Abadi v. Sessions

Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit·Decided September 11, 2018·No. 18-9509·Unpublished

Opinion

FILED

United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT September 11, 2018

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

MEHRDAD NOORI HOSSAIN ABADI,

Petitioner,

v. No. 18-9509 (Petition for Review)

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, United States Attorney General,

Respondent.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, McKAY and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.

Mr. Mehrdad Noori Hossain Abadi (Mr. Noori), a native and citizen of Iran, has filed a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), see Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361–62 (10th Cir. 2004), we deny the petition.

*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Noori attempted to enter the United States in 1993 using a fraudulent visa.

He was denied entry and placed in exclusion proceedings. He conceded excludability but applied for asylum and withholding of exclusion and deportation, claiming that if he returned to Iran, he would be persecuted because of his political opinion. In 1994, an administrative law judge denied his application and ordered him excluded, and the BIA denied review. Mr. Noori sought review of the agency’s decision by filing a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied his habeas petition but ordered him to file a motion to reopen. Mr. Noori filed the motion to reopen in 1997, seeking asylum based on political opinion. The BIA denied the motion in 1998. We later affirmed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition. See Abadi v. INS, No. 99-1522, 2000 WL 1158325 (10th Cir. Aug. 16, 2000) (unpublished).

Despite the exclusion order, Mr. Noori remained in the United States. In 2017, he converted from Islam to Christianity and married a woman who also had converted from Islam to Christianity. He then filed a motion to reopen to seek asylum, withholding, and relief under the U.N. Convention Against Torture. He alleged that the persecution of Christian converts in Iran had significantly worsened since the time of his exclusion hearing in 1994. The BIA decided that none of Mr. Noori’s evidence showed that there had been a material change in the persecution of Christian converts in Iran since his exclusion proceeding, and that the change in

his own circumstances was not a change in country conditions. The BIA therefore denied the motion. Mr. Noori seeks review of that decision.

II. ANALYSIS

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.

Qiu v. Sessions, 870 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2017). “The BIA abuses its discretion when its decision provides no rational explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ommitting a legal error or making a factual finding that is not supported by substantial record evidence is necessarily an abuse of discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[M]otions to reopen immigration cases are plainly disfavored, and [a movant] bears a heavy burden to show the BIA abused its discretion.” Maatougui v. Holder, 738 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

Generally, a petitioner may only file one motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), and it must be filed “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal,” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The motion to reopen at issue here was Mr. Noori’s second, and it was filed some 23 years after his final exclusion order. It was therefore both time- and number-barred. But the time bar does not apply to the filing of a motion to reopen in an asylum or withholding case if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and

was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). And under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the same showing of changed country conditions skirts the number bar. “[A] significant increase in the level of persecution constitutes a material change in country conditions for purposes of . . . § 1229a(c)(7)(C),” and “the BIA abuses its discretion when it fails to assess and consider a petitioner’s evidence that the persecution of others in his protected category has substantially worsened since the initial application.” Qiu, 870 F.3d at 1204–05. To assess whether there has been a material change in country conditions, the BIA compares the country conditions “that existed at the time of the merits hearing below” with “the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion [to reopen].” Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007).

Mr. Noori argues that the BIA failed to consider evidence he submitted that in 2017, soon after his conversion and marriage, there began a “new wave” of persecution of Christian converts in Iran, and that his case falls squarely within our decision in Qiu v. Sessions. We reject these arguments.

First, the BIA did not fail to consider Mr. Noori’s evidence. The BIA specifically acknowledged his argument that conditions had worsened, and it referenced the evidence he submitted in support. Although its discussion of that evidence was concise, it was not insufficient.

Second, Mr. Noori’s case is distinguishable from Qiu. Unlike in Qiu, the BIA did not wholly fail to consider the evidence that persecution had allegedly worsened.

Further, there was a much greater volume of evidence in Qiu, and that evidence was more probative. One human rights organization specifically identified a 300% increase in the level of persecution of Chinese Christians during the time period relevant to Qiu’s motion to reopen, 2013 to 2015. 870 F.3d at 1202. Another report similarly detailed a “drastic[]” increase in the persecution of Chinese Christians from 2013 to 2014. Id. Still another report from “an organization that tracks the persecution of Christians worldwide bumped China up its rank of worst-offender lists from 37th in 2014 to 29th in 2015.” Id. And the annual report for 2015 by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom described “unprecedented violations,” “an alarming increase in systematic, egregious, and ongoing abuses,” and the “striking development” of the destruction of more than 400 Christian churches in 2014, “a notable increase over previous years.” Id. at 1202–03 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, and of particular relevance to Mr. Noori’s argument, in Qiu, the U.S.

Commission noted that “some have characterized the new wave of persecution against Christians that swept through China in 2014 as the most egregious and persistent since the Cultural Revolution.” Id. at 1203 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Noori notes that one piece of his evidence, a Fox News article from March 2017, also uses the term “new wave” as part of its title: “Iran arrests two Catholics in new wave of brutality against Christians.” R., Vol. 1 at 131. The article describes the arrests of two recent converts from Islam to Christianity as a “draconian raid” and “part of a brutal crackdown on Catholicism” in one Iranian province. Id.

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Related

Infanzon v. Ashcroft
386 F.3d 1359 (Tenth Circuit, 2004)
Maatougui v. Holder
738 F.3d 1230 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Liying Qiu v. Sessions
870 F.3d 1200 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)
S-Y-G
24 I. & N. Dec. 247 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2007)