Abdel Karim Dandis v. Hi-Rev Performance

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 19, 2025
• Docket: A-0740-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0740-24

ABDEL KARIM DANDIS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

HI-REV PERFORMANCE,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted November 5, 2025 – Decided November 19, 2025

Before Judges Perez Friscia and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. LT-004328-24.

Bastarrika Soto Gonzalez & Somohano, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Franklin G. Soto, on the brief).

Goodman Galluccio and Chessin, attorneys for respondent (Neil Chessin, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Hi-Rev Performance appeals from the October 15, 2024

Special Civil Part judgment of possession entered in favor of plaintiff Abdel Karim Dandis based on the parties' lease being void ab initio and nonpayment

of rent. After reviewing the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law, we

reverse.

I.

We derive the following salient facts from the trial record. On about May

1, 2024, Dandis purchased a commercial building located at 189-193 Railroad

Avenue, Paterson, New Jersey (the property) from 183-191 Railroad Ave, LLC

(Railroad LLC). Dandis negotiated the purchase of the property with Giorgio

Klinar, the owner of Railroad LLC. The property had multiple commercial

units, which were occupied by tenants. At the time Dandis purchased the

property, defendant was a tenant in unit three for over ten years.

Defendant had entered leases in 2016 and 2019 that designated the

commercial use of unit three as "automotive repair." In April 2022, defendant

signed a new lease with Railroad LLC. The 2022 lease incorrectly listed under

Article I that defendant could use the property "for general office space in

connection with [t]enant's special needs advocacy business." Further, under

Article V, the lease incorrectly listed defendant's unit as general office space

used in connection with a mortgage business. The lease was for a five-year term

and terminated on April 30, 2027.

A-0740-24 2 At trial, Dandis testified that he filed a complaint on August 1, 2024, after

serving defendant with a notice to cease on May 2, 2024. Dandis' complaint

sought to "permanently remove" the tenant for "[n]onpayment of [r]ent" and

"other." Defendant attached the "Appendix XI-X Verified Complaint –

Nonpayment of Rent" form, also filed on August 1, alleging that defendant had

failed to pay rent of $3,250 for August 2024. Dandis' "Landlord Case

Information Statement" provided that the causes of action were for nonpayment

of rent and "Other (Holdover/For Cause)." Dandis' notice to cease stated that

defendant may be evicted for "using the premises in violation of your lease" as

"Article V allows only use as [a] general office space." The notice asserted

defendant was "operating an auto repair/mechanic shop" that was not permitted

under the lease.

Dandis further testified that on June 5, 2024, he had served defendant with

a notice terminating the lease. The notice stated, "You have continued to use

the premises in violation of your lease" and "Article V only allows use as [a]

general office space." Dandis testified that when he purchased the property,

defendant was using the property for an "office and [was] selling parts." Further,

Dandis alleged that after he purchased the property, defendant began using the

property for a mechanic and autobody shop, having installed car lifts and an

A-0740-24 3 epoxy floor. Additionally, he asserted defendant failed to pay rent for "August,

September, and October" 2024.

During cross-examination, Dandis acknowledged he had toured the

property before purchasing it and did not observe a mortgage banking business

or special needs advocacy business being operated in defendant's unit. He

admitted that the lease rider provided defendant was bound to an "environmental

clause." After defense counsel directly asked whether Klinar had explained that

defendant's business was an automotive repair business, Dandis responded that

he was only "[i]ncidentally" told "what the business was."

Klinar testified that he and Dandis went to the building "multiple times."

He explained Dandis "knew from the beginning . . . what we had there," noting

there were lifts in defendant's unit prior to the building's sale, and defendant's

certificate of occupancy (CO) was "for a mechanic shop." Klinar explained that

Railroad LLC had leased another property to a special needs advocacy business

and defendant's listed use in its lease "was a mistake from [his] team." Klinar

testified that he had explained to Dandis that defendant was in the automotive

repair business. On cross-examination, Klinar did not know if the property's

real estate listing delineated the unit's use, but he believed the pictures of the

unit showed the car lifts.

A-0740-24 4 Ariel Deleon, defendant's owner, testified that he had been a tenant at the

property for over ten years and had always operated an automotive repair

business. Deleon relayed the first two leases entered provided for the operation

of an automotive repair business and he entered the third lease believing "it was

exactly the same." Recalling Dandis' visit to his business prior to purchase,

Deleon explained that he spoke directly with Dandis and provided him with a

tour of the unit. Deleon asserted the car lifts were visible during the tour.

Regarding signage at the property, Deleon indicated that the current sign at the

property reads "Hi-Rev Performance, Full Service Automotive Repair Shop."

Further, he explained that since 2015, the CO for the unit has been for "Office

and [A]utomotive Repair."

The court entered a judgment of possession for plaintiff accompanied by

a limited oral decision. The court found the lease was void ab initio, because

"there is no lease that is now in existence," and rent was "due and owing" for

$9,750. Regarding defendant's use of the property, the court noted it "ha[d] been

used as a repair mechanic shop."

On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in: determining that the

lease agreement was void ab initio; and failing to make any real formal inquiry

between the litigants with respect to the issue of rent.

A-0740-24 5 II.

We begin by recognizing the well-established standard of review of an

appeal from a bench trial. We "review a 'trial court's determinations, premised

on the testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in

accordance with a deferential standard.'" Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466

N.J. Super. 325, 336 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216

N.J. 168, 182 (2013)). We will "'not disturb the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the trial judge' unless convinced that those findings and

conclusions were 'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests

of justice.'" Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)

(quoting Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

"[A] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow

from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell

& Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.

Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

A "lease is a contract . . . which sets forth [the parties'] rights and

obligations to each other in connection with [a] temporary grant of possession

of [one party's] property to [the other party]." Town of Kearny v. Disc. City of

A-0740-24 6 Old Bridge, Inc., 205 N.J. 386, 411 (2011). "It is well-settled that '[c]ourts

enforce contracts "based on the intent of the parties, the express terms of the

contract, surrounding circumstances and the underlying purpose of the

contract."'" Barila v. Bd. of Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 615-16 (2020)

(alteration in original) (quoting In re County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 254

(2017)). "The court's role is to consider the agreement's terms 'in the context of

the circumstances under which it was written,' 'accord to the language a rational

meaning in keeping with the expressed general purpose[,]' and apply the

agreement accordingly." Accounteks.Net, Inc. v. CKR Law, LLP, 475 N.J.

Super. 493, 504 (App. Div. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Conway v.

287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259, 269 (2006)). "The plain language of the

contract is the cornerstone of the interpretive inquiry; 'when the intent of the

parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court must enforce

the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd result.'"

Barila, 241 N.J. at 616 (quoting Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 45 (2016)). "The

interpretation of a contract is generally subject to de novo review." Arbus,

Maybruch & Goode, LLC v. Cohen, 475 N.J. Super. 509, 515 (App. Div. 2023).

A-0740-24 7 III.

We first address defendant's argument that the court failed to make

sufficient "findings before entering a [j]udgment of possession in favor of"

Dandis. The court's eight sentence decision lacks sufficient credibility

determinations, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. After the court found

defendant used the leased unit "as a repair mechanic shop," it simply stated,

"The lease, however, . . . is void ab initio. It is absolutely based upon a common

mistake of fact, and there is no lease that is now in existence." Then the court

determined back rent was due for three months, starting with the first missed

payment in August 2024. The court provided no further analysis. See R. 1:7-

4(a) (requiring trial courts to make sufficient "find[ings] [of] facts and state

[their] conclusions of law"). We, therefore, are constrained to reverse the court's

judgment of possession entered in favor of Dandis and remand for further

proceedings.

To be clear, a "trial [court] is required to 'state clearly its factual findings

and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222

N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980)).

"[A]ppellate review can be impeded when" a trial court fails to "state its factual

findings and conclusions of law on the record as required by Rule 1:7-4(a)."

A-0740-24 8 Lakhani v. Patel, 479 N.J. Super. 291, 297-98 (App. Div. 2024). Further,

"[n]aked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4." Rutgers Univ.

Student Assembly (RUSA) v. Middlesex Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 438 N.J. Super.

93, 107 (App. Div. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Curtis, 83 N.J. at 570).

As our court noted in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J.

Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 2000), when a trial court is interpreting a commercial

lease, "neither the parties nor [the appellate court] are well-served by an opinion

devoid of analysis or citation to even a single case."

We next turn to address the court's failure to address defendant's equitable

defenses. At trial, defendant argued, in essence, that Dandis was estopped from

asserting a lease violation and had waived an objection to defendant's use as

Dandis "knew it was a mechanic shop . . . when he bought it" and had assumed

Railroad LLC's lease. We note that "[e]ven when the contract on its face is free

from ambiguity, evidence of the situation of the parties and the surrounding

circumstances and conditions is admissible in aid of interpretation." Checchio,

335 N.J. Super. at 501 (quoting Schnakenberg v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n,

37 N.J. Super. 150, 155 (App. Div. 1955)). "The situation of the parties, the

attendant circumstances, and the objects they sought to attain are all necessarily

A-0740-24 9 to be considered by the trial court in its inquiry as to the intention of the parties."

Ibid.

In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the lease mistakenly

listed defendant's business use. Our Supreme Court has recognized the well

"settled principle that equity will grant relief in situations involving fraud,

accident, [and] mistake." Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc. v. Middletown Donut

Corp., 100 N.J. 166, 183 (1985). The court failed to address the uncontroverted

trial testimony that clearly established defendant had operated an automotive

repair business from the inception of the tenancy and Dandis had at the very

least constructive knowledge of defendant's use based on the CO, his visit, and

the lease rider.

The court clearly was permitted to consider estoppel and waiver because

they are cognizable in Special Civil Part summary dispossess actions. See 1266

Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 465 (App. Div.

2004) (citing Vineland Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 469

(1961)). "Estoppel is 'an equitable doctrine, founded in the fundamental duty of

fair dealing imposed by law.'" Casamasino v. City of Jersey City, 158 N.J. 333,

354 (1999) (quoting State v. Kouvatas, 292 N.J. Super. 417, 425 (App. Div.

1996)). "Waiver is traditionally defined as the voluntary relinquishment of a

A-0740-24 10 known right evidenced by a clear, unequivocal and decisive act from which an

intention to relinquish the right can be based." Country Chevrolet, Inc. v. N.

Brunswick Plan. Bd., 190 N.J. Super. 376, 380 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting

Mitchell v. Alfred Hofmann, Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 396, 405 (App. Div. 1958)).

Indeed, parties to a lease can waive contract provisions. See Home Owners

Constr. Co. v. Glen Rock, 34 N.J. 305, 316 (1961). Relevantly, Dandis

acknowledged assumption of Railroad LLC's lease and Klinar testified that the

incorrectly listed use in defendant's lease was his team's scrivener error. For

these reasons, we conclude a remand for a new trial is warranted.

Regarding defendant's argument that the court erred in granting Dandis a

judgment of possession based on the nonpayment of rent, we note Dandis filed

the complaint for defendant's failure to pay August's rent before the end of

business on the day rent was due—August 1. Therefore, we are also convinced

the court abused its discretion in finding a judgment of possession was

appropriate for nonpayment of rent without addressing the totality of facts and

whether there were "grounds to serve [defendant] with a [n]otice to [c]ease or a

[n]otice to [q]uit" while defendant was apparently current on the rent payments.

Finally, because the court expressed an opinion demonstrating "a

commitment to [its] findings," we deem it prudent to direct this matter be

A-0740-24 11 assigned to a different judge for a new trial. Carmichael v. Bryan, 310 N.J.

Super. 34, 49 (App. Div. 1998); Freedman v. Freedman, 474 N.J. Super. 291,

308 (App. Div. 2023); see also R. 1:12-1(d). We express no views regarding the

outcome on remand.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-0740-24 12