Abadi v. Sessions

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 11, 2018
Docket18-9509
StatusUnpublished

This text of Abadi v. Sessions (Abadi v. Sessions) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Abadi v. Sessions, (10th Cir. 2018).

Opinion

FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 11, 2018 _________________________________ Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court MEHRDAD NOORI HOSSAIN ABADI,

Petitioner,

v. No. 18-9509 (Petition for Review) JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, United States Attorney General,

Respondent. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, McKAY and MATHESON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Mr. Mehrdad Noori Hossain Abadi (Mr. Noori), a native and citizen of Iran,

has filed a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of

his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(1), see Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361–62 (10th Cir. 2004), we

deny the petition.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Noori attempted to enter the United States in 1993 using a fraudulent visa.

He was denied entry and placed in exclusion proceedings. He conceded excludability

but applied for asylum and withholding of exclusion and deportation, claiming that if

he returned to Iran, he would be persecuted because of his political opinion. In 1994,

an administrative law judge denied his application and ordered him excluded, and the

BIA denied review. Mr. Noori sought review of the agency’s decision by filing a

petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied his

habeas petition but ordered him to file a motion to reopen. Mr. Noori filed the

motion to reopen in 1997, seeking asylum based on political opinion. The BIA

denied the motion in 1998. We later affirmed the district court’s denial of his habeas

petition. See Abadi v. INS, No. 99-1522, 2000 WL 1158325 (10th Cir. Aug. 16,

2000) (unpublished).

Despite the exclusion order, Mr. Noori remained in the United States. In 2017,

he converted from Islam to Christianity and married a woman who also had

converted from Islam to Christianity. He then filed a motion to reopen to seek

asylum, withholding, and relief under the U.N. Convention Against Torture. He

alleged that the persecution of Christian converts in Iran had significantly worsened

since the time of his exclusion hearing in 1994. The BIA decided that none of

Mr. Noori’s evidence showed that there had been a material change in the persecution

of Christian converts in Iran since his exclusion proceeding, and that the change in

2 his own circumstances was not a change in country conditions. The BIA therefore

denied the motion. Mr. Noori seeks review of that decision.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.

Qiu v. Sessions, 870 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2017). “The BIA abuses its

discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs

from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or

conclusory statements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ommitting a

legal error or making a factual finding that is not supported by substantial record

evidence is necessarily an abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[M]otions to reopen immigration cases are plainly disfavored, and [a

movant] bears a heavy burden to show the BIA abused its discretion.” Maatougui v.

Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted).

Generally, a petitioner may only file one motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), and it must be filed “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final

administrative order of removal,” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The motion to reopen at issue

here was Mr. Noori’s second, and it was filed some 23 years after his final exclusion

order. It was therefore both time- and number-barred. But the time bar does not

apply to the filing of a motion to reopen in an asylum or withholding case if the

motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality

or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and

3 was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous

proceeding.” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). And under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the same

showing of changed country conditions skirts the number bar. “[A] significant

increase in the level of persecution constitutes a material change in country

conditions for purposes of . . . § 1229a(c)(7)(C),” and “the BIA abuses its discretion

when it fails to assess and consider a petitioner’s evidence that the persecution of

others in his protected category has substantially worsened since the initial

application.” Qiu, 870 F.3d at 1204–05. To assess whether there has been a material

change in country conditions, the BIA compares the country conditions “that existed

at the time of the merits hearing below” with “the evidence of country conditions

submitted with the motion [to reopen].” Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253

(BIA 2007).

Mr. Noori argues that the BIA failed to consider evidence he submitted that in

2017, soon after his conversion and marriage, there began a “new wave” of

persecution of Christian converts in Iran, and that his case falls squarely within our

decision in Qiu v. Sessions. We reject these arguments.

First, the BIA did not fail to consider Mr. Noori’s evidence. The BIA

specifically acknowledged his argument that conditions had worsened, and it

referenced the evidence he submitted in support. Although its discussion of that

evidence was concise, it was not insufficient.

Second, Mr. Noori’s case is distinguishable from Qiu. Unlike in Qiu, the BIA

did not wholly fail to consider the evidence that persecution had allegedly worsened.

4 Further, there was a much greater volume of evidence in Qiu, and that evidence was

more probative. One human rights organization specifically identified a 300%

increase in the level of persecution of Chinese Christians during the time period

relevant to Qiu’s motion to reopen, 2013 to 2015. 870 F.3d at 1202. Another report

similarly detailed a “drastic[]” increase in the persecution of Chinese Christians from

2013 to 2014. Id. Still another report from “an organization that tracks the

persecution of Christians worldwide bumped China up its rank of worst-offender lists

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Related

Infanzon v. Ashcroft
386 F.3d 1359 (Tenth Circuit, 2004)
Maatougui v. Holder
738 F.3d 1230 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Liying Qiu v. Sessions
870 F.3d 1200 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)
S-Y-G
24 I. & N. Dec. 247 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2007)

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