Abdah v. Obama

709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 2010 WL 1798989
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 18, 2010
DocketCivil Action 04-1254(HHK)
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 709 F. Supp. 2d 25 (Abdah v. Obama) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Abdah v. Obama, 709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 2010 WL 1798989 (D.D.C. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HENRY H. KENNEDY, JR., District Judge.

Yasein Khasem Mohammad Esmail (ISN 522), a Yemeni citizen, was taken into custody in Afghanistan in late 2001. The United States has held him at the naval base detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba since May 2002. Contending that he is unlawfully detained, Esmail has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondents in this case, President Barack H. Obama and other high-level officials in the United States Government, argue that Esmail is lawfully detained and should remain in U.S. custody. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the record and appeared before this Court for a hearing on the merits of Esmail’s petition on March 9, 10, and 11, 2010. Upon consideration of the motions and the evidence presented at the merits hearing, the Court concludes that respondents have demonstrated that the detention of Petitioner Esmail is lawful. Therefore, Esmail’s petition shall be denied.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Scope of the Government’s Detention Authority

The Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”), Pub.L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001), authorizes the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.” Pub.L. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the District Court for the District of Columbia has jurisdiction over petitions for writs of habeas corpus brought by detainees held at Guantanamo Bay pursuant to the AUMF. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2274, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004). The Supreme Court has provided “scant guidance,” however, as to whom respondents may lawfully detain under the statute. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C.Cir.2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has “consciously le[ft] the contours of the substantive and procedural law of detention open for lower courts to shape in a common law fashion” (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.); Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2276)).

In the absence of controlling law governing the question of by what standard to *27 evaluate the lawfulness of the detention of the individuals held at Guantanamo Bay, the Court shall rely on the reasoning of other Judges of this Court who have thoroughly and thoughtfully addressed this issue. Accordingly, as Judge Bates ruled in Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C.2009), the government may detain “those who are ‘part of the ‘Taliban or al Qaida forces,’ ” id. at 69-70, 1 and as Judge Walton ruled in Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C.2009), “[t]he key question is whether an individual ‘receive[s] and executefs] orders’ from the enemy force’s combat apparatus,” id. at 69 (alterations in original).

B. Burden of Proof

As stated in the Amended Case Management Order that governs this case, “[t]he government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner’s detention is lawful.” In re Guantanamo Bay Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, CMO § II.A (Nov. 6, 2008). Accordingly, Esmail need not prove that he is unlawfully detained; rather, respondents must produce “evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved,” that Esmail was part of Al Qaeda, “is more probable than not.” United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 28 (D.C.Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1255 & n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1994)); see also Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878 (rejecting Guantanamo Bay detainee’s argument that use of the preponderance of the evidence standard in his habeas case was unconstitutional). Only if respondents meet this burden may the Court deny Esmail’s petition.

C. Evidentiary Issues

The Court notes at the outset two issues regarding the evidence in this case.

First, as explained in the Court’s order of August 26, 2009 [# 606], the Court has permitted the admission of any hearsay evidence the parties seek to present and considers at this merits stage the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of the evidence on which the parties rely to support their arguments. This approach is consistent with a directive from the D.C. Circuit. See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (“[T]he question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible — it is always admissible — but what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits.”). The Court’s assessment of the weight properly accorded to particular pieces of evidence appears throughout this memorandum opinion.

Second, the nature of the evidence before the Court is atypical of evidence usually presented in federal actions. Respondents have offered a variety of types of documents produced and used by government intelligence agencies that are not the direct statements of the individuals whose personal knowledge they reflect. Several of the crucial pieces of evidence in this case are Intelligence Information Reports (“HRs”), Summary Interrogation Reports (“SIRs”), Field Documents (“FD-302s”) [redacted] IIRs are Department of Defense documents for recording information derived from human sources.f 1 redacted] FD-302s are forms completed by agents summarizing interviews, [redacted]

II. ANALYSIS

Esmail, or ISN 522, 2 grew up in a village near Ibb, Yemen, where his family had a *28 sheep farm. In approximately 1998, he graduated from a high school in Ibb, where he had studied Islamic law. In 1999, upset that he was not able to marry a particular woman, Esmail left home and traveled to Afghanistan. It is undisputed that while there, he stayed in guesthouses and attended training camps at which he learned to use weapons and employ warfare techniques. The parties also agree that Esmail was held in United States custody at a detention facility in Bagram, Afghanistan beginning in January 2002, was transferred to another detention facility in Kandahar, Afghanistan on February 2, 2002, and has since May [ 2

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709 F. Supp. 2d 25, 2010 WL 1798989, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/abdah-v-obama-dcd-2010.