, among other relief. (See id. at PageID.3–4.) Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Analysis The complaint does not specifically state the source of law under which Plaintiff intends to proceed. However, the complaint’s request for relief states that Plaintiff seeks compensation for the “cruel treatment” described in the facts. (See Compl. at PageID.4.) Plaintiff names Defendants Hooson and Olson in both their official and individual capacities. (See id. at PageID.2.) Such

claims, when sufficiently alleged, can arise under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Generally, the Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for

prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954. As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Section 1983 defendants can be named in their individual and official capacities. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). A. Official Capacity Claims A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). The states and their departments are immune from suit in the federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous opinions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune

from a § 1983 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771; Diaz v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2013); McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App’x 646, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison, 722 F.3d at 771. Here, Plaintiff only seeks monetary damages. (See Compl. at PageID.4.) However, an official capacity defendant is absolutely immune from monetary damages. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998). Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Hooson and Olson in their official capacities. B. Individual Capacity Claims In order for a prisoner-plaintiff to state an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must allege facts indicating that, “‘objectively,’ he was ‘incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.’” See Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The plaintiff must also show that “the official acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate safety, meaning the official was ‘subjectively aware of the risk’ and

‘fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829, 834, 847). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011). Further, to state a claim under Section 1983, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government- official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active

unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, construing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, he asserts he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, as barred by the Eighth Amendment, when he was held in segregation in the shower area at DRF without access to a mattress, pillow, or toilet for three days in March 2023. (See Compl at PageID.3.) However, such a claim fails because the complaint does not allege any facts indicating that Defendants Hooson or Olson had any personal involvement in Plaintiff’s placement in the showers for three days. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983) (citing Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1983)). Further, the complaint does not indicate that these Defendants knew of a substantial risk of harm and responded with deliberate indifference. (See, generally, Compl.) For example, Plaintiff does not indicate he informed these Defendants he needed to use the toilet, nor that they denied him access to one in another part of the facility. Instead, the complaint merely

alleges that Plaintiff was placed in an area that did not have a toilet—without connecting the Defendants to this housing placement, or indicating the Defendants disregarded any request by Plaintiff.2 Under these circumstances, Plaintiff fails to show that Defendants Hooson or Olson were deliberately indifferent. See, e.g., Abdias v. Macauley, No. 1:24–CV–776, 2025 WL 586028, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2025) (dismissing claims where the complaint alleged no personal involvement by the defendants in the plaintiff’s housing placement, nor that the plaintiff made the defendants aware of a substantial risk of harm); Speech v. Shank, No. 1:22–CV–404, 2022 WL 1793579, at *5 (W.D. Mich. June 2, 2022) (dismissing Eighth Amendment claim against defendants where the complaint failed to allege any facts suggesting that the defendants knew

2 Courts have found that a lack of access to a toilet, coupled with other extreme deprivations, can support an Eighth Amendment claim—where the officials responsible for such deprivation were aware of the issue and “fail[ed] to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Reedy, 988 F.3d at 912; see, e.g., Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 434–35 (6th Cir. 2011) (placing an inmate in painful restraints for 12 hours, without penological justification, during which he was unable to sit or lie down, missed one meal, and did not have access to water or a toilet, rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation). However, courts in this circuit have also found some deprivations of basic necessities, during a limited period, to not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. See Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that “deprivations of fresh water and access to the toilet for a 20-hour period, while harsh, were not cruel and unusual punishment”) (citing Stephens v. Carter County Jail, 816 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1987)); see also J.P. v. Taft, 439 F. Supp. 2d 793, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (reminding that “minor inconveniences resulting from the difficulties in administering a large detention facility do not give rise to a constitutional claim”) (internal quotation omitted)). Here, the Court need not decide whether Plaintiff’s particular circumstances rise to the level of “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment because the complaint fails against Defendants Hooson and Olson for the reasons described above. about the risk of harm or that they were personally involved in the plaintiff’s housing assignment); Smith v. Buckler, No. CV 14–51, 2016 WL 4132198, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 2, 2016) (dismissing cruel and unusual punishment claim where the complaint lacked allegations that the defendant “was not involved in the classification of housing decisions related to [the plaintiff’s incarceration).

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Hooson and Olson will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445

(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11. A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: April 2, 2025 /s/Maarten Vermaat Maarten Vermaat United States Magistrate Judge