Abdiyou v. Reigler

• Court: District Court, W.D. Michigan
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00919
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

ABDIRIZAK ABDIYOW,

Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-919

v. Honorable Sally J. Berens

UNKNOWN REIGLER,

Defendant. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a county detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the

summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all

proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendant has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that he is not presently a party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way Defendant is not a party who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),

1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion I. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee presently incarcerated at the Kent County Correctional Facility (KCCF) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Plaintiff sues KCCF Deputy/Correctional Officer Unknown Reigler in his personal capacity. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Plaintiff alleges that on July 24, 2025, Defendant Reigler opened a piece of Plaintiff’s legal mail and gave that mail to another inmate in Plaintiff’s housing unit. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff avers

that the envelope was clearly marked “Attorney/Client Privilege[;] Open in Presence of Addressee Only.” (Id.) Plaintiff avers that by giving the mail to another inmate, Defendant Reigler “allow[ed]

1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). this inmate to read [Plaintiff’s] mail [that is] supposed to be confidential[,] giving this inmate knowledge he’s not supposed to have regarding [Plaintiff’s] case.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he learned about this incident “during morning cleanup” from the inmate who received Plaintiff’s mail. (Id.) The inmate told Plaintiff that “sometime during the night or early morning,” Defendant Reigler gave the piece of mail to the other inmate, and the

other inmate “read what was inside the envelope.” (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a kite about the issue, stating that if camera footage was reviewed, the sergeants would be able to see “the deputy stopping at an inmate[’]s door and proceed to give him mail and the same inmate later that morning [stopping] at [Plaintiff’s] cell and hand[ing] [Plaintiff his] mail through the crack of the door.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the mail in question was stamped as received on July 23, 2025, and that he was not called out to receive any mail on that date. (Id.) Based upon the foregoing, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to assert various constitutional claims related to the handling of this piece of legal mail. As relief, Plaintiff seeks $50,000.00 in damages. (Id.)

II. Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “‘to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983

is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). In Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 873–74 (6th Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit considered multiple potential sources of protection for legal mail, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances, the First Amendment right of access to the courts, and the prisoner’s general interest in protecting the attorney-client privilege. Simply calling a particular correspondence “legal mail,” however, does not implicate each and every one of those protections. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only to criminal prosecutions. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576–77 (1974) (“As to the Sixth Amendment, its reach is only to protect the attorney-client relationship from intrusion in the criminal setting . . . .”); see also Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, Plaintiff references that the piece of mail in question was from an attorney, and that the other inmate was able to gain knowledge about Plaintiff’s “case.” (Compl., ECF No. 1,

PageID.3.) To the extent Plaintiff’s reference to a “case” indicates a pending criminal proceeding, he fails to set forth adequate facts suggesting a Sixth Amendment violation. To state a claim for interference with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, “there must be some allegation indicating an interference with the prisoner’s relationship with counsel.” Stanley, 602 F.3d at 770. While the Court certainly does not condone any situation where legal mail regarding one inmate’s pending criminal proceedings is provided to another inmate, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that this incident interfered with his relationship with counsel. Accordingly, any intended Sixth Amendment claim will be dismissed. Interference with legal mail might also implicate a prisoner’s First Amendment right to

access the courts. To state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show “actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1000 (6th Cir. 1992). In other words, a plaintiff must plead that the defendants’ actions have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351–53; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there may be an actual injury: Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. “Thus, a prisoner’s right to access the courts extends to direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc).2 In addition, the Supreme Court squarely has held that “the underlying cause of action...is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). “Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.” Id. at 415. Here, Plaintiff does not allege any negative consequence he has suffered in his criminal case. Accordingly, he has failed to state a First Amendment “access to the courts” claim. Plaintiffs allegations also implicate the protections afforded confidential communications between attorney and client. The Sixth Circuit has found “that the prisoner’s interest in unimpaired, confidential communication with an attorney is an integral component of the judicial process and,

therefore, that as a matter of law, mail from an attorney implicates a prisoner’s protected legal mail rights.” Sallier, 343 F.3d at 877.

2 Of course, a detainee has a right to access the courts in his initial criminal prosecution as well. The Sixth Circuit has consistently ruled that an inmate’s right of access to the courts is fully protected if he is represented by counsel. Skelton v. Pri–Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 104 (6th Cir. 1991); Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d 639, 640 (6th Cir. 1983) (“By [plaintiff’s] own admission, it is clear that counsel was appointed to represent him in both federal and state actions pending against him. As a matter of law, therefore, the state fulfilled its constitutional obligation to provide him with full access to the courts.”). Plaintiff does not allege facts that support an inference that Defendant interfered with the protection afforded by the appointment of counsel as a result of the brief delay in Plaintiff’s receipt of his legal mail. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the envelope in which the mail was sent was clearly marked “Attorney/Client Privilege[;] Open in Presence of Addressee Only.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Even assuming for purposes of this opinion that this piece of mail had been sent by Plaintiff’s attorney and that Defendant had been able to confirm that fact pursuant to KCCF policies, the isolated instance of interference with legal mail that Plaintiff describes does not rise

to the level of a First Amendment violation. The Sixth Circuit has held that “‘blatant disregard’ for mail handling regulations concerning legal mail violates constitutional protections,” Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (discussing that “[t]wo or three pieces of mail opened in an arbitrary or capricious way suffice to state a claim” (citing Sallier, 343 F.3d at 879–80; Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 1993)). However, “isolated instances of interference with prisoners’ mail” may not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under the First Amendment. See Johnson v. Wilkinson, No. 98-3866, 2000 WL 1175519, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (“This random and isolated interference with Johnson’s mail did not violate his constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)); see also Gardner v.

Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that an “isolated incident, without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with [the inmate’s] right to counsel or to access to the courts, does not give rise to a constitutional violation” (citations omitted)); Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App’x 182, 184 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “Okoro was only able to provide one specific incident where he allegedly did not receive the full contents of a letter from his wife,” and concluding that “[s]uch a random and isolated incident is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation” (citation omitted)); cf. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson for the holding that “isolated interference” with prisoners’ rights may not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation). Indeed, the Sixth Amendment has relied upon Colvin to confirm that a single isolated event of tampering with legal mail “does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” See Smith v. Goostrey, No. 23-1025, 2023 WL 5024659, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023). Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the mishandling of his incoming legal mail on one occasion was an isolated occurrence. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations

are not sufficient to set forth any constitutional claims premised upon the interference with his incoming legal mail. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United

States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 610–11. A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: September 2, 2025 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS United States Magistrate Judge