Abera v. San Diego Pacificvu LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 AMAN ABERA, Case No.: 25-cv-01937-RBM-DEB

11 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 12 v. 13 SAN DIEGO PACIFICVU LLC, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 On July 31, 2025, Plaintiff Aman Abera (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, 17 commenced this action by filing the operative Complaint (“Complaint”). (Doc. 1.) Along 18 with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Immediate 19 Stay and Quashing of Void Writ of Possession (“TRO Application”) (Doc. 2), a Motion 20 for Leave to Electronically File Documents (“E-File Motion”) (Doc. 4), an Application to 21 Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) (Doc. 5), and a second Motion for 22 Temporary Restraining Order (“Second TRO Application”) (Doc. 7). Plaintiff also filed a 23 Motion to Transfer Venue (“Motion to Transfer”) shortly thereafter. (Doc. 10.) 24 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application 25 (Doc. 5) and DISMISSES the Complaint (Doc. 1) as frivolous. The Court further DENIES 26 Plaintiff’s TRO Applications (Docs. 2, 7), Plaintiff’s E-File Motion (Doc. 4), and 27 Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer (Doc. 7) AS MOOT. 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 This action relates to an unlawful detainer matter adjudicated in the Superior Court 3 of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”) captioned San Diego 4 Pacificvu LLC v. Abera, Case No. 24UD014810C (the “Unlawful Detainer Action”). 5 A. Abera I 6 On June 5, 2025, Plaintiff initiated his first civil action before this Court. See Abera 7 v. PacificVU LLC et al., Case No. 25-cv-01437-RBM-DEB (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2025), ECF 8 No. 1 (“Abera I”). On the same day, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed IFP and an 9 Emergency Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order. Id., ECF Nos. 2–3. 10 On June 9, 2025, before the Court issued a ruling on his pending applications, Plaintiff 11 filed a Notice of Appeal with the Ninth Circuit appealing this Court’s “effective . . . 12 constructive denial” of the Emergency Ex Parte Application. Id., ECF No. 6. On June 10, 13 2025, this Court denied Plaintiff’s IFP application for failure to adequately allege indigency 14 but granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended application. Id., ECF No. 8 at 4 (“If Plaintiff 15 wishes to proceed IFP, he may file a renewed IFP application that provides clear and legible 16 answers and sufficiently demonstrates indigency.”). The Ninth Circuit denied his appeal 17 for lack of jurisdiction on June 16, 2025. Id., ECF No. 12 at 1. Plaintiff did not file an 18 amended IFP application, and the case remains dismissed. 19 B. Abera II 20 Instead of filing an amended application in Abera I, Plaintiff initiated a second 21 related civil action on June 18, 2025. See Abera v. PacificVU LLC et al., Case No. 25-cv- 22 01488-RBM-DEB (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2025), ECF No. 1 (“Abera II”). On the same day, 23 Plaintiff filed a second IFP application, a second TRO application, and a Motion for Leave 24 to Electronically File Documents. Id., ECF Nos. 2–4. 25 On June 20, 2025, Abera II was identified as related to Plaintiff’s first action, Abera 26 I. Id., ECF No. 5. Plaintiff filed an objection to the transfer that same day. Id., ECF No. 27 6. On June 30, 2025, Abera II was transferred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 28 40.1. Id., ECF No. 8 at 1. On July 1, 2025, and again before the Court issued a ruling, 1 Plaintiff filed a second Notice of Appeal based on the Court’s “constructive denial” of 2 Plaintiff’s second TRO application. Id., ECF No. 9 at 2. The Ninth Circuit denied his 3 second appeal for lack of jurisdiction on July 21, 2025. Id., ECF No. 14. The same day, 4 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Disqualify Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Id., ECF No. 16. 5 On July 25, 2025, this Court issued an order: (1) granting Plaintiff’s second IFP 6 Application; (2) dismissing his second Complaint on screening for lack of subject matter 7 jurisdiction; (3) denying Plaintiff’s second TRO application; (4) denying Plaintiff’s E-File 8 Motion as moot; and (5) denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify (the “Abera II Order”). 9 Id., ECF No. 18. On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Void Judgment 10 under Rule 60(b)(4), which is currently pending. Id., ECF No. 20. 11 C. The Instant Action 12 On July 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed a third civil action accompanied by a third TRO 13 Application (Doc. 2), a second E-Filing Motion (Doc. 4), and an “Affidavit of Personal 14 Bias and Prejudice.” (Doc. 3.) On August 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a third IFP Application 15 (Doc. 5) and a fourth TRO Application (Doc. 7). On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff’s third civil 16 action was identified as related to Abera I pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(e). (Doc. 6.) 17 Plaintiff filed an Objection to the Related Case Designation (Doc. 8; see also Doc. 9), 18 which the Honorable Judge Robert S. Huie overruled. The action was then transferred to 19 the undersigned on August 11, 2025. (Doc. 12.) 20 II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 22 subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the action: “(i) is 23 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 24 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 25 § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not 26 only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a 27 claim.”). “[T]he sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, not a 28 substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may choose to 1 bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 2 In addition, “[f]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do 3 not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide 4 jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson 5 ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) 6 (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must 7 dismiss the action.”). Courts address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first, as “[t]he 8 requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature 9 and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without 10 exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (quoting 11 Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 A. IFP Application 14 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP and has re-filed the same IFP 15 Application which the Court granted in Abera II.1 For the same reasons discussed in the 16 Abera II Order (see Abera II, Case No. 25-cv-01488-RBM-DEB (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2025), 17 ECF No. 18 at 5–6), the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently shown an inability to pay 18 the $405 filing fee pursuant to § 1915(a) and thus GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Application. 19 B. Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 20 Like Plaintiff’s prior cases, this Complaint is subject to screening pursuant to 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff previously commenced two other actions in this district against 22 the same Defendants making the same allegations as in the instant Complaint. Plaintiff has 23 now filed the instant Complaint in yet another attempt to undermine state court orders and 24

25 1 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a District Court of the United 26 States must pay a filing fee of $405. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court may authorize the 27 commencement of a suit without prepayment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits a signed affidavit “that includes a statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to pay 28 1 circumvent this Court’s dismissal of his Complaint in Abera II for lack of subject matter 2 jurisdiction. Because there has been no change of circumstance since Plaintiff’s first and 3 second actions were dismissed, this action must likewise be dismissed. 4 “To prevent . . . abusive or captious litigation, section 1915(d) authorizes federal 5 courts to dismiss a claim filed [IFP] ‘if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.’” 6 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)). A complaint 7 is legally “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Id. Moreover, 8 a complaint “that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims” is subject to 9 dismissal as frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Cato v. United States, 70 10 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th 11 Cir. 1988)). “Dismissal of the duplicative lawsuit, more so than the issuance of a stay or 12 the enjoinment of proceedings, promotes judicial economy and the ‘comprehensive 13 disposition of litigation.’” Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684, 692 (9th 14 Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 904 (2008). 15 In this case, the Court finds the Complaint is legally frivolous because it is 16 duplicative of Plaintiff’s previously dismissed actions and, for the reasons thoroughly 17 explained in the Abera II Order, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 18 1. Duplicative Actions 19 To determine whether a suit is duplicative, courts “borrow from the test for claim 20 preclusion.” Adams, 487 F.3d at 688 (citation omitted). “[I]n assessing whether the second 21 action is duplicative of the first, we examine whether the causes of action and relief sought, 22 as well as the parties . . . to the action, are the same.” Id. at 689. “The central criterion in 23 determining whether [the causes of action are the same] between the first and second 24 adjudications is whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” 25 Owens v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). 26 Here, there is no question that the prior actions and the instant action involve the 27 same parties, as the same Plaintiff brings claims against the same Defendants. It is also 28 clear that Plaintiff asserts the same causes of action as in Abera I and Abera II based on the 1 same factual allegations surrounding the Unlawful Detainer Action. (Compare Doc. 1 at 2 20–32 (asserting claims for violations of the First Amendment, violation of the Fourteenth 3 Amendment, retaliatory eviction, breach of implied warranty of habitability, fraudulent 4 concealment, and unjust enrichment) with Abera I, Case No. 25-cv-01437-RBM-DEB 5 (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2025), ECF No. 1 at 19–32 (asserting identical claims); and Abera II, 6 Case No. 25-cv-01488-RBM-DEB (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2025), ECF No. 1 at 19–32 7 (asserting identical claims).). Like in Abera I and Abera II, Plaintiff’s claims stem from 8 the allegedly “procedurally defective” proceedings in the Unlawful Detainer Action. 9 Indeed, Plaintiff expressly asserts that he “resubmits this Verified Complaint, originally 10 filed under Case No. 3:25-cv-01488-RBM-DEB” (Doc. 2 at 2), which the Court dismissed 11 without leave to amend for the reasons set forth in the Abera II Order. Thus, this action 12 and Plaintiff’s prior actions involve the same causes of action. 13 The Court concludes the instant action is duplicative of Plaintiff’s previously 14 dismissed actions and must be dismissed. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1230 15 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming dismissal of claims as “frivolous or malicious” where four prior 16 actions concerning the same issue were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 17 2. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 18 The Court further notes that, as Plaintiff’s allegations are identical to those in Abera 19 II, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, judicial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity would 20 also bar Plaintiff from proceeding in this action. As the Court explained in the Abera II 21 Order, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts are deprived of jurisdiction to 22 hear appeals to final, and non-final, orders and judgments issued by a state court. See Doe 23 & Assoc. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Noel v. Hall, 24 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). An action constitutes a de facto appeal when the 25 plaintiff is asserting legal errors by a state court and is seeking a relief from the state court 26 judgment. Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Noel, 341 27 F.3d at 1163). Here, Plaintiff attempts to do exactly that. Plaintiff requests that this Court 28 “quash” the Writ of Possession issued by the San Diego Superior Court, “enjoin any further 1 enforcement actions stemming from” the state court’s order, and “declare that the eviction 2 proceedings and post-trial enforcement were procedurally defective and constitutionally 3 infirm.” (Doc. 1 at 16.) In doing so, Plaintiff asks the Court to “review the final 4 determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings,” which is at the core of Rooker- 5 Feldman’s prohibition. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000); see Richards v. 6 Mercy Hous. Cal., No. C 12-00234 JW, 2012 WL 174186, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012) 7 (“[I]nsofar as [he] requests that the Court ‘stop’ the eviction,” Plaintiff is evidently 8 “seeking relief from the state court judgment.”). 9 Additionally, while Plaintiff asserts federal claims arising from the unlawful detainer 10 proceedings, his claims “rely on the premise that Plaintiff . . . [was] in fact entitled to 11 remain in possession,” meaning the judgment in the state court was “wrongful.” Koshak 12 v. Cnty. of Orange, No. SACV 13-01732-CJC(ANx), 2014 WL 12626351, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 13 Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 323 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Iula v. Voos, No. 23-CV- 14 2277 JLS (AHG), 2024 WL 171395, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2024) (citation omitted) (“The 15 issue of enforcing an unlawful detainer judgment is inextricably intertwined with the 16 judgment itself.”). Plaintiff’s claims are therefore “inextricably intertwined with the merits 17 of a state-court judgment” because they “succeed[] only to the extent that the state court 18 wrongly decided the issues before it.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012) 19 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 20 Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction to review or grant Plaintiff’s requested relief. 21 3. Failure to State a Claim and Immune Defendants 22 Lastly, for the same reasons previously discussed (see Abera II Order at 11), the 23 Complaint is also legally frivolous because: (1) it fails to state a claim for constitutional 24 violations against private individuals; and (2) Plaintiff impermissibly seeks relief against 25 several Defendants, including two state court judicial officers and the San Diego Sheriff’s 26 Department, “who are immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 27 Accordingly, the Complaint is subject to dismissal without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 28 F.3d at 1127 n.8 (“When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by 1 || definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”). 2 IV. CONCLUSION 3 For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows: 4 1. Plaintiff's IFP Application (Doc. 3) is GRANTED. 5 2. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND WITHOUT 6 LEAVE TO AMEND under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 7 3. Plaintiff's remaining motions (Docs. 2, 4-5, 7, 10) are DENIED AS MOOT. 8 See Olajide v. Brown, Case No. 18-cv-03991-CRB, 2018 WL 3328227, at *3 9 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2018) (dismissing complaint and denying TRO motion as 10 moot); Dudash vy. Ulloa, Case No.: 3:25-cv-1269-CAB-BLM, 2025 WL 11 1663395, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 11, 2025) (dismissing complaint and denying 12 plaintiff's motion for leave to electronically file documents as moot). 13 4. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to close the case and accept no 14 further filings, except a timely Notice of Appeal, which this Court 15 CERTIFIES would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 16 § 1915(a)(3). 17 Plaintiff is warned that if he makes any further duplicative filings in this Court, he 18 ||may be deemed a vexatious filer. If so, the Court may institute a prefiling bar requiring 19 || him to seek approval before he can file any further lawsuits. See, e.g., Lopez v. HSBC Bank 20 || USA, N.A., Case No. 8:19-cv-01816-JFW-KES, 2020 WL 7416930, at *2—8 (C.D. Cal. July 21 || 10, 2020) (declaring plaintiff a vexatious litigant where he filed numerous frivolous 22 actions, repeated previously dismissed claims, and filed procedurally improper appeals). 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 ||DATE: August 18, 2025 25 Gat Bemus, Micteryys □ 6 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ'MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 27 28