Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp.

147 N.W.2d 529, 33 Wis. 2d 445, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 640, 1967 Wisc. LEXIS 1151
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 10, 1967
StatusPublished
Cited by46 cases

This text of 147 N.W.2d 529 (Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Wisconsin Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Abbott Laboratories v. Norse Chemical Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 33 Wis. 2d 445, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 640, 1967 Wisc. LEXIS 1151 (Wis. 1967).

Opinion

Wilkie, J.

Consideration of the issues raised on this appeal must commence with an exposition of the nature *452 of the Abbott production process and of the Abbott customer list.

The Abbott Production Process.

The production of a cyclamate is a chemical reaction which was originally embodied in the 1941 du Pont patent, and which became available to everyone in 1959. However, although the basic reaction was known, the methods of producing this product commercially had to be developed.

The basic production processes dealt with in development are purification, yield, and speed. Purification essentially deals with ways of removing water and other impurities as the reaction is taking place. The yield process involves an attempt to get a greater output from materials used in the reaction, and speed must be achieved in carrying out this reaction to make it economically profitable. Overall, the chemical engineering involved in formulating the entire process is attempting to achieve high production at lowest cost by dealing with these three essentials. Substitution of cheaper materials and equipment is made where feasible as part of the attempt to hold down costs.

Customer List.

The Abbott marketing process was very costly and expensive to develop. In 1950, Sucaryl was virtually an unknown product and there were several important hurdles to be overcome. First, Abbott had to get sanction for the product’s marketing for consumer use from the United States government. Then, Abbott also had to develop a market for its product among bottling companies, food producers, and drug companies. Often this involved substantial customer education in the use of an artificial sweetener, and Abbott sometimes assisted in the development of processes by other companies who used Sucaryl in their products.

*453 Abbott’s customer list essentially involved the names and addresses of Sucaryl users. The list also disclosed the name of a key individual in the organization who was familiar with artificial- sweeteners and whom Abbott had educated in their use. Mueller had access to this list and the trial judge found:

“The Abbott customer list was used by the defendant Mueller in making up the Norse customer list and in soliciting Abbott’s customers, but Abbott’s customer list was not private, confidential or a trade secret.”

On the question of liability a single issue is raised on this appeal. Do Abbott’s technology and customer list constitute trade secrets so as to give rise to an unfair-competition action when wrongfully taken by the defendants ?

This is a case of first impression in this state, there being no previous decisions by this court on trade secret protection.

The law of trade secrets has developed to deal with a particular problem in American industry — employee mobility among key employees of an industrial concern. In today’s economy there is tremendous demand for highly trained technical, engineering, and research personnel. When an employee changes jobs, “it is inevitable that some of the employee’s previously acquired knowledge will be made available to his new employer. It is at this point that the problem arises — where do the trade secrets begin and the employee’s intellectual tools of the trade end ?” 1

Kalinowski sets out the basic factors of the problem as follows:

“There is no simple answer to this question. Its treatment at the hands of the courts has reflected a desire to balance the cross-currents of such social values as freedom of contract, personal economic freedom, and *454 business ethics. Thus, the courts are reluctant to place any ‘undue restrictions upon an employee’s liberty of action in his trade or calling.’ Nor will they require an employee who changes employers to ‘wipe clean _ the slate of his memory.’ On the other hand, their aim is to enforce ‘increasingly higher standards of fairness of commercial morality in trade.’
“The public interest is likewise involved to a considerable degree. The basis of our industrial system is a free economy. The encouragement of technological advancement is vital to the maintenance of - our economic system and of our industrial productivity. On the one hand, it can be said that if the employer’s trade secrets are not protected from appropriation by the employee or the unscrupulous, research and development will be impaired. No employer would be willing to spend large sums of money on research and development of new ideas, processes or methods if these can be taken and used by others with impunity. On the other hand, if potential competitors are intimated and the dissemination of ideas, processes and methods is impaired, competition is fettered and the public is injured. The courts have sought to balance these conflicting, yet fundamental, interests, but have done so with differing results.” 2

The law concerning trade secrecy developed as common law. The basis of the doctrine is an attempt to enforce morality in business. By its very nature, the trade-secrecy doctrine, under the heading of unfair competition, deals with an area that is nebulous as to the guidelines to be applied. However, the law features two basic themes.

The first theme was initiated by Mr. Justice Holmes as the rationale for protecting trade secrets in Du Pont Powder Co. v. Masland. 3

“ . . . The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. *455 Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant [a former employee] knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be.”

This philosophy has been adopted by the Restatement, 4 Torts, p. 5, sec. 757 b, as the basis for judicial protection of trade secrets.

Courts who emphasize the breach of confidence aspect of the law of unfair competition are essentially dealing with business morality. Usually, however, the cases involve a substantial breach of business ethics and an assumed trade secret. For example, in Standard Brands Inc., v. U. S. Partition & Packaging Corp. 4 the case involved drawings and patterns necessary to produce a process machine more efficient than any other in the industry. Key employees tried to steal these plans and encouraged other employees to join their enterprise. Defendants were able to switch most of the business of their former employer. Judge Grubb of the federal court for the Eastern district of Wisconsin stated the law as follows:

“ ... In the absence of an agreement to the contrary ... an agent is free to engage in competition with his principal after termination of his employment.

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147 N.W.2d 529, 33 Wis. 2d 445, 152 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 640, 1967 Wisc. LEXIS 1151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/abbott-laboratories-v-norse-chemical-corp-wis-1967.