J. H. Gillis, J.
Defendant Robert Farrell, a Michigan resident, was the driver of a Michigan-licensed automobile which went out of control and rolled over a number of times while proceeding west on highway 401 in the Province of Ontario, Canada. Defendant Dietrich Leasing, Incorporated, is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Wayne county. Dietrich was the owner of the automobile being driven by Farrell.
At the time of the misfortune in Ontario, Farrell was en route from Buffalo, New York, to Detroit, his most direct route taking him through Ontario. There were 3 passengers in Farrell’s automobile, all of whom were New York residents: Leona Abend-schein, Darrell Abendschein and Penny Lipsitz. Leona was killed in the crash. Darrell, 12 years old, and Penny, 19 years old, were severely injured.
Plaintiff Earl Abendschein was the husband of Leona and is the personal representative of her estate. He also sues as guardian of Darrell. Plaintiff Paul Kanter is guardian for Penny. Appointments were made and letters were issued by the New York courts.
Plaintiffs brought this action in the circuit court for Wayne county alleging'that defendant Farrell operated the automobile in a grossly negligent manner with reckless and intentional disregard of his own safety and that of his passengers and was guilty of wanton and wilful misconduct. In particu[665]*665lar, it is alleged that Farrell consumed excessive amounts of alcohol both while driving and before driving with a conscious indifference to the safety of his passengers. Plaintiffs plead that Farrell drove his automobile at an excessive rate of speed (90 miles per hour around curves) over the protestations of his passengers, and refused to slow down on their demands.
Defendants moved for summary judgment in the trial court for plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (G-CR 1963, 117.2[1]). The motion urged that the issue of defendants’ liability must be governed by the law of Ontario, the place of the wrong. Ontario statutes (Ont Rev Stat c 172, § 105 [2] [1960]) deny recovery to a gratuitous passenger who is injured as a result of the negligence or gross negligence of the host-driver. No allegation is made that this was not a gratuitous guest-passenger relationship within the meaning of the Ontario statute.
Plaintiffs argued in the trial court, as they contend on this appeal, that Ontario law should not govern the issue of liability of a host-driver to his guest-passenger. New York allows recovery against the host for ordinary negligence (Babcock v. Jackson [1963], 12 NY2d 473 [240 NYS2d 743, 191 NE2d 279, 95 ALR2d 1]), and Michigan allows recovery for injuries sustained due to the driver’s gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct, OLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2101). Under the law of either New York or Michigan, plaintiffs have stated a good cause of action.
The trial judg’e granted the motion for summary judgment on the authority of Kaiser v. North (1939), 292 Mich 49, and dismissed the action. To be sure, Kaiser, decided some 29 years ago, does appear to [666]*666be on all fours with the present case, and to compel the result reached by the trial court.
In Kaiser, two Michigan residents were driving in Ontario where their automobile was involved in an accident. The Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal holding first, that the law of the place of the wrong governs (the lex loci delicti) and second, that the Ontario statute did not contravene the public policy of the State of Michigan. This precise issue of what law governs the host’s responsibility ;to his guest has not been questioned since 1939.1 In Goldberg v. Koppy Tool & Die Co. (1962), 365 Mich 469, the'Court spoke in terms of law governing the guest-passenger relationship but in actuality had before it. only the question of whether defendant was negligent under the law of Tennessee. The Court did apply Tennessee law to the duty owed the passenger by her host, but a careful reading will disclose that' the choice-of-laws problem was not raised or decided.
Thus in innumerable cases the Court has said that matters relating- to the existence of a right of action, that is whether a cause of action exists, are governed by the law of the place of the wrong, but, as in Goldberg, only decided that the issue of negligence is determined by law of the place of the wrong. Leebove v. Rovin (1961), 363 Mich 569; Blake v. Brama (1955), 343 Mich 27; Slayton v. Boesch (1946), 315 Mich 1. In other cases, the Court was deciding the applicable law governing substantive rights in a suit brought under a foreign statute, Summar v. Besser Manufacturing Co. (1945), 310 Mich 347; Howard [667]*667v. Pulver (1951), 329 Mich 415; Yount v. National Bank of Jackson (1950), 327 Mich 342.
In Bostrom v. Jennings (1949), 326 Mich 146, the Court held that the law of the place of the wrong governed the question of whether plaintiff-passenger was a joint adventurer with the driver-host. A careful reading of this case will reveal that the choice-of-laws problem was not decided. The question the Court had before it already assumed the applicability of foreign substantive law, and the Court decided whether the relationship was a matter of substance or procedure under local law.
Reviewing the post-Kaiser Michigan authority, we find that the only cases in which the Court was called upon to make a choice of conflicting substantive law were those in which the foreign standard of conduct was applied to a Michigan suit. That is, we are firmly committed to the notion that the substantive wrong being sued upon and the sufficiency of the alleged facts constituting that wrong must be governed by the law of the place of the wrong. While other cases recite a broad rule of governing laws, they were mere recitals and were not necessary to resolution of any choice of conflicting laws.
The case of Kaiser v. North, itself does specifically decide a conflicting choice-of-laws problem. Its holding cannot be distinguished from the pertinent issue in the present case; that is, that the law of the place of the wrong governs the rights and duties between nonresident hosts and passengers, who fortuitously happened to be in the state wherein the accident occurred. Plaintiffs do not attempt to distinguish the present case, and ask this Court to merely criticize the rule of Kaiser as presently being out of step with other jurisdictions. If Kaiser is to be over-iuled, to be sure that is the function of the Supreme Court.
[668]*668Kaiser is not based on any authority which remains viable today, and, although the operative facts in the present case are indistinguishable from Kaiser, the policy facts on which that decision rested have changed radically in the intervening years— so much so that one might question whether we are even deciding the same problems raised by the Kaiser situation. Kaiser’s emphasis on comity might lend support to the argument that that case no longer stands as authority.
Kaiser and the Michigan decisions predating that case reveal that our Courts have never expressed an independent analysis or reason for the rule therein stated. Lex loci delicti was the universal rule among the jurisdictions and universality of application made the rule not only desirable in terms of predictability, but almost automatic as well, with no alternative rules being presented to the courts. The authority referred to in Kaiser included Restatement of the Law, Conflicts, § 388; 15 CJS, Conflict of Laws, §§4, 12, pp 865, 899; Beale on Conflicts, § 378.4; Goodrich on Conflicts (1st ed) § 92, p 188; and the only Michigan case cited as authority was Eskovitz v. Berger (1936), 276 Mich 536.
Esl&ovits v. Berger is well illustrative of the point that the lex loci delicti rule had simply come to be accepted in Michigan, apparently because it was, at that time, the general if not the only rule available. In Esl&ovits two Michigan residents were injured in an automobile accident which occurred in the State of Ohio. Ohio allowed recovery by a guest passenger on a showing of ordinary negligence. The Ohio statute was held to govern in the Michigan lawsuit.
Although the language of the Esl&ovits opinion is phrased in all-encompassing, sweeping choice-of-laws language (“all matters relating to the right of action are governed by the laws of Ohio,” 276 Mich [669]*669536, 540) the decision did not deal with a choice-of-laws question. Even by the time Eskovits was decided, the doctrine of lex loci delicti was being automatically applied in this State. It is noteworthy that defendant’s brief in Eskovits did not even raise the choice-of-laws question.2 So automatic was the application of the law of the place of the wrong that defendant’s only issues on appeal were whether application of Ohio law contravened the public policy of Michigan and whether defendant was negligent under Ohio law.
Through the unfortunate use of the broad language as pointed out above, Eskovits has come to be cited as something of a leading case in this State on choice of applicable laws governing tort actions. Thus in the Kaiser Case, the unfortunate misapplication of Eskovits formed a questionable foundation for the decision.
There were other cases besides Eskovits which were decided prior to Kaiser, but like Eskovits did not actually decide the issue before the Court in Kaiser. Why Eskovits was chosen as authority is by now a historical curiosity- — other cases were only beside the point but Eskovits was unfortunate dictum. Of these pre-Kaiser decisions, the bulk deal with the law applicable to the standard of conduct or the substantive elements of the tort. It was universally accepted and would not be seriously disputed today that the measure of conduct is determined by the law of the place of the wrong, Stahl v. Bell (1936), 276 Mich 37; Meyer v. Weimaster (1936), 278 Mich 370; Edison v. Keene (1933), 262 Mich 611; and in Perkins v. Great Central Transport Corp. (1933), 262 Mich 616, a similar decision [670]*670was dictum since foreign and local law on contributory negligence were tbe same.
In Hazard v. Great Central Transport Corp. (1935), 270 Mich 60, the Court did employ some language which might indicate a choice of laws for governing legal incidents of relationships having-had some contact with Michigan. Again, however, this language was dictum, and the dispositive issue on appeal was whether the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence. In its dictum the decision cites the case of Young v. Masci (1933), 289 US 253 (53 S Ct 599, 77 L Ed 1158, 88 ALR 170), which merely decided whether New York could constitutionally apply its ownership statute to a New Jersey bailor of an automobile involved in an accident in New York. Young supports a broader multistate legislative jurisdiction — a wider choice of applicable laws rather than a narrow choice of laws formula.
In two early and “venerable” cases the Michigan Supreme Court applied Canadian law to injuries occurring in Canada. On the facts, however, they are distinguishable from the case at bar and from Kaiser, and were not cited in the Kaiser Case. In Wingert v. Wayne Circuit Judge (1894), 101 Mich 395, plaintiff’s decedent drowned in Canadian waters allegedly due to defendant’s negligence in Canada. Michigan had nothing to do with the relationship, the accident, or the injury and understandably, the Court held the Michigan statute inapplicable. It is doubtful whether a different conclusion could have been reached. See Home Insurance Company v. Dick (1930), 281 US 397 (50 S Ct 338, 74 L Ed 926, 74 ALR 701). The second of these early cases is Turner v. St. Clair Tunnel Co. (1897), 111 Mich 578 (36 LRA 134). A workman on the tunnel was injured when he was working on the Canadian side. It was held that whether the actions of his super[671]*671visor were negligent in failing to supervise properly was a question under Canadian law. Again, the conduct is measured by the law of the place of the wrong.
We have indulged this extensive review of Michigan authority to point out that Kaiser is the only decision in Michigan to decide the question of what law governs the legal incidents (the standard of care or duty owed) of a relationship having contact with more than one jurisdiction. Kaiser stands alone with no Michigan authority before or after its decision coming to its support. The decision itself does not purport to be making law but merely to be following established rules. Those rules are not only unsettled today, but are contrary to the modern trend of decisions. If this is so, if the very foundation facts on which Kaiser rests are no longer existent, then we cannot see why Kaiser should be held to control a new set of foundation facts.
The citation of Beale on Conflicts (§ 378.4) in Kaiser did express the prevailing lex loci delicti rule of the day. Professor Beale’s work was printed in 1935 and the author was also the reporter for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (section 388 of the Restatement was cited in Kaiser). Beale’s work would no longer be acceptable to the American Law Institute whose proposed Restatement 2d expressly repudiates the original view and that partially relied upon in Kaiser. See Restatement of the Law 2d, Conflict of Laws, Proposed Official Draft (May 1, 1968), §§ 145,3 1464 and following comments and reporter’s notes.
[672]*672The reference to Goodrich on Conflicts (1st ed) no doubt supported the proposition that lex loci delicti governs as to all matters relative to the right. The 4th edition (Scoles, 1964) of Goodrich on Conflicts dramatizes the evolution of choice-of-laws concepts over the intervening years, and this later edition of the work no longer supports a mechanical application of lex loci delicti to all aspects of the multistate tort case. See section 92 (p 165) et seq.:
“Frank recognition that the law by which the forum is guided in determining the issues in tort cases is that of the state which is most significantly related to the issue will avoid the mechanistic results that have characterized this area in the past. Courts will be required to make and perhaps to articulate pertinent policy considerations that will enable our common-law rules to develop commensurate with the growing complexity of multistate torts.” (Id, section 92 at pp 166, 167.)
The citation to 12 CJ, Conflict of Laws, § 35, p 452, and 15 CJS, Conflict of Laws (now obsolete), §§ 4,12, pp 865, 899, did reflect the general view as it existed in 1939, the publication date of the later volume. The view expressed in Corpus Juris, however, as we shall point out, is but the collection of prevail[673]*673ing views amongst the jurisdictions which has drastically and dramatically changed in recent years.
The Kaiser decision further cites the case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. (1909), 213 US 347 (29 S Ct 511, 53 L Ed 826), for the proposition that: “the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must he determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.” To be sure, we agree that whether or not activities in a foreign jurisdiction constitute a substantive wrong should be governed by the laws of that jurisdiction. That is not to say, however, that the territorial limitation of a state’s laws limits its application of its own laws to an issue with which it has a substantial and legitimate interest. Given the multistate legislative interest, American Banana imposes no choice-of-laws mandate on the respective states, Richards v. United States (1962), 369 US 1 (82 S Ct 585, 7 L Ed 2d 492). Such choice-of-laws rules, within the limit of legitimate governmental interest in the matter, have been and remain a matter of internal policy of the respective states, Richards, supra.
We are left with the inescapable conclusion that Kaiser was not the result of independent analysis based on facts similar to those now before us. Nowhere in Kaiser is inquiry made as to why the law of the place of the wrong should invariably govern the standard of care owed by parties to a relationship based primarily in a state other than that in which the injury occurred. We conclude that a necessary ingredient of the Kaiser decision was that the application of lex loci delicti as to any and all issues relating to the right was the universally accepted rule in this country. What should the result be on a re-examination of Kaiser when the very essential fact of universality and predictability are no longer existent? It appears to our minds that [674]*674Kaiser governs a fact situation which no longer exists. Under the facts of the present case, including the jurisdictional facts which are necessarily part of any conflicts or choice-of-laws rule, our Supreme Court should write on a clean slate. No Michigan decision has decided the issue of choice-of-laws amid a family of sister sovereignties who have chosen to apply the law of the place of most significant relationship with the particular issue in question.
In Reich v. Purcell (1967), 67 Cal 2d 551, 555 (63 Cal Rptr 31, 432 P2d 727), the California court forthrightly rejected the lex loci delicti rule in favor of the more flexible and modern approach of most significant relationship. Justice Traynor, writing for the court, stated:
“As jurisdiction after jurisdiction had departed from the law of the place of the wrong as the controlling law in tort cases, regardless of the issue involved * * * that law no longer affords even a semblance of the general application that was once thought to be its great virtue. We conclude that the law of the place of the wrong is not necessarily the applicable law for all tort actions brought in the courts of this state.”
We believe that Kaiser was predicated on this “general application” and that the reason having disappeared from the present case, that decision is simply no longer applicable. Ratio est legis anima; mutata legis ratione mutalur et lex.5
Indeed, the lex loci delicti formulation is no longer of general application. Nearly" every jurisdiction6 [675]*675which has recently considered the choice-of-laws issue in multistate torts has departed from the lex loci delicti formulation as to applicable law. The precise language and rules adopted by these jurisdictions vary in exact content but are unanimous in seeking a rule of governing law which will do justice in a particular case and vindicate the state’s policy having the most significant relationship with the particular issue of the case. Reich v. Purcell, supra;7 Babcock v. Jackson (1963), 12 NY2d 473 (240 NYS2d 743, 191 NE2d 279, 95 ALR2d 1);8 Wartell v. Formusa (1966), 34 Ill 2d 57 (213 NE2d 544); Balts v. Balts (1966), 273 Minn 419 (142 NW 2d 66);9 Clark v. Clark (1966), 107 NH 351 (222 A 2d 205);10 Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1964), 416 Pa 1 (203 A2d 796);11 Mellk v. Sarahson (1967), 49 NJ 226 (229 A2d 625);12 Wilcox v. Wilcox (1965), 26 Wis 2d 617 (133 NW2d 408); Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. of Fargo v. United States (DC ND, 1967), 272 F Supp 409; Casey v. Manson Construction & Engineering Company (1967), 247 Or 274 (428 P2d 898); Wessling v. Paris (Ky, 1967), 417 SW2d 259; Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc. (CA DC, 1965), 357 F2d 581.13
Concluding then, as we do, that every vestige of reason for the Kaiser decision has been stripped [676]*676away, it now remains to decide which law should govern the issue of duty owed by a host-driver to his guest-passenger. More particularly, we must analyze the respective interests of Ontario, New York and Michigan in resolving this issue and which of those interests will be served by application of that jurisdiction’s substantive rules.
The sole issue on this appeal is the duty attached to a legal relationship created and consummated in New York. We believe that State’s law should govern the duties and liabilities imposed through that relationship. Kaiser v. North, supra, which we are obligated to follow, compels a contrary conclusion. But to our minds it would seem only logical not to subject a one-time legal relationship such as host and passenger to a multitude of legal incidents, unanticipated by the parties, solely by virtue of crossing states’ lines.
Babcock v. Jackson, supra, is not explicit on this point. There, New York law was held to govern the issue of duty owed by a New York driver to a New York passenger who were involved in an automobile accident while passing through Ontario. The opinion talks both about the most significant relationship with the issue of duty owed, and a “grouping of contacts” approach to arriving at a choice of governing law. This has led to an uncertainty in the minds of some as to whether the test of Babcock is a qualitative appraisal of respective states’ interests or a mechanical (quantitative) counting or grouping of relevant contacts. See comment, 52 Va L Rev 302. The later decision in Dym v. Gordon (1965), 16 NY2d 120 (262 NYS2d 463, 209 NE2d 792), would make it appear that New York will identify the most significant relationship in terms of a quantitative counting of the contacts. Thus in Dym, two New York residents met in Colorado and were traveling [677]*677in that State when the accident occurred. Although Colorado had no more interest in the host-passenger liability there than Ontario had in Babcock, Colorado law was held to govern the liability issue apparently because it had the greatest number of contacts.
There would appear to be a common thread running through these cases of great weight being placed on the initial situs of the relationship whose legal incidents are in issue, or the place where that relationship was created.
A similar comparison can be found in New Hampshire. In Dow v. Larrabee (1966), 107 NH 70 (217 A2d 506), a New Hampshire resident went to Massachusetts to pick up another New Hampshire resident who had been staying in Massachusetts. On the return trip the accident occurred while the parties were still in Massachusetts. Although the New Hampshire court was applying the most significant interest formula, Massachusetts’ law was held to govern because it was there the guest-passenger relation was created. In Clark v. Clark, supra, decided later that year by the same court, two New Hampshire residents were driving from one point in that state to another when they passed through Vermont. The accident occurred in Vermont, and the law of that State required gross negligence for a guest-passenger action. In Clark, however, the guest-passenger relation arose in New Hampshire and that State’s law was held to govern.
The many cases dealing with the issue of intrafamilial liability have likewise been governed by the law of the situs of the relationship, Emery v. Emery (1955), 45 Cal 2d 421 (289 P2d 218); Wartell v. Formusa, supra; Balts v. Balts, supra; Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corporation (1958), 27 NJ 1 (141 A2d 34). Although explained on the basis that the domicile state has the most significant interest in [678]*678the family relationship (Wartell, supra, 34 Ill 2d 57, 59 [213 NE2d 544, 545]) it is not unlike other legal relationships which may exist within the state as well. The gist, we believe, aside from the somewhat exceptional nature of family law, is that the state in which the legal incidents of a relationship are primarily situate has the most significant interest in governing that relationship for choice-of-law purposes.
We believe this to be the better and more logical choice of law as to this issue of a host’s duty to his guest. Defendant Farrell went into New York and there the guest-passenger relationships were formed. All parties could reasonably anticipate, on beginning the trip from Buffalo to Detroit, that New York’s law might govern the rights incident to that relationship. We do not rest this decision, on any pretense of a contract made in Buffalo relative to the carriage to Detroit. There was an agreement, however, by which defendant agreed to become a host-driver and his passengers agreed to ride with him. The agreement, and consequently the relationship, was born in New York and was a creature of New York law. If the parties had contemplated the governing law at the inception of their relationship, we can only say, in the absence of a contrary showing, that they would contemplate application of New York’s rules. We cannot say that under such an arrangement these New York parties would have contemplated application of Ontario or even Michigan law to their relationship. One might imagine the surprise of a New York resident out for a ride over to Ontario where he now finds out that his driver is free to indulge in the most wanton misconduct without fear of liability.
Ontario has no genuine interest in whether a New York passenger can recover for the wrongful acts [679]*679óf a Michigan host-driver, driving a Michigan vehicle. The policy behind the Ontario statute involved in this case was to prevent fraudulent and collusive suits against a gratuitous host’s insurer. See Bab-cock v. Jackson, supra, citing article at 1 Toronto LJ 358 (1936); see, also, 67 Columbia L Rev 459. Ontario’s policy will be neither served nor thwarted by the imposition of liability in this present case — a Canadian insurer not being involved. Ontario simply has no interest in the resolution of this issue and there is no good reason why its laws should serve such an ignoble purpose in this'case.
Because we do not believe that Michigan has the most significant relationship with Farrell’s responsibility to his passengers, we need not reach the question of whether this State would be free to apply its .own substantive rules of liability. See Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, supra.
Ontario has the primary interest in the conduct taking place on the highways and roads within the province. It is generally accepted that as to the substantive wrong, i.e., whether the conduct constituted negligence or gross negligence, the law of the place of the wrong governs. Babcock v. Jackson, supra; Reich v. Purcell, supra; Williams v. Rawl-ings Truck Line, Inc., supra. Ontario’s interest in this aspect of the case is prime. The decisions of this State which have considered the question will support the application of Ontario law to determine whether the defendant Farrell’s conduct was tor-tious.
Kaiser v. North, however empty a shell, remains for its destruction by its creating tribunal. "We urge a fresh look at the dictates of lex loci delicti and are hopeful that plaintiff will so pursue his cause. In our desire to have this rule re-examined we share the expression of the late Judge Robert M. Toms, [680]*680when, in speaking of his duty to precedent, he stated (as quoted in Detroit Edison Company v. Janoss [1957], 350 Mich 606, 614):
“ ‘The court fervently hopes the petitioners in this case will appeal his decision and that it will be promptly and definitely reversed by the Supreme Court in which event the court will join a host of others in dancing in the streets.’ ”
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
Quinn, J., concurred with j. H. Giulis, J.