Abbani v. Village of Lawrence

Opinion

Abbani v Village of Lawrence

2026 NY Slip Op 04827

August 5, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Victoria Abbani, appellant,

v

Village of Lawrence, defendant-respondent, et al., defendant, SSNS Express, LLC, nonparty-respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 5, 2026

2024-12655, (Index No. 600320/22)

Lara J. Genovesi, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Barry E. Warhit

Lourdes M. Ventura, JJ.

Jonathan D. Mandell, Lynbrook, NY (Jeremy A. Greener of counsel), for appellant.

Milber, Makris, Plousadis & Seiden, LLP, Woodbury, NY (William E. Morrissey, Jr., of counsel), for defendant-respondent.

McCarthy & Associates, Melville, NY (Michael D. Kern of counsel), for nonparty-respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Francis Ricigliano, J.), entered October 2, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Village of Lawrence which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it and denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 203(f) for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint adding nonparty SSNS Express, LLC, as an additional defendant.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

On February 17, 2021, the plaintiff allegedly was injured when she fell in a parking lot owned by the defendant Village of Lawrence. In January 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action against the Village and the defendant Central Ave Market, LLC (hereinafter Central), to recover damages for personal injuries. In April 2024, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 203(f) for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint adding nonparty SSNS Express, LLC (hereinafter SSNS), as an additional defendant. Thereafter, the Village moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defective condition. In an order entered October 2, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied the plaintiff's motion and granted that branch of the Village's motion. The plaintiff appeals.

As there is no dispute that the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see id. § 214[5]) had expired by the time the plaintiff moved for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint adding SSNS as an additional defendant, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate the applicability of the relation-back doctrine (see Dixon v Jones, 217 AD3d 838, 840; Spaulding v Mt. Vernon Hosp., 283 AD2d 634, 635). The relation-back doctrine allows a party to be added to an action after the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the claim is deemed timely interposed if "(1) the claim arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, (2) the [*2]additional party is united in interest with the original party, and (3) the additional party knew or should have known that but for a mistake by the plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against the additional party as well" (Sarceno v Manhattan View, LLC, 230 AD3d 1176, 1177 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 26, 35).

Here, although the claims arose out of the same occurrence, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Central and SSNS are united in interest. Parties are united in interest when their interests in the subject matter are such that they will stand or fall together with respect to the plaintiff's claim (see Ragusa v Drazie's Farm II, LLC, 226 AD3d 836, 837). Here, Central and SSNS are separate and distinct entities (see Patrick v Comprehensive Med. Supply, LLC, 225 AD3d 777, 779; Chandler v New York City Tr. Auth., 209 AD3d 825, 827), and there is no evidence in the record that SSNS had a relationship with Central which would make it vicariously liable for Central's negligence (see Weckbecker v Shanska USA Civ. Northeast, Inc., 173 AD3d 936, 937-938; Kammerzell v Clean Burn, Inc., 165 AD3d 768, 769). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for leave to serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint adding SSNS as an additional defendant.

Code of the Village of Lawrence § 130-1 provides, in relevant part, that no civil action may be maintained against the Village for personal injuries sustained as a consequence of, inter alia, the existence of any defect or dangerous condition on "public grounds or other building or area open for use by the public" unless prior written notice of the condition "was actually given to the Village Clerk and there was a failure or neglect, within a reasonable time after the receipt of such notice, to repair or remove the defect, danger or obstruction complained of."

"Prior written notice of a defective condition is a condition precedent to maintaining an action against a municipality where, as here, there is a local law requiring such notice" (Kolenda v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 215 AD3d 647, 648 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Parthesius v Town of Huntington, 210 AD3d 789, 790). "When a municipality has adopted a prior written notice law, the municipality cannot be held liable for a defect within the scope of the law absent the requisite written notice, unless an exception to the requirement applies" (Walker v City of Newburgh, 222 AD3d 809, 810 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morreale v Town of Smithtown, 153 AD3d 917, 918). "Where the municipality establishes, prima facie, that it lacked prior written notice, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the applicability of one of two recognized exceptions to the prior written notice rule, namely, that the municipality affirmatively created the defect through an act of negligence or that a special use resulted in a special benefit to the municipality" (Kolenda v Incorporated Vil. of Garden City, 215 AD3d at 648; see Groninger v Village of Mamaroneck, 17 NY3d 125, 129-130; Smith v City of New York, 210 AD3d 53, 69). "Alternatively, a plaintiff may raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the municipality did, in fact, have prior written notice of the alleged defective condition" (Douglas v City of Mount Vernon, N.Y., 226 AD3d 973, 974 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the Village established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. In support of its motion, the Village submitted, among other things, an affidavit of the Village's deputy clerk who averred that a search of the appropriate records failed to reveal any prior written notice of a defective condition at the subject parking lot (see Discepolo v County of Nassau, 226 AD3d 646, 647; Parthesius v Town of Huntington, 210 AD3d at 790). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the Village received prior written notice of the alleged defective condition or whether an exception to the prior written notice law applied (see La Fleur v Janowitz, 228 AD3d 636, 638; Torres v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 195 AD3d 974, 975-976).

Further, the plaintiff's contention that the subject branch of the Village's motion should have been denied as premature is without merit. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, she failed to establish that further discovery might lead to information relevant to establish the Village's liability. "The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion" [*3](Sterling Natl. Bank v Alan B. Brill, P.C., 186 AD3d 515, 518 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Liddell v Morrison, 204 AD3d 987, 989).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the Village's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

GENOVESI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and VENTURA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court