Absar Realty Co. v. Bowles

149 F.2d 654, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2654
CourtEmergency Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 1, 1945
DocketNo. 189
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 149 F.2d 654 (Absar Realty Co. v. Bowles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Emergency Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Absar Realty Co. v. Bowles, 149 F.2d 654, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2654 (eca 1945).

Opinion

MAGRUDER, Judge.

Complainant owns and operates an apartment building at 3900 Greystone Avenue in the Fieldston-Riverdale Section, the Bronx, New York City, and as such is subject to the Rent Regulation for Housing for the New York City Defense-Rental Area issued October 8, 1943, effective November 1, 1943. 8 F.R.13914. On March 1, 1943, the maximum rent date established by the regulation, complainant was supplying for use of its tenants a free private bus service to the schools, shopping and amusement centers, and also to the 207th Street and Broadway station of the Eighth Avenue Independent Line subway and to the 242nd Street station of the Broadway-Seventh Avenue subway line of the Interbor[655]*655ough Rapid Transit. Of the two, the IRT station at 242nd Street is much nearer complainant’s building, being a half a mile or less away, but the Independent line is much preferred because it is newer, better equipped, and faster, with much fewer stops on the way downtown to 42nd Street. Complainant’s apartment is situated on a very high point in the city, and according to one affidavit in the record “it is only with extreme difficulty that the average woman could walk up the hill from the 242nd Street subway station if she had any encumbrances or impediment in her hands.” On April 1, 1943, complainant was obliged to discontinue this accommodation bus service in compliance with an order of the Office of Defense Transportation. Thereafter, on February 14, 1944, the Area Rent Director instituted proceedings under § 5(c) (3) of the regulation to decrease complainant’s maximum rents on account of a substantial decrease in services since the maximum rent date. As a result of such proceedings, the Rent Director, on February 28, 1944, issued a group of orders decreasing by 5 per cent the maximum rents of complainant’s apartment units now in question. Complainant duly protested these orders, and on November 6, 1944, the Administrator denied the protest, after which the present complaint was filed.

The protest did not challenge the validity of any provision in the regulation, but was directed against adjustment orders under § 5 decreasing complainant’s maximum rents. Therefore the general question before us on review is whether the Administrator has correctly applied the adjustment provisions in question, and whether, under the terms of the regulation and on the evidence in the record, there was a rational basis for the Administrator’s conclusion that complainant’s maximum rents should be reduced 5 per cent as representing the decrease in rental value of the subject housing units as of the maximum rent date by reason of the discontinuance of the free bus service.

The relevant provisions of the regulation are as follows:

“Sec. 3. Minimum services, furniture, furnishings and equipment. Except as set forth in section 5(b), every landlord shall, as a minimum, provide with housing accommodations the same essential services, furniture, furnishings, and equipment as those provided on the date determining the maximum rent, and as to other services, furniture, furnishings and equipment not substantially less than those provided on such date: * * *

“Sec. 5. Adjustments and other determinations. In the circumstances enumerated in this section, the Administrator may issue an order changing the maximum rents otherwise allowable or the minimum services required. In those cases involving * * * an increase or decrease of services, * * * the adjustment in the maximum rent shall be the amount the Administrator finds would have been on March 1, 1943, the difference in the rental value of the housing accommodations by reason of such change: Provided, however, That no adjustment shall be ordered where it appears that the rent on the date determining the maximum rent was fixed in contemplation of and so as to reflect such change. * * *

“(b) Decreases in minimum services, furniture, furnishings and equipment — (1) Decreases prior to November 1, 1943. If, on November 1, 1943, the services provided for housing accommodations are less than the minimum services required by section 3, the landlord shall either restore and maintain such minimum services or, on or before November 30, 1943, file a petition requesting approval of the decreased service. * * *

“(3) Adjustment in maximum rent for decreases. The order on any petition under this paragraph may require an appropriate adjustment in the maximum rent; and any maximum rent for which a report is required by this paragraph may be decreased in accordance with the provisions of section 5(c) (3). * * *

“(c) Grounds for decrease of maximum rent. The Administrator at any time, on his own initiative or on application of the tenant, may order a decrease of the maximum rent otherwise allowable, only on the grounds that: * * *

“(3) Decrease in services, furniture, furnishings or equipment. There has been a decrease in the minimum services, furniture, furnishings or equipment required by section 3 since the date or order determining the maximum rent.

“Sec. 13. Definitions. — (a) When used in this regulation the term: * * *

“(7) ‘Services’ includes' repairs, decorating and maintenance, the furnishing of light, heat, hot and cold water, telephone, elevator service, window shades, and stor[656]*656age, kitchen, bath, and laundry facilities and privileges, maid service, linen service, janitor service, the removal of refuse and any other privilege or facility connected with the use or occupancy of housing accommodations.”

On several grounds complainant contends that no reduction at all was warranted:

First, it is urged that the discontinuance of the bus service was involuntary on the landlord’s part and in obedience to the command of another federal agency. This is true, but the regulation, providing for a decrease in maximum rents on account of a substantial decrease in services, makes no distinction based upon the reason for the decrease of services. As the Administrator points out in his opinion, to permit the landlord to maintain the old rental charge after discontinuance of the bus service would have the same inflationary effect whether the bus service were given up by the landlord voluntarily or involuntarily.

Second, it is objected that the discontinuance of the bus service did not constitute a “substantial” decrease of services within the meaning of Section 3 of the regulation. This objection was not contained in the protest, and hence, strictly, is not properly before us. But we may say that the evidence fully warranted the Administrator’s determination in this respect.

Third, complainant urges that all of its leases in effect on the maximum rent date “contemplated and provided for the discontinuance of the bus service in question, and in each lease the rent was provided for accordingly.” 1 Hence, complainant claims that no reduction of maximum rents should have been imposed, because of the proviso in the first paragraph of Section 5 of the regulation reading: “Provided, however, That no adjustment shall be ordered where it appears that the rent on the date determining the maximum rent was fixed in contemplation of and so as to reflect such change.” The leases which were in effect on March 1, 1943, the maximum rent date, were negotiated in the spring and summer of 1942.

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Bluebook (online)
149 F.2d 654, 1945 U.S. App. LEXIS 2654, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/absar-realty-co-v-bowles-eca-1945.