OPINION
DIMOND, Senior Justice.
In a drunken rage, Mickey Abraham beat his wife to death. He entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to five years imprisonment with four years suspended. The court ordered that Abraham was to be considered ineligible for parole during the one-year period of imprisonment. During the four-year period of suspended sentence, he was placed on probation, subject to certain conditions, one of which was that he totally refrain from consuming . alcoholic beverages.
The state appealed to this court on the basis that the sentence was too lenient.1 [528]*528We agreed with the state’s contention, stating that the superior court, in sentencing Abraham, had accorded insufficient weight to the sentencing goals of deterrence of the offender and of other members of the community who might possess similar criminal tendencies, and reaffirmation of societal norms. We held that a minimal protection of society required that Abraham be given a more substantial sentence, and that “a sentence of 1-year confinement for the taking of a human life in a most brutal manner does not serve to effectuate the goals of deterrence and respect for the laws of Alaska.”2
On November 12, 1976, prior to the date of our decision on the state’s sentence appeal,3 Abraham filed with the superior court under Criminal Rules 35(a) and 35(b)(1)4 an application for correction of the sentence which had been imposed. Abraham asserted (1) that the sentence imposed constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Alaska Constitutions,5 and (2) that it violated his constitutional right to reformation.6 The basis for the first contention was that he spoke only the Eskimo Yupik language, lived in a traditional native style, and ate only a native diet. Thus, Abraham asserted that any incarceration outside of Bethel, a municipality inhabited mostly by Eskimos, would result in cruel and unusual punishment because (a) he would be in virtual isolation, as he could not communicate with other prisoners or the staff; (b) he would be unable to participate in any programs offered in the facility; and (c) he would be deprived of his natural diet. Thg basis for Abraham’s second contention, that his right to reformation would be violated, was that he needed alcoholic rehabilitation, which could not be provided to him within the existing prison programs since he spoke only the Yupik language and there are no alcohol rehabilitation programs for such people.
On December 14, 1976, Judge Hanson summarily denied Abraham’s application, without stating any reasons for such action. Under Criminal Rule 35(j) Abraham had 40 days from December 14, 1976, within which to appeal Judge Hanson’s denial of his application to correct sentence. No appeal was taken within that time. Instead, Abraham filed a “Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence” on December 23, 1976. Here, he requested the court to reconsider the denial of the original application. In addition, Abraham asserted that prior to entry of his plea of nolo contendere, Judge Hanson had assured him that he would receive a sentence of no greater than one year and that the judge had imposed, instead, a greater sentence, i. e., five years, with four years suspended.7 In addition, [529]*529Abraham challenged Judge Hanson for cause on the ground that he would be a material witness if Abraham’s motion for reconsideration were granted. Judge Van Hoomissen granted the challenge for cause, and the case was assigned to Judge Cooke on January 25, 1977. Judge Cooke denied Abraham’s Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence in a memorandum opinion dated February 18, 1977.
On March 9,1977, Abraham filed a notice of appeal from Judge Hanson’s summary denial of his Application for Correction of Sentence and from Judge Cooke’s denial of his Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence. Criminal Rule 35(j) permits one to appeal a final judgment entered under Rule 35 within 40 days of the entry of judgment. Since Abraham’s appeal was not taken until March 9, 1977, which was more than 40 days following Judge Hanson’s denial of Abraham’s Rule 35 motion, the appeal was untimely.
Abraham contends, however, that the filing of his Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence extended the time for appeal. Criminal Rule 35(h) provides that: “All rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings, including pre-trial and discovery procedures are available to the parties.” Literally, this would mean that a motion for reconsideration under Civil Rule 77(m) would permit the timely filing of Abraham’s Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence, since in that application he requested reconsideration of Judge Hanson’s denial of his original motion. The supplemental application would have been timely since it was filed within ten days from the decision of Judge Hanson.8 But this would be of little help to Abraham on his appeal. The supplemental application before Judge Cooke was in reality a motion to reconsider Judge Hanson’s denial of Abraham’s Application to Correct Sentence. But at the time of the motion to reconsider, such motion did not terminate the running of the time for filing an appeal from the order sought to be reconsidered. This is clear from the provisions of Appellate Rule 7(a).9 What this means, then, is that this appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider does not bring up for review the final decision of Judge Hanson denying Abraham’s Application for Correction of Sentence. As we stated in Brown v. State, 563 P.2d 275, 278 (Alaska 1977):
If the rule were otherwise, one could appeal from a final judgment after the time for filing an appeal had expired by utilizing a motion to reconsider under Civil Rule 77(m), and this would circumvent the rule limiting the time within which appeals may be taken and would frustrate the sound policy of having finality in litigation, [footnote omitted]
Thus, the only order that Abraham’s notice of appeal could relate to was Judge Cooke’s order denying the subsequent Application for Correction of Sentence since [530]*530that order was entered on February 18, 1977, and the notice of appeal, filed March 9,1977, was within the 40-day time limit for appeals under Criminal Rule 35(j). But the only question that would be presented by that appeal would be the propriety of the denial of reconsideration and would not bring before this court the merits of the December 14, 1976, order of Judge Hanson denying the Application for Correction of Sentence. Brown, supra, at 278.10
Despite the procedural web which appears to entangle Abraham and block his efforts to have his contentions reviewed by this court, we have the discretionary authority to consider and pass upon the arguments made by him. Appellate Rule 46 provides:
These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by this court where a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice.
We invoke that rule in this case. A strict adherence to the 40-day rule11
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OPINION
DIMOND, Senior Justice.
In a drunken rage, Mickey Abraham beat his wife to death. He entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to five years imprisonment with four years suspended. The court ordered that Abraham was to be considered ineligible for parole during the one-year period of imprisonment. During the four-year period of suspended sentence, he was placed on probation, subject to certain conditions, one of which was that he totally refrain from consuming . alcoholic beverages.
The state appealed to this court on the basis that the sentence was too lenient.1 [528]*528We agreed with the state’s contention, stating that the superior court, in sentencing Abraham, had accorded insufficient weight to the sentencing goals of deterrence of the offender and of other members of the community who might possess similar criminal tendencies, and reaffirmation of societal norms. We held that a minimal protection of society required that Abraham be given a more substantial sentence, and that “a sentence of 1-year confinement for the taking of a human life in a most brutal manner does not serve to effectuate the goals of deterrence and respect for the laws of Alaska.”2
On November 12, 1976, prior to the date of our decision on the state’s sentence appeal,3 Abraham filed with the superior court under Criminal Rules 35(a) and 35(b)(1)4 an application for correction of the sentence which had been imposed. Abraham asserted (1) that the sentence imposed constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Alaska Constitutions,5 and (2) that it violated his constitutional right to reformation.6 The basis for the first contention was that he spoke only the Eskimo Yupik language, lived in a traditional native style, and ate only a native diet. Thus, Abraham asserted that any incarceration outside of Bethel, a municipality inhabited mostly by Eskimos, would result in cruel and unusual punishment because (a) he would be in virtual isolation, as he could not communicate with other prisoners or the staff; (b) he would be unable to participate in any programs offered in the facility; and (c) he would be deprived of his natural diet. Thg basis for Abraham’s second contention, that his right to reformation would be violated, was that he needed alcoholic rehabilitation, which could not be provided to him within the existing prison programs since he spoke only the Yupik language and there are no alcohol rehabilitation programs for such people.
On December 14, 1976, Judge Hanson summarily denied Abraham’s application, without stating any reasons for such action. Under Criminal Rule 35(j) Abraham had 40 days from December 14, 1976, within which to appeal Judge Hanson’s denial of his application to correct sentence. No appeal was taken within that time. Instead, Abraham filed a “Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence” on December 23, 1976. Here, he requested the court to reconsider the denial of the original application. In addition, Abraham asserted that prior to entry of his plea of nolo contendere, Judge Hanson had assured him that he would receive a sentence of no greater than one year and that the judge had imposed, instead, a greater sentence, i. e., five years, with four years suspended.7 In addition, [529]*529Abraham challenged Judge Hanson for cause on the ground that he would be a material witness if Abraham’s motion for reconsideration were granted. Judge Van Hoomissen granted the challenge for cause, and the case was assigned to Judge Cooke on January 25, 1977. Judge Cooke denied Abraham’s Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence in a memorandum opinion dated February 18, 1977.
On March 9,1977, Abraham filed a notice of appeal from Judge Hanson’s summary denial of his Application for Correction of Sentence and from Judge Cooke’s denial of his Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence. Criminal Rule 35(j) permits one to appeal a final judgment entered under Rule 35 within 40 days of the entry of judgment. Since Abraham’s appeal was not taken until March 9, 1977, which was more than 40 days following Judge Hanson’s denial of Abraham’s Rule 35 motion, the appeal was untimely.
Abraham contends, however, that the filing of his Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence extended the time for appeal. Criminal Rule 35(h) provides that: “All rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings, including pre-trial and discovery procedures are available to the parties.” Literally, this would mean that a motion for reconsideration under Civil Rule 77(m) would permit the timely filing of Abraham’s Supplemental Application for Correction of Sentence, since in that application he requested reconsideration of Judge Hanson’s denial of his original motion. The supplemental application would have been timely since it was filed within ten days from the decision of Judge Hanson.8 But this would be of little help to Abraham on his appeal. The supplemental application before Judge Cooke was in reality a motion to reconsider Judge Hanson’s denial of Abraham’s Application to Correct Sentence. But at the time of the motion to reconsider, such motion did not terminate the running of the time for filing an appeal from the order sought to be reconsidered. This is clear from the provisions of Appellate Rule 7(a).9 What this means, then, is that this appeal from the denial of a motion to reconsider does not bring up for review the final decision of Judge Hanson denying Abraham’s Application for Correction of Sentence. As we stated in Brown v. State, 563 P.2d 275, 278 (Alaska 1977):
If the rule were otherwise, one could appeal from a final judgment after the time for filing an appeal had expired by utilizing a motion to reconsider under Civil Rule 77(m), and this would circumvent the rule limiting the time within which appeals may be taken and would frustrate the sound policy of having finality in litigation, [footnote omitted]
Thus, the only order that Abraham’s notice of appeal could relate to was Judge Cooke’s order denying the subsequent Application for Correction of Sentence since [530]*530that order was entered on February 18, 1977, and the notice of appeal, filed March 9,1977, was within the 40-day time limit for appeals under Criminal Rule 35(j). But the only question that would be presented by that appeal would be the propriety of the denial of reconsideration and would not bring before this court the merits of the December 14, 1976, order of Judge Hanson denying the Application for Correction of Sentence. Brown, supra, at 278.10
Despite the procedural web which appears to entangle Abraham and block his efforts to have his contentions reviewed by this court, we have the discretionary authority to consider and pass upon the arguments made by him. Appellate Rule 46 provides:
These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by this court where a strict adherence to them will work surprise or injustice.
We invoke that rule in this case. A strict adherence to the 40-day rule11 for appealing Judge Hanson’s decision of December 14, 1976, would work an injustice because Abraham’s contentions that his conditions of imprisonment amount to a deprivation of his right to rehabilitation and reformation and his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, would never be heard.12 As we stated in MgGinnis v. Stevens, 543 P.2d 1221, 1236 n. 45 (Alaska 1975):
If fundamental constitutional rights are alleged to be abridged in disciplinary proceedings, it would be the duty of the court to inquire into the allegations.
Art. I, § 12 of the Alaska Constitution states in part that: “Penal administration shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public.” In State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970), we published our first opinion on sentence review under a statute enacted by the legislature in 1969 and made effective in January, 1970, which conferred sentence review power upon the courts. AS 12.55.120; 22.05.010(a). We stated that one of the objectives of art. I, § 12 of the constitution dealing with penal administration was the “rehabilitation of the offender into a noncriminal member of society.”13 Since our decision in Chaney, we have published numerous decisions dealing with review of sentencing.14 We have repeatedly [531]*531required the sentencing judge to consider, on the record, various goals or objectives to be achieved in sentencing, including among other factors the reformation or rehabilitation of the offender.
In addition, the legislature has acted to implement the constitutional provision we are concerned with. AS 33.30.020 requires the Commissioner of Health and Social Services to establish programs for the treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation of prisoners, in discharge of the Commissioner’s duties to administer all matters affecting prisoners once the court has pronounced sentence.15
The constitutional provision we are considering is concerned with penal administration. It provides that such administration shall be based on two factors: (1) the principle of reformation, and (2) the need for protecting the public. It is obvious that one thrust of this constitutional requirement is directed toward the public welfare. Not only does it expressly mention the “protection of the public,” but also it is apparent that if the offender is reformed or rehabilitated, this will advance the public interest.
But the public is not the sole beneficiary of this constitutional requirement. The constitution speaks of penal administration being based on the “principle of reformation.” Reformation relates to something being done to rehabilitate the offender into a noncriminal member of society. True, society will benefit from this, but so will the offender since, to the extent that he is rehabilitated into a law-abiding person, his inherent dignity as a human being will be enhanced. He will be the object of respect, rather than of fear or loathing by his fellow citizens, and to that extent, will benefit from the sense of personal satisfaction enjoyed by those who live decent lives, unsullied by disobedience and rebellion against the laws by which we govern ourselves in a peaceful and tranquil society. Thus, there was reason for including the constitutional provision we are considering under art. I of our constitution, which is entitled “Declaration of Rights.”
In our recent decision in Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978), we held that a prisoner in Alaska has the right to receive necessary medical services, including psychiatric care, under certain conditions. We based that decision on statutory provisions relating to the medical care of prisoners, and also on the fact that such right of treatment stems from the constitutional prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment,” which language must be interpreted in light of “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”16 But in the Rust case we stated in n. 35 that “We have determined that the case at bar does not present an appropriate vehicle for delineation of the contours of a prisoner’s right to rehabilitation under either art. I, § 12 of the Alaska Constitution or AS 33.30.020.”17 We pass on that issue in this case because it is squarely before us.
The basis for Abraham’s claim that his right to rehabilitation is being violated is that any reformation that he needs is alcoholic rehabilitation and this could not be supplied within the existing framework of prison programs. As to his criminal tendencies being related to the consumption of alcohol, the sentencing judge noted:
He’s [Abraham] not a criminal in the sense that he preys on people for profit and that sort of thing. If there is something that can be done during the year of Mr. Abraham’s incarceration to stop him from drinking, that will be good for him.
[532]*532Abraham stated in an affidavit that “I have used alcohol regularly for many years.” The affidavit of Myron Angstman, Abraham’s counsel, stated that “During my period of association with Mr. Abraham, it has become very apparent to me that he has a reliance on alcohol, and is an alcoholic.” The probation officer’s report prepared for sentencing states on page 4: “it should be noted that he [Abraham] has a drinking problem and when drinking is capable of violant [sic] acts.” In a supplemental report to the presentence report on Abraham the following statement is made: “I feel that his recent assaultive behavior is a result of his excessive drinking.” From this it appears quite clear that Abraham’s criminal behavior is linked to his use or abuse of alcohol.
The ability of the state to provide alcoholic rehabilitation for Abraham was placed in issue by the record. Mr. Angstman’s affidavit explored the lack of rehabilitative programs for Yupik-speaking individuals. The record indicates that there are no suitable correctional facilities in Bethel for long-term prisoners who could then receive alcoholic treatment. In addition, the inadequacy of the correctional programs in regards to Yupik-speaking individuals is reflected by Judge Hanson’s statement:
I’m also going to — because of my familiarity with the division of corrections— order that no parole be granted during this period. He’s to serve the entire year. My experience has been found that if they found him difficult to deal with because he couldn’t speak English, they would dump the effort and simply turn him back without attempting (1) rehabilitation or (2) enforcing the intention of the court in imposing the sentence.
It is apparent, then, that the question of the need for and availability of alcoholic rehabilitation was developed as a genuine issue in this case. Judge Hanson’s summary denial of Abraham’s Application for Correction of Sentence was erroneous because of the existence of such genuine issue of material fact.
In summary, what Abraham is contending on this appeal is that he squarely put into issue in his Application for Correction of Sentence the ability of the state to provide alcoholic rehabilitation. His contention was that he would not receive such rehabilitation under the existing programs for alcoholic rehabilitation of prisoners in Alaska.18
We are unable to state that Abraham cannot receive rehabilitative treatment for his problem of alcohol, because no eviden-tiary hearing was held on his application to correct his sentence.19 It is apparent to us [533]*533that in this case it is essential to Abraham’s reformation as a noncriminal member of society, and to the protection of the public, that he receive rehabilitative treatment with respect to his obvious problem with alcohol. From all that appears in the record and the briefs on this appeal, Abraham is a peaceful citizen when sober, but an extremely violent and dangerous one when he drinks alcohol. We are confident that the vast resources of this state can in some way be directed to correct this all too prevalent situation, which we see on a daily basis when the courts sentence criminal offenders for alcohol-related crimes.
Abraham has a constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment — particularly with respect to his consumption of alcohol. Whether he is securing or will receive such treatment we do not know since this aspect to his appeal has not been explored. This case must be remanded to the superior court for necessary evidentiary hearings in this regard in order that the judiciary can take whatever steps are deemed necessary to make the constitutional right to reformation a reality and not simply something to which lip service is being paid. The hearing to be conducted by the superior court should be in depth, extensive in its scope, and adversary in nature. Every aspect of a criminal offender’s right and opportunity to receive rehabilitative treatment relating to the use of alcohol, as it relates to his criminal propensities, should be explored. This hearing shall be expedited.
Abraham also claims that the imprisonment will subject him to cruel and unusual punishment, forbidden by art. I, § 12 of the Alaska Constitution. The basis for this claim, as we stated earlier in this opinion, is that Abraham has lived in a traditional native style, speaks Yupik and virtually no English, eats a native diet which would not be available in prison facilities, and has virtually no experience outside of the traditional life of natives in southwestern Alaska. He claims that incarceration in a place outside of the Bethel area would result in cruel and unusual punishment because he would be in virtual isolation, as he would be unable to communicate with other prisoners or staff, would be unable to participate in any of the programs offered in the facilities, and would be deprived of his natural diet.
There is nothing unusual or cruel in the character of the punishment imposed, i. e., a sentence of imprisonment of five years with four years suspended. Confinement in a penal institution is the most common method of imposing punishment for criminal behavior. It may be true that because of Abraham’s difficulty in speaking and understanding English there will be problems in his communicating with the prison authorities, but these problems are not insurmountable. Persons who speak different languages generally will find, as a matter of necessity, adequate ways of communicating their thoughts to each other. And the dietary problem encountered by Abraham in a jail outside of Bethel does not make the imprisonment there unusual in its character' and cruel in its exeessiveness. Common experience shows that a person will soon adapt himself to eating any nutritious foods even if they may be distasteful to him. Abraham is not being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. I, § 12 of the Alaska Constitution.
There is some question as to whether the application to the superior court by Abraham under Criminal Rule 35(a) and (b) was the appropriate method of obtaining the rehabilitative treatment he is seeking. We [534]*534need not decide that question. It will suffice for us to say that all future proceedings required pursuant to our remand for an evidentiary hearing are to be considered as if Abraham had initiated a civil action seeking the rehabilitative treatment to which he is entitled to under our constitution. See Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134 (Alaska 1978).
The order denying Abraham’s Application for Correction of Sentence, entered by Judge Hanson on December 14, 1976, is vacated and the case is remanded to the superior court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.