Abdul-Haqq v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAMILAH ABDUL-HAQQ, Case No. 3:19-cv-03727-JD

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 v. RE THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP 10 PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC., et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Plaintiff Jamilah Abdul-Haqq filed this lawsuit against defendants The Permanente 14 Medical Group (TPMG), Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (KFH), the California Nurses Association 15 (CNA), and eight individuals, asserting various claims arising from her employment with TPMG. 16 Dkt. No. 20. The Court dismissed all the claims except for Abdul-Haqq’s wrongful termination 17 claim against TPMG and her claim for violation of the duty of fair representation against CNA, 18 Dkt. No. 82, and subsequently granted summary judgment for CNA on that count, Dkt. Nos. 155, 19 156. 20 Consequently, the sole remaining claim in this case is whether TPMG wrongfully 21 terminated Abdul-Haqq from her job as a nurse in violation of public policy. Dkt. No. 82. The 22 Court initially understood that this claim related only to Abdul-Haqq’s allegations of retaliation 23 for filing workplace complaints, id., but the parties discussed disability discrimination as another 24 potential public policy ground in their cross-motions for summary judgment, and so that will be 25 taken up here as well. Dkt. No. 121 (TPMG motion); Dkt. No. 126 (Abdul-Haqq motion). 26 The record before the Court indicated that TPMG had legitimate, non-discriminatory and 27 non-pretextual reasons for terminating Abdul-Haqq’s employment, and Abdul-Haqq did not 1 157. Even so, out of an abundance of caution in light of Abdul-Haqq’s pro se status, the Court 2 held a hearing on July 21, 2022, to allow Abdul-Haqq to identify the evidence that might warrant a 3 trial. Dkt. Nos. 157, 177. The parties’ familiarity with the record is assumed, and summary 4 judgment is granted in TPMG’s favor. 5 STANDARDS 6 Parties “may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense -- or the part 7 of each claim or defense -- on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary 8 judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 9 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine “if 10 the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 11 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 12 A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See id. 13 To determine whether a genuine dispute as to any material fact exists, the Court views the 14 evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and “all justifiable inferences are to 15 be drawn” in that party’s favor. Id. at 255. The moving party may initially establish the absence 16 of a genuine issue of material fact by “pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of 17 evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 18 (1986). It is then the nonmoving party’s burden to go beyond the pleadings and identify specific 19 facts that show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 323-24. “A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is 20 merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact.” 21 Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). 22 “It is not the Court’s responsibility to root through the record to establish the absence of 23 factual disputes, or to look for evidence on the nonmoving parties’ behalf.” CZ Servs., Inc. v. 24 Express Scripts Holding Co., No. 3:18-cv-04217-JD, 2020 WL 4368212, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 25 2020) (citations omitted); see also Winding Creek Solar LLC v. Peevey, 293 F. Supp. 3d 980, 989 26 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 932 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2019). 27 1 DISCUSSION 2 “The central assertion of a claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy is 3 that the employer’s motives for terminating the employee are so contrary to fundamental norms 4 that the termination inflicted an injury sounding in tort.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 5 686, 702 (2009) (citing Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 176 (1980)). To prove a 6 wrongful-termination claim, Abdul-Haqq must show that TPMG terminated her employment, that 7 “the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy,” and that “the 8 discharge caused [her] harm.” Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc., 229 Cal. App. 4th 144, 154 9 (2014). 10 Under California law, “disability discrimination can form the basis of a common law 11 wrongful discharge claim.” City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143, 1161 (1998). 12 For Abdul-Haqq to prove wrongful termination in this context, she must show that TPMG 13 terminated her employment “because of the disability.” Prue v. Brady Co./San Diego, Inc., 242 14 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1378 (2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 15 TPMG presented solid evidence of non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Abdul- 16 Haqq’s employment. Several doctors reported that Abdul-Haqq committed errors in delivering 17 nursing care, such as delay in administering medication and in responding to her work phone 18 while on duty, delay in registering medication that had been administered, and failure to notify a 19 treating physician that a patient under her care was hypotensive. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 121-1, Exhs. 20 C, D, F, H. Additionally, an investigation found that Abdul-Haqq “participated in an 21 inappropriate, unprofessional and loud hostile verbal argument with another employee that 22 continued on throughout patient care areas” in the emergency department. Id., Exh. B. TPMG has 23 also submitted evidence that Abdul-Haqq avoided meeting with a supervisor to discuss these 24 incidents, and the meetings that did occur did not resolve the supervisor’s concerns. Dkt. No. 121- 25 1 ¶¶ 9-10, 14, 16, 20, 23 (Gaustad declaration); see also id., Exhs. A, E. Consequently, the burden 26 shifted to Abdul-Haqq to “demonstrate a triable issue by producing substantial evidence that the 27 employer’s stated reasons were untrue or pretextual, or that the employer acted with a 1 engaged in intentional discrimination or other unlawful action.” Serri v. Santa Clara Univ., 226 2 Cal. App. 4th 830, 861 (2014) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 3 Abdul-Haqq has not adduced evidence that TPMG’s reasons for terminating her 4 employment were pretextual, or that TPMG otherwise acted with discriminatory intent. 5 “[G]enerally, pretext may be demonstrated by showing the proffered reason had no basis in fact, 6 the proffered reason did not actually motivate the discharge, or, the proffered reason was 7 insufficient to motivate discharge.” Zamora v. Sec. Indus. Specialists, Inc., 71 Cal. App. 5th 1, 56 8 (2021) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Again, the record shows that TPMG received 9 multiple reports that Abdul-Haqq did not comply with its standards and policies, with implications 10 for patient wellbeing. In response, Abdul-Haqq alleges inconsistencies in her disciplinary 11 paperwork, disagrees with how TPMG handled her case, and says that a “computer problem was 12 the root cause of the alleged” nursing errors. Dkt. No. 126 at 15. But the evidence she has 13 identified is insufficient to demonstrate that TPMG’s reasons were pretextual. See Wills v. 14 Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 4th 143, 160 (2011) (“The employee cannot simply show that the 15 employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether 16 discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, 17 prudent, or competent.” (cleaned up)). 18 To the extent that Abdul-Haqq’s claim for wrongful termination is premised upon 19 retaliation, it fares no better. “In summary judgment proceedings, a FEHA [California Fair 20 Employment and Housing Act] retaliation claim is treated the same as a FEHA discrimination 21 claim: Where the employer presents admissible evidence . . . that the adverse employment action 22 was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory factors, the employer will be entitled 23 to summary judgment unless the employee produces admissible evidence which raises a triable 24 issue of fact material to the employer’s showing.” Wilkin v. Cmty. Hosp. of the Monterey 25 Peninsula, 71 Cal. App. 5th 806, 828 (2021) (cleaned up). Abdul-Haqq did not adduce evidence 26 to the effect that TPMG’s reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual. She points to 27 the timing of an EEOC contact with TPMG in July 2016 and her suspension in August 2016, Dkt. 1 || Kaiser Permanente Int’l, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1112 (2007). Temporal proximity is also 2 || insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact when combined with her other evidence, 3 such as the problems with her disciplinary paperwork. 4 Consequently, TPMG is entitled to judgment in its favor. Abdul-Haqq’s motion for 5 summary judgment is denied for the same reasons. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: October 12, 2022 8 9 JAMESYPONATO 10 United {tates District Judge 11 12

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