Cite as 2020 Ark. 47 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-19-597
ABDULHAKIM MUHAMMAD Opinion Delivered: January 30, 2020
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT AND V. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT APPELLANT’S BRIEF STATE OF ARKANSAS [NO. 39CV-19-32] APPELLEE HONORABLE RICHARD L. PROCTOR, JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION MOOT.
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
Appellant Abdulhakim Muhammad appeals from the denial of his pro se petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl.
2016). Because Muhammad stated no basis for the writ, the circuit court’s order is
affirmed.1
I. Background
In 2011, Muhammad entered a plea of guilty to capital murder, attempted capital
murder, and ten counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm. The charges arose out of a
1 In the course of this appeal, Muhammad filed a motion to supplement his brief-in- chief in which he reiterates the arguments that he raised in the brief. Inasmuch as Muhammad failed to state a basis for the writ and the motion repeats the claims already advanced, the motion is moot. shooting in 2009 at a military recruiting station in Little Rock in which one soldier was
killed and another soldier was wounded. Twelve life sentences plus 540 months’
imprisonment were imposed to be served consecutively. Muhammad filed the petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the county where he is incarcerated in 2019. Gardner v. Kelley,
2018 Ark. 300 (Any petition for writ of habeas corpus to effect the release of a prisoner is
properly addressed to the circuit court in which the prisoner is held in custody, unless the
petition is filed pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001 seeking scientific testing of evidence.); see
also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201 (Repl. 2016) (providing that petitions under Act 1780
are brought in the court in which the petitioner’s convictions were entered).
II. Grounds for Issuance of the Writ
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its
face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Philyaw v. Kelley, 2015 Ark.
465, 477 S.W.3d 503. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the
subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris, 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007).
When the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and also has jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the court has authority to render the judgment. Johnson v. State,
298 Ark. 479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989).
Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his actual innocence
and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the
judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or
other evidence of probable cause to believe that he is being illegally detained. Ark. Code 2 Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). Unless the petitioner can show that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a
finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Fields v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 416.
III. Standard of Review
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld
unless it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision
is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court,
after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id.
IV. Issues on Appeal
A. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
Muhammad argued in his petition for the writ, and he repeats in this appeal in
Points One and Two, that the State lacked jurisdiction to try him for the offenses because
the offenses were referred to by several congressmen and a government official as
“international terrorism” committed by a “foreign terrorist organization.” He contended
that only a federal court had authority to try such offenses. As support for the assertion,
Muhammad pointed to the fact that the victims were awarded the Purple Heart medal,
alleging that the perpetrator of an offense that resulted in the victim’s being awarded a
military medal could only be an “enemy combatant or international terrorist or both,” and
a state trial court lacked jurisdiction to try an enemy combatant or an international
3 terrorist. He further alleged that he was denied the right to raise defenses in state court
that would have been available to him in a federal or military court.
Muhammad’s argument is without merit. Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty,
the State of Arkansas may prosecute any person whose conduct violated state law even if
the person’s conduct also violated federal law. Hale v. State, 336 Ark. 345, 985 S.W.2d 303
(1999). When a defendant violates the peace and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking the
laws of each, he or she has committed two distinct offenses; thus, the dual-sovereignty
doctrine provides that successive prosecutions by the two sovereigns are not prohibited and
are not barred by the double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. (Prosecution for violation of Arkansas law after the defendant entered
plea bargain on federal charges arising from the same conduct fell within the dual-
sovereignty doctrine and thus did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under the facts
of the case.); see also State v. Johnson, 330 Ark. 636, 956 S.W.2d 181 (1997) (noting that,
according to the “dual sovereignty doctrine,” the defendant who in a single act violates the
peace and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking laws of each has committed two distinct
offenses). The United States Supreme Court has long held that conduct that is a crime
under federal law may be prosecuted by a state when the same conduct is a crime under the
State’s law. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). Thus, the fact that
Muhammad’s conduct could have been charged as a crime under a federal statute did not
prohibit the State of Arkansas from trying him in state court, and he did not demonstrate
that the trial court in his case lacked jurisdiction in the case.
4 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Muhammad alleged that his plea of guilty was not valid because he was not afforded
effective assistance of counsel when he entered the plea. As support for the claim, he cited
a number of ways that counsel fell short of representing him adequately and asserted that
the judgment entered on his plea of guilty should be vacated because the plea was not
intelligently and voluntarily entered.
We have held that a petitioner’s allegation that he or she was induced to plead
guilty by virtue of improvident advice from counsel and generally deficient representation
constitutes an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel with the underlying claim that
the plea was not entered intelligently and voluntarily because of the advice provided by
counsel. See Griffin v. State, 2018 Ark. 10, 535 S.W.3d 261. Claims of ineffective
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Cite as 2020 Ark. 47 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-19-597
ABDULHAKIM MUHAMMAD Opinion Delivered: January 30, 2020
APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT AND V. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT APPELLANT’S BRIEF STATE OF ARKANSAS [NO. 39CV-19-32] APPELLEE HONORABLE RICHARD L. PROCTOR, JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION MOOT.
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
Appellant Abdulhakim Muhammad appeals from the denial of his pro se petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101 (Repl.
2016). Because Muhammad stated no basis for the writ, the circuit court’s order is
affirmed.1
I. Background
In 2011, Muhammad entered a plea of guilty to capital murder, attempted capital
murder, and ten counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm. The charges arose out of a
1 In the course of this appeal, Muhammad filed a motion to supplement his brief-in- chief in which he reiterates the arguments that he raised in the brief. Inasmuch as Muhammad failed to state a basis for the writ and the motion repeats the claims already advanced, the motion is moot. shooting in 2009 at a military recruiting station in Little Rock in which one soldier was
killed and another soldier was wounded. Twelve life sentences plus 540 months’
imprisonment were imposed to be served consecutively. Muhammad filed the petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the county where he is incarcerated in 2019. Gardner v. Kelley,
2018 Ark. 300 (Any petition for writ of habeas corpus to effect the release of a prisoner is
properly addressed to the circuit court in which the prisoner is held in custody, unless the
petition is filed pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001 seeking scientific testing of evidence.); see
also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201 (Repl. 2016) (providing that petitions under Act 1780
are brought in the court in which the petitioner’s convictions were entered).
II. Grounds for Issuance of the Writ
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its
face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Philyaw v. Kelley, 2015 Ark.
465, 477 S.W.3d 503. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the
subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris, 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007).
When the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the appellant and also has jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the court has authority to render the judgment. Johnson v. State,
298 Ark. 479, 769 S.W.2d 3 (1989).
Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his actual innocence
and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the
judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or
other evidence of probable cause to believe that he is being illegally detained. Ark. Code 2 Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016). Unless the petitioner can show that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face, there is no basis for a
finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Fields v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 416.
III. Standard of Review
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld
unless it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon, 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision
is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court,
after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id.
IV. Issues on Appeal
A. The Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
Muhammad argued in his petition for the writ, and he repeats in this appeal in
Points One and Two, that the State lacked jurisdiction to try him for the offenses because
the offenses were referred to by several congressmen and a government official as
“international terrorism” committed by a “foreign terrorist organization.” He contended
that only a federal court had authority to try such offenses. As support for the assertion,
Muhammad pointed to the fact that the victims were awarded the Purple Heart medal,
alleging that the perpetrator of an offense that resulted in the victim’s being awarded a
military medal could only be an “enemy combatant or international terrorist or both,” and
a state trial court lacked jurisdiction to try an enemy combatant or an international
3 terrorist. He further alleged that he was denied the right to raise defenses in state court
that would have been available to him in a federal or military court.
Muhammad’s argument is without merit. Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty,
the State of Arkansas may prosecute any person whose conduct violated state law even if
the person’s conduct also violated federal law. Hale v. State, 336 Ark. 345, 985 S.W.2d 303
(1999). When a defendant violates the peace and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking the
laws of each, he or she has committed two distinct offenses; thus, the dual-sovereignty
doctrine provides that successive prosecutions by the two sovereigns are not prohibited and
are not barred by the double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Id. (Prosecution for violation of Arkansas law after the defendant entered
plea bargain on federal charges arising from the same conduct fell within the dual-
sovereignty doctrine and thus did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under the facts
of the case.); see also State v. Johnson, 330 Ark. 636, 956 S.W.2d 181 (1997) (noting that,
according to the “dual sovereignty doctrine,” the defendant who in a single act violates the
peace and dignity of two sovereigns by breaking laws of each has committed two distinct
offenses). The United States Supreme Court has long held that conduct that is a crime
under federal law may be prosecuted by a state when the same conduct is a crime under the
State’s law. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (2019). Thus, the fact that
Muhammad’s conduct could have been charged as a crime under a federal statute did not
prohibit the State of Arkansas from trying him in state court, and he did not demonstrate
that the trial court in his case lacked jurisdiction in the case.
4 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Muhammad alleged that his plea of guilty was not valid because he was not afforded
effective assistance of counsel when he entered the plea. As support for the claim, he cited
a number of ways that counsel fell short of representing him adequately and asserted that
the judgment entered on his plea of guilty should be vacated because the plea was not
intelligently and voluntarily entered.
We have held that a petitioner’s allegation that he or she was induced to plead
guilty by virtue of improvident advice from counsel and generally deficient representation
constitutes an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel with the underlying claim that
the plea was not entered intelligently and voluntarily because of the advice provided by
counsel. See Griffin v. State, 2018 Ark. 10, 535 S.W.3d 261. Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel are not cognizable as a ground for the writ. McConaughy v. Lockhart,
310 Ark. 686, 840 S.W.2d 166 (1992). Any allegation that Muhammad desired to raise
pertaining to the adequacy of counsel should have been raised in a timely petition under
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 (2011). See State v. Tejeda-Acosta, 2013 Ark.
217, 427 S.W.3d 673. A habeas proceeding is not a substitute for a petition under the
Rule, nor does a habeas proceeding afford the petitioner an opportunity to reargue issues
already raised under the Rule or to raise new issues that could have been raised within the
purview of the Rule. See Gardner, 2018 Ark. 300; Barber v. Kelley, 2017 Ark. 214.
HART, J., concurs.
5 JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Justice, concurring. I agree that the circuit court did
not err in denying Muhammad’s habeas petition. I disagree, however, with how the
majority has handled his “motion to supplement” his brief. Muhammad’s has stated an
insufficient rationale for supplementing his main brief; he ascribes his failure to include
the material in his main brief to “inadvertence.” However, Muhammad’s “motion” also
includes the material that he wished to include in his main brief, and it does not actually
raise any new arguments. Further, Muhammad’s “motion” was filed on September 30,
2019, just three days after the State filed its appellee’s brief. Accordingly, this court
should have treated his “motion” as a reply brief. That way, we would have given
Muhammad his full measure of due process.
This court does not ignore motions filed by free-world appellants and, after the
case is submitted, declare the motions moot. We should treat all the appellants that
come before this court equally.
I concur.
Abdulhakim Muhammad, pro se appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.