Acevedo v. City of New York

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 15, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-00558·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK FELIPE ACEVEDO, Plaintiff, 24-CV-0558 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND CITY OF NEW YORK; HARLEM HOSPITAL; NYPD 25TH PRECINCT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who currently is incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, brings this action, pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order dated February 12, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.2 On August 5, 2023, and/or, August 6, 2023, Plaintiff was treated at Defendant Harlem Hospital for gunshot wounds. He alleges that the

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. Hospital “discharged [him] with broken bones.” (ECF 1, at 4.) He indicates that he “now has severe permanent damage to his foot from gunshot wound.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also alleges that police officers from the 25th Precinct of the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) “interrogat[ed] Plaintiff under duress . . . by moving Plaintiff from cell to cell without proper medical attention knowing Plaintiff had gunshot wounds that were not

treated for.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff seeks $15,000,000.00 in compensatory damages. DISCUSSION A. 25th Precinct Plaintiff’s claims against the 25th Precinct must be dismissed because a precinct is not an entity that has the capacity to be sued. See Orraca v. City of New York, 897 F. Supp. 148, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he 25th Precinct is a subdivision of the Police Department without the capacity to be sued.”). To the extent the Court were to construe the claims against the precinct as brought against the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), such claims also must be dismissed because the NYPD cannot be sued, pursuant to the New York City Charter. See N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the

violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”). The Court therefore dismisses the claim against the 25th Precinct because it is a nonsuable entity and construes the claim involving the police as one brought against the City of New York. B. Municipal Liability Plaintiff brings a claim against Harlem Hospital, which is operated by New York City Health + Hospitals (“H+H”). The Court construes these allegations as asserting a claim against H+H, which provides health services to individuals at Harlem Hospital.3 “[H+H] and its employees are state actors for purposes of Section 1983.” Mejia v. NYC Health & Hosp. Corp., No. 16-CV-9706, 2018 WL 3442977, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2018). Plaintiff also asserts claims against the City of New York concerning the NYPD’s alleged interrogation practices and failure to provide medical care. The claims against H+H and the City of New York are analyzed as

claims brought against a municipality. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011).

In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.4 See Jones

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