Blackburn, Judge.
Kenneth R. Holmes, a minister, brought the underlying action for malicious prosecution and tortious interference with business relations against Achor Center, Inc. (Achor). Achor is a nonprofit organization that houses and trains homeless women and children. Achor and the church pastored by Holmes shared a facility. This arrangement led to a number of disputes between the two that culminated in Holmes’ termination by his employer, the United Baptist Church (UBC), and Holmes’ subsequent arrest for criminal trespass. This appeal stems from the trial court’s denial of Achor’s motion for summary judgment.
In 1987 the UBC sold property where it conducted religious services to the Christian Council of Metropolitan Atlanta, Inc. (CCMA). As a condition of the sale, UBC retained the right to use certain portions of the property. Subsequently, CCMA conveyed the property to Achor who established a homeless shelter on the site. Achor acknowledged the use agreement between CCMA and UBC, and UBC was permitted to continue conducting services at the facility. In 1988, UBC commenced a new Sunday service on the property, and Holmes was hired to serve as the minister.
Beginning in 1990, a series of confrontations took place between Holmes and various Achor officials. Among other things, Achor asserts that, contrary to its rules and despite requests that he refrain, Holmes repeatedly entered the women’s dormitory without permission. The dormitory area was separate from the church where Holmes conducted services and Achor asserts that Holmes had no valid reason for being there. In January 1993, Achor’s board of directors informed UBC of the dormitory problem and threatened to hold UBC legally liable for any “negative consequences” resulting from Holmes’ presence at the facility. In February 1993, Achor’s chairman wrote a letter to UBC requesting that Holmes be permanently precluded from entering Achor’s property and renewed Achor’s threat to hold UBC legally responsible for Holmes’ acts. In April, Achor and UBC met specifically to discuss the removal of Holmes and his congregation from the Achor facility.
[400]*400Shortly thereafter, on May 2, 1993, UBC discussed problems between Achor and Holmes at its quarterly meeting. Achor officials attended the meeting. At that time, UBC terminated Holmes’ employment and withdrew funding for his ministry. Holmes did not consider his termination to be valid and continued to hold services on the Achor property even though Achor took certain measures to bar Holmes’ entry. On one such occasion, when Holmes entered the facility to conduct services, UBC contacted the police. In response to questions posed by the arresting officer, Joyce Dorsey, Achor’s chairman, provided documentary proof of Achor’s ownership of the property and an oral account of the warnings issued to Holmes. Holmes subsequently filed these claims for tortious interference with business relations and malicious prosecution against Achor.
1. “The elements essential to a cause of action under OCGA § 51-7-40 are: (1) prosecution for a criminal offense; (2) instigated without probable cause; (3) with malice; (4) under a valid warrant, accusation or summons; (5) which has terminated favorably to the plaintiff; and (6) has caused damage to the plaintiff.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Blackford, 264 Ga. 612, 613 (449 SE2d 293) (1994). Achor argues that it had probable cause to pursue criminal trespass claims against Holmes and that it was not acting maliciously.
“The gravamen of the complaint is the absence of probable cause on the part of the person instituting the prosecution. [Cits.] Probable cause is absent ‘when the circumstances are such as to satisfy a reasonable (person) that the accuser had no ground for proceeding but his desire to injure the accused.’ ” Id. As a result, it is not necessary for Achor to prove that Holmes was guilty of criminal trespass but rather that Achor reasonably believed Holmes to be guilty of criminal trespass. See Jones v. Parrish, 203 Ga. App. 566, 569 (417 SE2d 210) (1992). Upon review of the undisputed evidence, we conclude that Achor could reasonably believe Holmes was guilty of the crime for which he was arrested.
Holmes was expelled from the UBC and removed from his pastorship several weeks before his arrest, and Achor was aware of his expulsion. A criminal trespass occurs when one knowingly or maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the owner’s consent. OCGA § 16-7-21 (a). Despite the dissent’s contention that Holmes was not adequately advised not to enter the Achor property prior to his arrest, Holmes admits that after his expulsion, he was not welcome at the Achor facility and Achor officials clearly communicated that to him. Holmes’ deposition testimony reflects that, a few days prior to his arrest, Achor removed from its property the church sign that contained Holmes’ name. Holmes confronted the individual removing the sign and their exchange grew so heated that the police were summoned. [401]*401By his own admission, Holmes perceived the sign’s removal as an indication that he was without authority to enter Achor’s property. Achor also changed the facility’s locks to prevent Holmes’ entry to the property, another act that Holmes considered part of a “continuing effort” to bar him from the property. Finally, as he stated in an affidavit given prior to his arrest, Holmes heard an Achor chairperson, Joyce Dorsey, openly and unequivocally state that Holmes was not to return to Achor’s property.1 In light of the above, when Holmes subsequently appeared on Achor property, Achor could reasonably believe that Holmes knowingly entered its property without consent and was thus guilty of criminal trespass.
Further, Achor has offered unrefuted evidence that it was UBC and not Achor who contacted the police complaining of Holmes’ trespass. At the time of the arrest, an Achor official who was present at the request of UBC, merely responded to police questions. “ ‘The law draws a fine line of demarcation between cases where a party directly or indirectly urges a law enforcement official to begin criminal proceedings and cases where a party merely relays facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to arrest or prosecute. In the former case there is potential liability for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution [cit.]; in the latter case there is not. [Cit.]’ ” Tench v. Turner, 201 Ga. App. 156, 157 (410 SE2d 357) (1991). In the present matter, no evidence exists that Achor instigated the police investigation or urged the arrest of Holmes. Rather Achor’s chairman “merely relayed facts about what [she] believed happened” to the investigating officer. Id. at 157.
Moreover, the trial court erred in considering certain evidence proffered by Holmes in support of his malicious prosecution claim. The evidence in question was an uncertified, photocopied portion of a hearing transcript taken in a different proceeding. This testimony extract is clearly an unauthenticated writing, OCGA §§ 24-7-1; 24-7-20, and is not properly considered in evaluating a summary judgment motion. Gen. Ins. Co. of America v. Camden Constr. Co., 115 Ga. App.
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Blackburn, Judge.
Kenneth R. Holmes, a minister, brought the underlying action for malicious prosecution and tortious interference with business relations against Achor Center, Inc. (Achor). Achor is a nonprofit organization that houses and trains homeless women and children. Achor and the church pastored by Holmes shared a facility. This arrangement led to a number of disputes between the two that culminated in Holmes’ termination by his employer, the United Baptist Church (UBC), and Holmes’ subsequent arrest for criminal trespass. This appeal stems from the trial court’s denial of Achor’s motion for summary judgment.
In 1987 the UBC sold property where it conducted religious services to the Christian Council of Metropolitan Atlanta, Inc. (CCMA). As a condition of the sale, UBC retained the right to use certain portions of the property. Subsequently, CCMA conveyed the property to Achor who established a homeless shelter on the site. Achor acknowledged the use agreement between CCMA and UBC, and UBC was permitted to continue conducting services at the facility. In 1988, UBC commenced a new Sunday service on the property, and Holmes was hired to serve as the minister.
Beginning in 1990, a series of confrontations took place between Holmes and various Achor officials. Among other things, Achor asserts that, contrary to its rules and despite requests that he refrain, Holmes repeatedly entered the women’s dormitory without permission. The dormitory area was separate from the church where Holmes conducted services and Achor asserts that Holmes had no valid reason for being there. In January 1993, Achor’s board of directors informed UBC of the dormitory problem and threatened to hold UBC legally liable for any “negative consequences” resulting from Holmes’ presence at the facility. In February 1993, Achor’s chairman wrote a letter to UBC requesting that Holmes be permanently precluded from entering Achor’s property and renewed Achor’s threat to hold UBC legally responsible for Holmes’ acts. In April, Achor and UBC met specifically to discuss the removal of Holmes and his congregation from the Achor facility.
[400]*400Shortly thereafter, on May 2, 1993, UBC discussed problems between Achor and Holmes at its quarterly meeting. Achor officials attended the meeting. At that time, UBC terminated Holmes’ employment and withdrew funding for his ministry. Holmes did not consider his termination to be valid and continued to hold services on the Achor property even though Achor took certain measures to bar Holmes’ entry. On one such occasion, when Holmes entered the facility to conduct services, UBC contacted the police. In response to questions posed by the arresting officer, Joyce Dorsey, Achor’s chairman, provided documentary proof of Achor’s ownership of the property and an oral account of the warnings issued to Holmes. Holmes subsequently filed these claims for tortious interference with business relations and malicious prosecution against Achor.
1. “The elements essential to a cause of action under OCGA § 51-7-40 are: (1) prosecution for a criminal offense; (2) instigated without probable cause; (3) with malice; (4) under a valid warrant, accusation or summons; (5) which has terminated favorably to the plaintiff; and (6) has caused damage to the plaintiff.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Blackford, 264 Ga. 612, 613 (449 SE2d 293) (1994). Achor argues that it had probable cause to pursue criminal trespass claims against Holmes and that it was not acting maliciously.
“The gravamen of the complaint is the absence of probable cause on the part of the person instituting the prosecution. [Cits.] Probable cause is absent ‘when the circumstances are such as to satisfy a reasonable (person) that the accuser had no ground for proceeding but his desire to injure the accused.’ ” Id. As a result, it is not necessary for Achor to prove that Holmes was guilty of criminal trespass but rather that Achor reasonably believed Holmes to be guilty of criminal trespass. See Jones v. Parrish, 203 Ga. App. 566, 569 (417 SE2d 210) (1992). Upon review of the undisputed evidence, we conclude that Achor could reasonably believe Holmes was guilty of the crime for which he was arrested.
Holmes was expelled from the UBC and removed from his pastorship several weeks before his arrest, and Achor was aware of his expulsion. A criminal trespass occurs when one knowingly or maliciously interferes with the possession or use of the property of another person without the owner’s consent. OCGA § 16-7-21 (a). Despite the dissent’s contention that Holmes was not adequately advised not to enter the Achor property prior to his arrest, Holmes admits that after his expulsion, he was not welcome at the Achor facility and Achor officials clearly communicated that to him. Holmes’ deposition testimony reflects that, a few days prior to his arrest, Achor removed from its property the church sign that contained Holmes’ name. Holmes confronted the individual removing the sign and their exchange grew so heated that the police were summoned. [401]*401By his own admission, Holmes perceived the sign’s removal as an indication that he was without authority to enter Achor’s property. Achor also changed the facility’s locks to prevent Holmes’ entry to the property, another act that Holmes considered part of a “continuing effort” to bar him from the property. Finally, as he stated in an affidavit given prior to his arrest, Holmes heard an Achor chairperson, Joyce Dorsey, openly and unequivocally state that Holmes was not to return to Achor’s property.1 In light of the above, when Holmes subsequently appeared on Achor property, Achor could reasonably believe that Holmes knowingly entered its property without consent and was thus guilty of criminal trespass.
Further, Achor has offered unrefuted evidence that it was UBC and not Achor who contacted the police complaining of Holmes’ trespass. At the time of the arrest, an Achor official who was present at the request of UBC, merely responded to police questions. “ ‘The law draws a fine line of demarcation between cases where a party directly or indirectly urges a law enforcement official to begin criminal proceedings and cases where a party merely relays facts to an official who then makes an independent decision to arrest or prosecute. In the former case there is potential liability for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution [cit.]; in the latter case there is not. [Cit.]’ ” Tench v. Turner, 201 Ga. App. 156, 157 (410 SE2d 357) (1991). In the present matter, no evidence exists that Achor instigated the police investigation or urged the arrest of Holmes. Rather Achor’s chairman “merely relayed facts about what [she] believed happened” to the investigating officer. Id. at 157.
Moreover, the trial court erred in considering certain evidence proffered by Holmes in support of his malicious prosecution claim. The evidence in question was an uncertified, photocopied portion of a hearing transcript taken in a different proceeding. This testimony extract is clearly an unauthenticated writing, OCGA §§ 24-7-1; 24-7-20, and is not properly considered in evaluating a summary judgment motion. Gen. Ins. Co. of America v. Camden Constr. Co., 115 Ga. App. 189, 192 (154 SE2d 26) (1967) (evidence must be competent and admissible to raise a genuine issue of material fact on review of a summary judgment motion).2
[402]*402Where undisputed facts disclose that a complaint was filed in good faith and with probable cause, summary judgment is appropriate. Booker v. Eddins, 183 Ga. App. 449, 450 (359 SE2d 211) (1987) rev’d on other grounds Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Perimeter Tractor &c. Repair, 192 Ga. App. 243 (384 SE2d 449) (1989). In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court erred in denying Achor’s motion for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. This holding is consistent with the policy to disfavor malicious prosecution actions and to encourage citizens to report an individual they suspect may have committed crimes. See K-Mart Corp. v. Coker, 261 Ga. 745, 747-748 (410 SE2d 425) (1991).
2. Achor also sought summary judgment on Holmes’ claim that Achor tortiously interfered with the relationship between Holmes and UBC. Achor had a joint-use agreement with UBC that permitted UBC limited access to the property. Achor provided evidence of numerous instances of Holmes’ erratic conduct that took place while he was present at the Achor facility or was witnessed by the Achor staff. This behavior led Achor to request UBC to restrict Holmes’ access to the property.
“[A] person’s business is property in the pursuit of which he is entitled to protection from tortious interference by a third person, who, in interfering therewith, is not acting in the exercise of some right.” (Punctuation omitted.) Taylor v. Greiner, 156 Ga. App. 663, 666 (275 SE2d 737) (1980); see also Life Care Ambulance v. Hosp. Auth. of Gwinnett County, 202 Ga. App. 864, 868 (415 SE2d 502) (1992). As owner and operator of the property, Achor was attempting to exercise a legitimate interest, protecting the well-being of its residents and staff, when it sought to have UBC bar Holmes from the property. Further, Achor merely sought to protect its property rights in requesting that UBC preclude its agent, Holmes, from entering the property after it had previously complained of his conduct. It did not seek to interfere with the contract between UBC and Holmes. UBC’s termination of Holmes was clearly its attempt to protect its interests and its contract with Achor.
On the facts of this case, Achor’s dealings with UBC reflect no malicious intent toward Holmes, an element necessary to recover for tortious interference with business relations. See Lake Tightsqueeze v. Chrysler First Financial Svcs. Corp., 210 Ga. App. 178, 181 (435 SE2d 486) (1993). Achor had an absolute right to protect its ownership rights in its dealings with UBC, and indeed had a duty to the females in the dormitory to take action. Therefore, the trial court erroneously denied Achor’s motion for summary judgment as to the tortious interference claim and that ruling is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
Beasley, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, P. J., Andrews, Johnson, Smith and Ruffin, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J.,
[403]*403
dissents.