Abbott v. Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte

146 P. 998, 94 Kan. 553, 1915 Kan. LEXIS 126
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedMarch 6, 1915
DocketNo. 19,338
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 146 P. 998 (Abbott v. Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Abbott v. Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte, 146 P. 998, 94 Kan. 553, 1915 Kan. LEXIS 126 (kan 1915).

Opinion

[554]*554The opinion of the court was delivered by

Burch, J.:

The action was one for damages resulting from the death of the driver of an automobile, occasioned by a defective bridge. The plaintiff recovered and the defendant appeals.

The bridge spans Mission creek between Edwards-ville and Bonner Springs. The bridge is forty feet long and is in line with the roadway to the west but not to the east. The roadway leading to the bridge from the east is generally forty feet wide, sixteen feet of which is macadamized. Within twenty feet of the bridge the roadway narrows down to the width of the bridge, which is fourteen feet. The traveled portion of the road includes not only the part macadamized but level ground on each side' of the macadam, and when snow is on the ground the surfaced and unsurfaced portions are indistinguishable. An automobile driven westward toward the bridge along the north side of the road would, if it continued in a straight line, miss the bridge.

The deceased conducted an auto-livery business at Bonner Springs. About nine o’clock on the evening of January 5, 1913, he received a call from Edwardsville to go to that place with an automobile and from there take two young men and two young women to Bonner Springs to catch a train leaving Bonner Springs at nine forty-five. The distance between the two towns is about three miles. As the deceased with his passengers approached the bridge from the east on his return to Bonner Springs he was driving at the- rate of about twenty-five miles per hour. There was no moon, the wind was blowing, it was snowing a little, and the ground was covered with snow. He drove in a straight line along the north side of the road, missed the bridge except that the left rear wheel of the automobile struck the north girder of the bridge, and went over the embankment to his death.

The petition charged negligence in failing to pro[555]*555vide a suitable and sufficient approach to the bridge and guard rails at the ends and sides to act as a warning to travelers nearing the bridge, particularly in the nighttime, indicate the location of the bridge, and enable travelers to see it so that they would not miss it and fce precipitated into the creek. The court instructed the jury that an approach is something connecting the bridge proper with the highway making the bridge accessible from the highway, and so sub-nftted the cause that the existence of an approach in this sense was material to the plaintiff’s cause of action. The defendant says the evidence shows that the moment a vehicle going east leaves the bridge it is upon natural ground which had been the roadbed for years before the bridge was erected. The jury returned the following findings of fact on this subject:

“Q. 1. Was there any filling made at any time at the east end of the bridge, except the back filling around the abutment? Answer. Yes.

“Q. 3. In about 1904 or 1905, when the bridge was moved to the east and stone abutments were put under it, was any approach built, or work, done on the road immediately east of the bridge, except back-filling around the abutment? Answer. Yes.

“Q. 5. Did the county build or construct any approach at the east end of this bridge? Answer. Yes.”

There was evidence sustaining the defendant’s view, but a number of witnesses who claimed to be familiar with the facts gave testimony supporting the findings of the jury.

Some confusion results from the use of the word “fill” by different witnesses. It fairly appears that when the bridge was reconstructed the surface of the ground east of the bridge was higher than the bridge and was graded down to the same level as the bridge, the earth removed being used to make a fill of considerable length at the west end of the bridge. There was clear evidence, however, that when the east abutment was constructed it was set some distance, the estimates [556]*556vary from a few feet to several feet, from the east bank of the stream and the space between the abutment and the bank was filled in. This filling constituted an approach.

In the defendant’s reply brief it is said:

“The abutment was 8 or 10 feet wide at the bottom. The excavation therefor was necessarily some wider so as to leave room for placing the foundation stones. The abutment at the top was two feet wide. Consequently when the abutment was complete there had to be some filling in against the land side of the abutment.”

Accepting this statement as true, the filling constituted an approach.

In this case the existence of a very small approach is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the instruction because the petition was interpreted too rigidly against the plaintiff. It is not necessary to quote the allegations of the petition. here, but they are open to the interpretation that guard rails as appurtenances to the bridge itself were necessary to make the bridge a proper structure, and whether or not an. artificial approach existed this bridge was defective for want of a wing guard at its northeast corner. The purpose of the bridge was to carry traffic brought up to it by the highway over the stream. It was so located and constructed, however, with respect to the stream and to the highway, that travelers using the highway with due care might miss the entrance and plunge over a dangerous declivity. Therefore the bridge itself was incomplete and defective in construction.

It is said there is no evidence which warranted the jury in finding that the chairman of the board of county commissioners had notice of the defect in the bridge for at least five days before the casualty, as the statute imposing liability on the county requires. The court instructed the jury as follows:

“If the jury believes from a preponderance of the evidence that James Kilmer was the Chairman of the [557]*557Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte County, Kansas, on January 5th, 1913, and at' the time of the death of Abbott, and while acting as the Chairman of said Board frequently visited said bridge prior to the death of Abbott, and passed over the bridge in controversy and saw the condition surrounding said approach (if you find there was constructed at the east end of said bridge an approach, as hereinbefore stated), and knew that there were no guard rails on the north side of the east approach of said bridge, and had personal knowledge of the conditions at said point, then you may find that the defendant had notice of the condition of said bridge. And if you further find from the evidence that the east approach (if you believe and find there was such an approach) was unsafe and dangerous to travelers by reason of the lack or failure to erect guard rails on the north side of said approach, then you may find that the defendant had notice that said bridge and its east approach was in a defective and unsafe condition.”

It is not claimed that this instruction misstates the law, but that the question of notice should not have been submitted to the jury at all.

The chairman of the board of county commissioners denied that he ever saw or knew of any dangerous condition at or near the bridge, and said his attention had never been called to conditions at the right of the east end of the bridge; he had never noticed or had knowledge of the conditions there, and in passing over the bridge he had never noticed the “jump off” or condition there. Notwithstanding these assertions the jury appear to have been satisfied he did know and had long known the facts.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
146 P. 998, 94 Kan. 553, 1915 Kan. LEXIS 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/abbott-v-board-of-county-commissioners-of-wyandotte-kan-1915.