Abiomed, Inc. v. Maquet Cardiovascular LLC

District Court, D. Massachusetts·Decided November 5, 2021·No. 1:16-cv-10914·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

_______________________________________ ) ABIOMED, INC., ) ) Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, ) ) Civil Action No. v. ) 16-10914-FDS ) MAQUET CARDIOVASCULAR LLC, ) ) Defendant/Third-Party ) Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ ) Counter-Claimant, ) ) v. ) ) ABIOMED EUROPE GMBH, ) ) Third-Party Defendant, ) ) v. ) ) ABIOMED R&D, INC., ) ) Third-Party Defendant/ ) Counter-Claimant. ) _______________________________________)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON ABIOMED’S MOTION TO REDACT ORAL ARGUMENT HEARING TRANSCRIPTS SAYLOR, C.J. This is an action for patent infringement. Defendant and counterclaim-plaintiff Maquet Cardiovascular LLC owns six patents directed to guidable intravascular blood pumps and related methods. Plaintiff and counterclaim-defendants Abiomed, Inc.; Abiomed R&D, Inc.; and Abiomed Europe GmbH (collectively, “Abiomed”) manufacture the “Impella” line of intravascular blood pumps. Abiomed filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that its Impella products do not infringe Maquet’s patents and that they are invalid. Maquet has filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for infringement. Abiomed has moved to redact in part the transcripts of oral arguments that took place in this case on August 20 and 24, 2020. The excerpts at issue refer to (1) the amounts that Abiomed paid to Dr. Walid Aboul-Hosn, who now works as a consultant for Abiomed and is the first named inventor of the ’100 Patent; (2) the specifics of his role at Abiomed; (3) the proposed

royalty awards of each party’s damages expert; (4) the revenues of certain Impella products; (5) allegations that there were no non-infringing alternatives at the time of the hypothetical negotiation; and (6) statements of Abiomed’s expert, Dr. Lynn Weber, about internal market surveys of the Impella products. (See Reply at 1, n.1). Documents submitted to this Court that are “relevant to the determination of [] litigants’ substantive rights” or for the “purpose of influencing an[] adjudicatory proceeding” are normally subject to the presumption of public access. United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 58, 59 n.9 (1st Cir. 2013). For “non-discovery motions, like motions for summary judgment, [and] Daubert motions,” the party seeking to overcome the presumption of public access “must demonstrate

significant countervailing interests, like the existence of trade secrets in the documents or confidential business information.” Bradford & Bigelow, Inc. v. Richardson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 445, 448 (D. Mass. 2015) (citing Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 1993); but see In re Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Pracs. Litig., 686 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (9th Cir. 2012) (reversing a ruling that records were within an exception for sealed discovery documents attached to a nondispositive motion, and noting that “[i]n some cases, such as this one, a Daubert motion connected to a pending summary judgment motion may be effectively ‘dispositive of a motion for summary judgment’” and therefore the “compelling reasons” standard should have applied (emphasis added)). Only the most compelling reasons can overwhelm the presumption. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987). On February 23, 2017, the Court entered a protective order in this case that had been stipulated to by both parties. (ECF 56). As relevant here, the order states: “[a]ll documents of any nature, including briefs, which have been designated either as CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION or HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, and which are filed with this court, shall be filed under seal . . . .” (Id. § 5(a)). Abiomed contends that the items in question all contain information from materials that it designated as “confidential” or “highly confidential” during discovery. (Mot. ¶¶ 3-4). It also contends that, at least as to the August 24 hearing, the parties agreed that confidential material would be redacted: Mr. Hummel: Yes. Your Honor, just one other housekeeping matter, which I discussed with counsel for Maquet. There’s a lot of highly confidential information that’s covered in these particular motions. The parties have excised for the most part the most highly confidential information from their slides, and there’s the more softer information that’s been technically marked confidential, highly confidential or confidential, but the parties will, if they see something on each other’s slides, raise their hand if there’s a problem, otherwise, we don’t see any problem with presenting to your Honor, you know, what’s on these slides and redacting them to the extent they get filed, if that’s acceptable to your Honor. The Court: Yes, that’s fine. (ECF 943, Aug. 24, 2020 Tr. at 4:24-5:12). The Court and the parties have an interest in efficient discovery, and that interest is furthered by respecting protective orders entered into by joint agreement among the parties. See Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that “the lubricating effects of the protective order on pre-trial discovery would be lost if the order expired at the end of the case or were subject to ready alteration” and finding that “[n]othing . . . suggests that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to lift the protective order for discovery materials not introduced at trial”). However, this case is no longer in the discovery phase of litigation, and therefore, the parties’ interests in confidentiality must be balanced against the public’s right to access. See Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. LSI Corp., 878 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509-10 (D. Del. 2012) (rejecting the parties’ position “that any mention of a document that has been designated as ‘Confidential’ . . . under the Protective Order is sufficient to close the otherwise public proceedings of oral argument”); In re Petrobras Secs. Litig., 393 F. Supp. 3d 376, 387 (S.D.N.Y.

2019) (finding that “most of the materials covered by the July 2016 [protective] order c[ould] now be unsealed[] [s]ince the documents related to this Court's ruling on summary judgment”); Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 680 n.15 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that a party’s “assumption that the PO properly may be read to govern the treatment of confidential [] documents that were admitted into evidence” may be “factually and legally flawed” because, among other reasons, “BIC would have this court hold that a stipulated protective order gave [it] the unilateral power to designate which of its documents would be[] a part of the public record”). As a preliminary matter, Maquet contends that Abiomed never requested that the hearing be sealed, even though the Court e-mailed videoconference access instructions to each party for

them to convey to anyone who would like to join. (ECF 947, Perrin Decl. ¶ 8). One of Maquet’s representatives attended the hearings, and it thus contends that the motion should be denied because “[c]ourts routinely deny motions to seal or redact information already disclosed in open court.” (Opp. at 10, n.5 (citing Smith v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist.

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