1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 AARON JACOB GREENSPAN, Case No. 24-cv-04647-MMC
7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 8 v. MOTION FOR REVIEW AND REVERSAL OF CLERK’S COSTS 9 ELON MUSK, et al., AWARD 10 Defendants.
11 Before the Court is plaintiff Aaron Jacob Greenspan’s (“Greenspan”) Motion, filed 12 November 8, 2025, “for Court Review and Reversal of Clerk’s Costs Award.” Defendants 13 Elon Musk, Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”), the Elon Musk Revocable Trust dated July 22, 2003, 14 Excession, LLC, Jared Birchall, Singer Cashman, LLP, Allison Huebert, Adam S. 15 Cashman, Adam G. Mehes, and Alex Spiro have filed opposition, to which Greenspan 16 has replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition 17 to the motion, the Court rules as follows.1 18 By the Court’s prior order, filed July 17, 2025, Greenspan’s federal claims were 19 dismissed with prejudice and his state law claims were remanded to state court (see 20 Order Re Motions to Dismiss at 16:11-12 (Doc. No. 156)), whereafter Tesla filed a Bill of 21 Costs for the $405 filing fee it paid on removal of the instant action (see Doc. No. 160), 22 and the Clerk of Court taxed costs in that amount (see Doc. No. 174). 23 By the instant motion, Greenspan asks the Court to “review the Clerk of Court’s 24 award of costs . . . and reverse or vacate such award.” (See Mot. at 1:7-9.) In support of 25 that requested relief, Greenspan makes the following four arguments: (1) removal was 26 improper; (2) Tesla is not the prevailing party; (3) the removal fee was not “necessarily 27 1 incurred”; and (4) equitable factors weigh against an award of costs. (See id. at 4-11.) 2 The Court addresses each such argument in turn. 3 First, Greenspan argues, “a court should not award costs to the removing party 4 when removal was improper” and that “[t]hrough its ruling in ECF No. 156, this Court thus 5 ruled that Defendant Tesla’s removal to this Court was improper as this Court lacked 6 jurisdiction over any portion of plaintiff’s original complaint—the version of the complaint 7 that was actually removed to federal court on July 31, 2024.” (See Mot. at 4:26-5:12) 8 (internal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). Although Greenspan is correct that 9 the Court, in the order to which he refers, found the state law claims comprising his initial 10 Complaint did not raise a federal question, the Court issued no ruling as to the propriety 11 of the removal, as Greenspan, rather than filing a motion to remand, filed an Amended 12 Complaint adding a federal claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 13 Organizations Act (“RICO”) (See Doc. No. 55), thereby conferring federal jurisdiction over 14 the case, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and electing to have his claims proceed in federal court. 15 Second, Greenspan argues, Tesla is “not the ‘prevailing party’ for the purposes of 16 Rule 54(d)(1)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Mot. at 5:19-22), under which, 17 “[u]nless a federal statute, [said] rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other 18 than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 54(d)(1). In support thereof, Greenspan points out that the Court dismissed only his 20 RICO claim, whereas his state law claims were remanded, the Court declining to exercise 21 supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims once the sole federal claim was 22 dismissed. (See Doc. No. 156 at 15:1-12.) The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that a 23 defendant that prevails on a plaintiff’s federal claims is the prevailing party even though 24 the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such plaintiff’s state law 25 claims and, after either dismissal or remand, depending on where those claims initially 26 were filed, allows them to proceed in state court. See San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. 27 San Diego City Employees’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 732, 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 1 remaining against them in the district court, [defendants] were clearly the prevailing 2 parties” and, “[a]s such, they were entitled to the award of costs decreed by the district 3 court”); see also Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 4 “[w]here a district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution, 5 it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice”). 6 Third, Greenspan, argues, “the removal fee was not ‘necessarily incurred’” 7 because Tesla elected to remove this action from state court. (See Mot. at 7:13-26); see 8 also 28 U.S.C. § 1924 (providing “[b]efore any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any 9 item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit . . . that such item . . . has 10 been necessarily incurred”). A number of district courts, however, have found such 11 argument “without merit.” See Rezaipour v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2015 WL 13762921 at 12 *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015) (holding “[f]ees for removal are taxable as costs”) (collecting 13 cases).2 14 Lastly, Greenspan argues, “the five primary factors enumerated in Escriba v. 15 Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 2014)[,] clearly weigh 16 against awarding costs in this action.” (See Mot. at 9:8-11.) In Escriba, the Ninth Circuit 17 held Rule 54(d)(1) “creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, 18 but vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs.” See id. at 1247-48 19 (holding “[a]ppropriate reasons for denying costs include: (1) the substantial public 20 importance of the case, (2) the closeness and difficulty of the issues in the case, (3) the 21 chilling effect on future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff’s limited financial resources, and 22 (5) the economic disparity between the parties.” 23 Here, as to the first and third factors, although Greenspan contends the case could 24
25 2 Greenspan’s citation to Nelson v. Capital Resorts Club, Inc., 2025 WL 2433216 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2025), is distinguishable on its facts, as within a few days after 26 removing the action, the defendant therein filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the district court declined to award the removal filing fee as costs because removal was “not 27 a prerequisite to moving to compel arbitration.” See id. at *1, *7 (internal quotation and 1 potentially expose how defendants “defrauded investors and lied to federal regulators” 2 (see Mot. at 9:17-20) and that an award of costs to an exceptionally wealthy party “would 3 have an obvious chilling effect” (see Mot. at 10:17-19), the Court is not persuaded 4 Greenspan has sufficiently shown either such factor weighs in his favor. Cf. id. at 1248 5 (affirming district court’s denial of bill of costs where plaintiff alleged employer violated 6 poultry plant workers’ statutory rights and submitted Department of Labor letter stating 7 case was “particularly important to the public interest” and “taxing costs would chill future 8 actions because low-wage earners would be reluctant to file suit”).
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1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 AARON JACOB GREENSPAN, Case No. 24-cv-04647-MMC
7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 8 v. MOTION FOR REVIEW AND REVERSAL OF CLERK’S COSTS 9 ELON MUSK, et al., AWARD 10 Defendants.
11 Before the Court is plaintiff Aaron Jacob Greenspan’s (“Greenspan”) Motion, filed 12 November 8, 2025, “for Court Review and Reversal of Clerk’s Costs Award.” Defendants 13 Elon Musk, Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”), the Elon Musk Revocable Trust dated July 22, 2003, 14 Excession, LLC, Jared Birchall, Singer Cashman, LLP, Allison Huebert, Adam S. 15 Cashman, Adam G. Mehes, and Alex Spiro have filed opposition, to which Greenspan 16 has replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition 17 to the motion, the Court rules as follows.1 18 By the Court’s prior order, filed July 17, 2025, Greenspan’s federal claims were 19 dismissed with prejudice and his state law claims were remanded to state court (see 20 Order Re Motions to Dismiss at 16:11-12 (Doc. No. 156)), whereafter Tesla filed a Bill of 21 Costs for the $405 filing fee it paid on removal of the instant action (see Doc. No. 160), 22 and the Clerk of Court taxed costs in that amount (see Doc. No. 174). 23 By the instant motion, Greenspan asks the Court to “review the Clerk of Court’s 24 award of costs . . . and reverse or vacate such award.” (See Mot. at 1:7-9.) In support of 25 that requested relief, Greenspan makes the following four arguments: (1) removal was 26 improper; (2) Tesla is not the prevailing party; (3) the removal fee was not “necessarily 27 1 incurred”; and (4) equitable factors weigh against an award of costs. (See id. at 4-11.) 2 The Court addresses each such argument in turn. 3 First, Greenspan argues, “a court should not award costs to the removing party 4 when removal was improper” and that “[t]hrough its ruling in ECF No. 156, this Court thus 5 ruled that Defendant Tesla’s removal to this Court was improper as this Court lacked 6 jurisdiction over any portion of plaintiff’s original complaint—the version of the complaint 7 that was actually removed to federal court on July 31, 2024.” (See Mot. at 4:26-5:12) 8 (internal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). Although Greenspan is correct that 9 the Court, in the order to which he refers, found the state law claims comprising his initial 10 Complaint did not raise a federal question, the Court issued no ruling as to the propriety 11 of the removal, as Greenspan, rather than filing a motion to remand, filed an Amended 12 Complaint adding a federal claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 13 Organizations Act (“RICO”) (See Doc. No. 55), thereby conferring federal jurisdiction over 14 the case, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and electing to have his claims proceed in federal court. 15 Second, Greenspan argues, Tesla is “not the ‘prevailing party’ for the purposes of 16 Rule 54(d)(1)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (see Mot. at 5:19-22), under which, 17 “[u]nless a federal statute, [said] rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other 18 than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 54(d)(1). In support thereof, Greenspan points out that the Court dismissed only his 20 RICO claim, whereas his state law claims were remanded, the Court declining to exercise 21 supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims once the sole federal claim was 22 dismissed. (See Doc. No. 156 at 15:1-12.) The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that a 23 defendant that prevails on a plaintiff’s federal claims is the prevailing party even though 24 the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such plaintiff’s state law 25 claims and, after either dismissal or remand, depending on where those claims initially 26 were filed, allows them to proceed in state court. See San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. 27 San Diego City Employees’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 732, 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 1 remaining against them in the district court, [defendants] were clearly the prevailing 2 parties” and, “[a]s such, they were entitled to the award of costs decreed by the district 3 court”); see also Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding 4 “[w]here a district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state claims for resolution, 5 it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice”). 6 Third, Greenspan, argues, “the removal fee was not ‘necessarily incurred’” 7 because Tesla elected to remove this action from state court. (See Mot. at 7:13-26); see 8 also 28 U.S.C. § 1924 (providing “[b]efore any bill of costs is taxed, the party claiming any 9 item of cost or disbursement shall attach thereto an affidavit . . . that such item . . . has 10 been necessarily incurred”). A number of district courts, however, have found such 11 argument “without merit.” See Rezaipour v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2015 WL 13762921 at 12 *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2015) (holding “[f]ees for removal are taxable as costs”) (collecting 13 cases).2 14 Lastly, Greenspan argues, “the five primary factors enumerated in Escriba v. 15 Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 2014)[,] clearly weigh 16 against awarding costs in this action.” (See Mot. at 9:8-11.) In Escriba, the Ninth Circuit 17 held Rule 54(d)(1) “creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, 18 but vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs.” See id. at 1247-48 19 (holding “[a]ppropriate reasons for denying costs include: (1) the substantial public 20 importance of the case, (2) the closeness and difficulty of the issues in the case, (3) the 21 chilling effect on future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff’s limited financial resources, and 22 (5) the economic disparity between the parties.” 23 Here, as to the first and third factors, although Greenspan contends the case could 24
25 2 Greenspan’s citation to Nelson v. Capital Resorts Club, Inc., 2025 WL 2433216 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 2025), is distinguishable on its facts, as within a few days after 26 removing the action, the defendant therein filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the district court declined to award the removal filing fee as costs because removal was “not 27 a prerequisite to moving to compel arbitration.” See id. at *1, *7 (internal quotation and 1 potentially expose how defendants “defrauded investors and lied to federal regulators” 2 (see Mot. at 9:17-20) and that an award of costs to an exceptionally wealthy party “would 3 have an obvious chilling effect” (see Mot. at 10:17-19), the Court is not persuaded 4 Greenspan has sufficiently shown either such factor weighs in his favor. Cf. id. at 1248 5 (affirming district court’s denial of bill of costs where plaintiff alleged employer violated 6 poultry plant workers’ statutory rights and submitted Department of Labor letter stating 7 case was “particularly important to the public interest” and “taxing costs would chill future 8 actions because low-wage earners would be reluctant to file suit”). 9 As to the fourth and fifth factors,3 Greenspan likewise fails to make a sufficient 10 showing. Although Greenspan asserts he has “limited financial resources” (see Mot. at 11 10:22) and points to the “wide gulf between [his] modest net worth and [d]efendant 12 Musk’s” multi-billion-dollar net worth (see Mot. at 11: 2-3), Greenspan has not shown the 13 relatively small cost award sought here would have any significant effect on his financial 14 stability. See Escriba, 743 F.3d at 1248 (holding “[c]osts are properly denied when a 15 plaintiff would be rendered indigent should [he] be forced to pay the amount assessed’) 16 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 17 Lastly, Greenspan argues, defendants’ “willingness to exceed the value of their 18 claimed costs in spending on their own attorney’s fees” evidences “a campaign of 19 harassment,” and “should not be rewarded.” (See Mot. at 11:10-14); see also Escriba, 20 743 F.3d at 1248 (noting five factors are “not an exhaustive list of ‘good reasons’ for 21 declining to award costs”). The Court, however, declines to deny otherwise awardable 22 costs on a showing of economic impracticality. 23 In sum, the Court finds (1) Tesla is the prevailing party in the above-titled action, 24 (2) the filing fee paid by Tesla constitutes a taxable cost in the amount of $405, and (3) 25 the equitable factors do not weigh against awarding costs in that amount. 26
27 3 As to the second factor, Greenspan concedes “[t]he legal issues in this case 1 Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Greenspan's “Motion for Court Review 2 || and Reversal of Clerk’s Costs Award” is hereby DENIED. 3 IT 1S SO ORDERED. 4 5 || Dated: December 19, 2025 MAKINE M. CHESNEY 6 Unitéd States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12
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