Abbylen Amezcua v. Nissan North America, Inc.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: September 4, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-05720
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ABBYLEN AMEZCUA, Case No. 2:25-cv-05720-HDV-RAO 11 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 12 Plaintiff, TO REMAND [10] 13 14 v. 15 16 NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC. et al., 17 18 Defendants. 19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 I. INTRODUCTION 2 This lemon law action arises out of alleged defects and nonconformities in Plaintiff Abbylen 3 Amezcua’s 2023 Nissan Kicks. Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (“Motion”), which 4 contends that Nissan North America, Inc. (“Nissan”) failed to satisfy its burden to establish the 5 $75,000 amount in controversy requirement.1 [Dkt. 10]. 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court disagrees, and on that basis denies the Motion. 7 II. BACKGROUND 8 Amezcua purchased a new 2023 Nissan Kicks on December 16, 2022. Complaint ¶ 5 9 [Dkt. 1-1]. Along with the vehicle, Amezcua received written warranties, including a three-year or 10 36,000 mile basic warranty and a five-year or 60,000 mile powertrain warranty. Id. ¶ 7. But 11 Amezcua has since delivered the car to Defendants’ authorized service and repair facilities on at 12 least five separate occasions for various defects, including a malfunctioning self-parking feature, a 13 faulty battery, and a faulty automatic emergency breaking system, among others. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. Each 14 time, Defendants failed to confirm the vehicle to the applicable warranties. Id. ¶ 12. And despite 15 repeated demands, Defendants failed to make restitution or replacement. Id. ¶ 20. 16 On May 8, 2025, Amezcua initiated the instant action against Nissan in Los Angeles County 17 Superior Court, alleging breach of implied and express warranty in violation of the Song-Beverly 18 Consumer Warranty Act (the “Song-Beverly Act”). Id. ¶¶ 14–34. Nissan removed to federal court. 19 Notice of Removal [Dkt. 1]. On July 16, 2025, Plaintiff moved to remand. The Court heard oral 20 argument on the Motion on August 14 and took the matter under submission. [Dkt. 13]. 21 III. LEGAL STANDARD 22 Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions where there is complete diversity 23 and where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 24 Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005). Section 1332 requires complete diversity, 25

27 1 Plaintiff does not challenge Nissan’s allegations as to complete diversity. The Court is satisfied that such diversity exists here. Plaintiff, an individual, is a citizen of California, and Defendant is a 28 Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Tennessee. 1 meaning that each plaintiff must be diverse from each defendant. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 2 Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806)). 3 A defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court pursuant to the federal 4 removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), an improperly removed case 5 must be remanded to state court. Any doubts about removal are resolved in favor of remand. 6 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 7 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Th[is] ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction 8 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. 9 When a state court complaint is silent or ambiguous as to the amount in controversy, “the 10 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 11 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Co. of 12 Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018). In its notice of removal, the removing party need 13 only include a short and plain statement setting forth “a plausible allegation that the amount in 14 controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 15 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014). But where the plaintiff challenges removal, “both sides submit proof and 16 the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy 17 requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88. “In assessing the amount in controversy, [courts] may 18 consider allegations in the complaint and in the notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment- 19 type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 20 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018). 21 IV. DISCUSSION 22 The only question presented is whether the amount in controversy requirement has been met. 23 The Song-Beverly Act allows a plaintiff to recover damages, civil penalties, and costs and 24 expenses, including attorney’s fees. Cal. Civ. Code § 1794. “In the case of restitution, the 25 manufacturer shall make restitution in an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the 26 buyer,” which “may be reduced by the manufacturer by that amount directly attributable to use by 27 the buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle.” Id. § 1793.2(d)(2). See Nealy v. 28 FCA US LLC, No. 2:21-cv-06552-MEMF-SHKx, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2022) (outlining formula 1 | for mileage offset). Here, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s estimate that the actual damages 2 || are $27,000. Notice of Removal at 4; Declaration of Victoria Holmberg § 2 (averring that based on 3 | her review of the subject vehicle’s records, $27,000 is a non-speculative estimate of actual damages) 4 | [Dkt. 11-1]. 5 Rather, Plaintiff challenges only the inclusion of civil penalties and attorneys’ fees. In 6 || particular, Plaintiff contends that though she prayed for civil penalties up to two times the amount of 7 || actual damages, civil penalties are too speculative to be included in the amount in controversy. 8 || Motion at 4; Complaint Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). But Plaintiff does allege that Nissan 9 | “knowing[ly]” and “intentionally” failed to make restitution. Complaint § 20 (alleging that Nissan, 10 | “knew of [its] obligations under the Song-Beverly Act” but “intentionally failed and refused to make 11 | restitution or replacement”); id. § 31 (alleging that Nissan “knowing [its] obligations under the Song- 12 |} Beverly Act... failed and refused to make restitution or replacement,” such that civil penalties of up 13 | to two times Plaintiff's actual damages are warranted). Given such allegations, civil penalties are 14 | properly considered as part of the amount in controversy, which “reflects the maximum recovery the 15 | plaintiff could reasonably recover.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 16 |} 2019). See also Ladd v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-02879-HDV-BFM, 2025 WL 17 | 2081572, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). 18 Plaintiff also contends that attorneys’ fees should be excluded. Motion at 5. But as 19 || Plaintiff's maximum potential recovery in actual damages and civil penalties is $81,000, attorneys’ 20 || fees are not necessary to reach the $75,000 threshold. Accordingly, remand is not warranted. 21 | V. CONCLUSION 22 Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is denied. 23 □ 24 Dated: September 4, 2025 Hefnan D. Vera 25 United States Distuersmipe 26 27 28