FILED Mar 27 2026, 8:33 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Aaron Gregory Fowler, Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
March 27, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1910 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable James K. Snyder, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D32-2401-F1-2097
Opinion by Judge Brown Judges Altice and DeBoer concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 1 of 18 Brown, Judge.
[1] Aaron Gregory Fowler was convicted, following a jury trial, of twenty-three
counts including multiple counts of child molesting, child solicitation, child
exploitation, sexual misconduct with a minor, possession of child pornography,
unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and attempted
obstruction of justice. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting certain evidence and that the State presented insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for attempted obstruction of justice as a level
5 felony. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In March 2023, forty-seven-year-old Fowler met thirteen-year-old N.S. when
N.S. and her mother, Betty S., were dropping groceries off at the apartment of
N.S.’s older sister, Cierra. N.S. visited Cierra’s apartment frequently, and
Fowler was present about “80 percent” of the time that N.S. was there.
Transcript Volume V at 30. On one occasion, N.S. talked to Fowler “about
school” which at the time was “James A. Garfield 31,” an elementary and
middle school. Id. at 29. N.S. “told [Fowler] how old [she]was” and so did her
mother, Betty. Id. at 125.
[3] On March 17, 2023, N.S. was at Cierra’s apartment when Fowler and his son
Ziah came over. They “all ate dinner . . . were hanging out, watching a
movie.” Id. at 30. N.S. “went to bed” between “10:00 and 11:00.” Id. at 30,
34. At 3:00 a.m., Fowler woke her up and told her to come into the living
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 2 of 18 room. N.S. went to the bathroom, and when she came into the living room,
Fowler was on the couch. When she approached him and asked, “Hey what do
you need,” Fowler “kissed” N.S. on the mouth and “pulled [her] on the
couch.” Id. at 35. At that point, Fowler was “on top of” N.S. Id. at 36.
Fowler “pull[ed] down [N.S.’s] shorts” and underwear, and “put his penis”
inside her vagina. Id. at 36, 39. When “the sex was done,” N.S. went back to
the room she had been sleeping in and “wrote down [her phone] number” and
gave it to Fowler. Id. at 41.
[4] N.S. did not speak with Fowler again until June or July 2023, when Fowler
began texting N.S. “[F]rom there, [Fowler and N.S.] started talking about
everything, like, anything and everything that [they] could talk about.” Id. at
43. They would talk in person, through text, or by way of video calls. If
Fowler’s son was nearby, Fowler would end his calls with N.S. because he did
not want his son to know about the relationship. N.S. assumed that Fowler did
not want his son to know about the relationship because it “was illegal.” Id. at
74. At some point, Fowler asked N.S. to be his girlfriend. During their
relationship, Fowler and N.S. exchanged 891 text messages with 150
attachments that included pictures of N.S. in various states of undress.
[5] On one occasion in June or July 2023 when her family “was out at the
racetrack at Speedrome,” Fowler came to N.S.’s house and she let him in
through the front door. Id. at 46. Fowler and N.S. had sexual intercourse
upstairs in N.S.’s bedroom. N.S. also performed oral sex on Fowler. Fowler
left briefly to go home and shower, but he returned later and again had sexual
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 3 of 18 intercourse with N.S. Betty, who was still not home, “video called” N.S. and
noticed that N.S.’s “shirt was on backwards.” Id. at 51. After Betty told N.S.
that she was “coming home soon” and seemed to “suspect[] something was
happening,” Fowler “got spooked” and left. Id.
[6] Also in July 2023, Fowler arrived at N.S.’s house one night after her family was
asleep. Fowler parked on a street nearby and walked to the residence. N.S.
met Fowler in the backyard. The two engaged in “[s]ex and oral.” Id. at 53.
[7] On August 19, 2023, Betty “popped open [N.S.’s] door” and caught N.S. on a
video call with Fowler. Id. at 9. Betty became angry, took away N.S.’s phone,
and grounded her. Rather than disclosing her relationship with Fowler, N.S.
told Betty that she was just “trying to find marijuana somewhere.” Id. at 56.
Betty did not believe N.S. so, that same day, Betty sent Fowler several messages
on Facebook Messenger. In one message, Betty threatened Fowler to leave
N.S. alone and stated: “[Y]ou cannot tell me not one bit that [] you did not
know you were talking to a 13-year-old child and be that you did not know that
it was [N.S.] and then you hang up the minute you see my ass on the screen . . .
I feel you’re a f* child molester . . . a baby rapist.” Exhibits Volume IV at 131.
Betty began another message with, “Listen you know how old [N.S.] is . . . .”
Id. at 132. Betty tried to call Fowler multiple times, but he did not answer the
calls. A short time later, Fowler messaged back, tried to convince Betty that
maybe N.S. was looking to buy weed or perhaps his son was the one interacting
with N.S. Betty again referenced N.S.’s age by saying, “I got a 13 year old kid
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 4 of 18 telling me s[h]e trying to buy weed from a grown ass man.” Id. at 133. 1 Fowler
responded that he has three daughters and that his friends could vouch for him
that he “don’t play” around with kids, that Betty was “right,” that he
understood Betty’s anger as a mother, and that he owed her an apology. Id.
Fowler never denied knowing that N.S. was only thirteen years old.
[8] After Betty took away N.S.’s phone, Fowler delivered three phones to N.S. by
tying “them up in a grocery bag” and placing them in a dumpster behind her
house. Transcript Volume V at 57. N.S. turned fourteen years old in August
2023. On her birthday, she sent Fowler a picture of herself from school wearing
a dress. Fowler responded, “Beautiful happy birthday day lady.” Exhibits
Volume II at 43.
[9] Betty gave N.S. her phone back in November 2023. N.S. and Fowler continued
communications and their relationship. In January 2024, Fowler drove over to
N.S.’s home and parked on a street nearby. N.S. left her house and met Fowler
in his car. Fowler placed his penis in N.S.’s vagina and in her mouth, and he
placed his mouth on her vagina. On January 13, 2024, N.S. again snuck out of
her home, met Fowler, and they drove to his apartment. Fowler gave N.S.
alcohol and they had sexual intercourse multiple times. Fowler handed N.S.
his phone to record one of the sexual encounters. The recording was created at
2:11 a.m. on January 13, 2024.
1 Betty’s initial message was sent at 5:36 p.m. Fowler’s responses began shortly after 6:00 p.m.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 5 of 18 [10] That morning, Betty woke up earlier than usual and discovered N.S. was not
home. Betty located N.S.’s phone and discovered calls and messages from
Fowler. Betty, N.S.’s sister, and her father tried to call Fowler, but he had
turned off his phone. When he turned his phone back on, Fowler texted N.S.’s
family that he had been asleep. As N.S. hid in a garage area, Fowler filmed a
video of the inside of his apartment to send to her family to prove that she was
not there. Fowler then drove N.S. home and dropped her off a street away
from the residence. Upon returning home, N.S. did not immediately disclose
her whereabouts. However, N.S. eventually revealed her sexual relationship
with Fowler to her family.
[11] Betty reported the relationship to police. N.S. spoke with police and
Department of Child Services investigators and went to the Center of Hope for
a medical evaluation. Also, on January 19, 2024, law enforcement executed a
search warrant at Fowler’s apartment and located two firearms. One of the
firearms was in a chest of drawers along with Fowler’s debit card, phone, and
wallet.
[12] Fowler instructed N.S. to delete anything on her phone involving him so that
her parents would not discover their activities. N.S. followed that instruction.
Fowler deleted data from his phone on January 7, 16, and 19, 2024.
[13] On January 22, 2024, the State charged Fowler with three counts of child
molesting as level 1 felonies, four counts of sexual misconduct with a minor as
level 4 felonies, child exploitation as a level 5 felony, and unlawful possession
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 6 of 18 of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a level 4 felony. On February 14,
2024, the State filed an amended information adding ten counts of possession of
child pornography as level 6 felonies, two counts of child solicitation as level 5
felonies, and one count of contributing to the delinquency of a minor as a level
6 felony. The State also subsequently alleged that Fowler was an habitual
offender.
[14] On May 5, 2025, while Fowler was incarcerated at the Marion County Jail,
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective Lauren Carmack retrieved a
handwritten letter Fowler placed in out-going mail. In the letter, Fowler
directed the recipient to locate an individual named “Mike” and stated: “I’m
trying to pay him or get him to write a statement saying that’s his brother hand
writing . . . . He got to say how he know me . . . he’s like an uncle. He got to
say that his brother hand writing . . . . He’s a weed head so if he don’t do it for
free, shit a $20 would work.” Exhibits Volume IV at 154. Fowler explained
that he needed the recipient to do this because “they” think Fowler wrote
“Dre[’s]” witness statement. Id. The letter included a copy of a purported
witness statement written on his behalf titled “Declaration of Andre Brewer”
that Fowler had previously filed with the court. Id. at 156. The letter also
directed the recipient to contact Fowler’s friend “Larry” to fabricate a lease for
Fowler’s apartment “so it will look like someone with a gun [permit] stayed
there other than me,” and to have Larry’s son “Jared” copy a gun permit that
Fowler could “show the court” to suggest that Jared was on the lease and
owned the firearm found in the apartment. Id. at 154-155. Fowler made
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 7 of 18 several jail phone calls discussing the letter. On May 29, 2025, the State filed
an amended information against Fowler adding one count for attempted
obstruction of justice as a level 6 felony and one count for attempted
obstruction of justice as a level 5 felony.
[15] A jury trial began on June 9, 2025. During trial, Betty testified that on one
occasion, she “popped open [N.S.’s] door” and caught N.S. on a video call with
Fowler. Transcript Volume V at 9. When asked, if she had ever confronted
Fowler “over social media,” Betty responded, “Yes.” Id. at 11. When asked,
“In what platforms,” Betty responded, “It was TikTok and on [Facebook]
Messenger.” Id. The prosecutor showed Betty a copy of the messages she sent
to Fowler over Facebook Messenger and his responses, she stated they were
true and accurate copies of those messages, and the prosecutor moved to admit
the messages as State’s Exhibit 294. Fowler’s counsel objected on hearsay
grounds. Specifically, Fowler’s counsel argued that, although Fowler’s
responses to Betty’s text messages “would all be admissible,” Betty’s text
statements were hearsay. Id. at 13. After initially sustaining the hearsay
objection, the court ultimately overruled the objection and admitted State’s
Exhibit 294. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Fowler not guilty of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor but guilty on all remaining counts.
He waived a jury trial on the second phase of trial for unlawful possession of a
firearm and the habitual offender enhancement. Following a bench trial, the
court found that Fowler was a serious violent felon and an habitual offender. A
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 8 of 18 sentencing hearing was held on July 8, 2025. The court sentenced Fowler to an
aggregate executed term of 119 years.
Discussion
I.
[16] Fowler asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting State’s
Exhibit 294, and specifically “N.S.’s mother’s hearsay statement[s] about telling
Fowler N.S.’s age.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. The trial court has broad
discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d
996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is
generally accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d
459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh’g denied. We do not reweigh the evidence; rather, we
consider only evidence that is either favorable to the ruling or unrefuted and
favorable to the defendant. Beasley v. State, 46 N.E.3d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2016).
[17] Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally
inadmissible, subject to a handful of specific and limited exceptions. Cornell v.
State, 139 N.E.3d 1135, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; Ind. Evidence
Rule 802.
[18] During trial, in response to Fowler’s hearsay objection to the admission of
State’s Exhibit 294, the prosecutor asserted that Betty’s statements contained
therein were admissible because she, the declarant, was present and testifying
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 9 of 18 and available for cross-examination. 2 We agree with Fowler that the State
“essentially was arguing the old Patterson rule” that “has been dead for well
over three decades.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. As the Indiana Supreme Court
noted in Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 835 n.1 (Ind. 2000):
Under the old ‘Patterson Rule’ an out-of-court statement not given under oath could be considered as substantive evidence so long as the declarant was available at trial for cross-examination. Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975)). As a result of this Court’s opinion in Modesitt v. State, 578 N.E.2d 649 (Ind. 1991) and the later adoption of the Indiana Rules of Evidence, the ‘Patterson Rule’ has been completely abrogated. Consequently, regardless of whether the declarant is available at trial for cross-examination, a hearsay statement is not ordinarily admissible as substantive evidence.
[19] After initially sustaining Fowler’s hearsay objection, the trial court ultimately
overruled the objection stating, “when someone is making an out of court
statement such as you’re having a relationship with a 13-year-old child goes
unrebutted. . . [t]his is admissible. And I think it’s because based on the
2 On appeal, the State changes course and asserts that Betty’s messages to Fowler accusing him of knowing that N.S. was thirteen years old, were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of her statements – that is, they were not offered to prove that Fowler knew N.S. was thirteen years old but instead “to show that [Betty] told [Fowler] that N.S. was thirteen years old.” Appellee’s Brief at 17. We believe that this is a distinction without a difference. In other words, we agree with Fowler that the messages were at least, in part, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein – that is, that Fowler knew that N.S. was thirteen years old.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 10 of 18 statements that are made not only by [Betty] and Mr. Fowler’s silence.”
Transcript Volume V at 13. 3
[20] We believe the trial court was referring to Ind. Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(B)
which excludes from the definition of hearsay a statement “offered against an
opposing party” that “is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to
be true.” This Court has observed that “Indiana law on adoptive admissions
since the adoption of the Indiana Rules of Evidence is scarce, but Indiana’s rule
is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B), and we may use federal
cases for guidance.” Lancaster v. State, 153 N.E.3d 1144, 1148 (Ind. Ct. App.
2020) (quoting Irmscher Suppliers, Inc. v. Schuler, 909 N.E.2d 1040, 1046-1047
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009)), trans. denied. “The federal rule governing adoptive
admissions ‘does not require the party to specifically adopt another person’s
statements, but a ‘manifestation of a party’s intent to adopt another’s
statements, or evidence of the party’s belief in the truth of the statements, is all
that is required for a finding of adoptive admission.’” Id. (quoting Irmscher, 909
N.E.2d at 1047 (quoting United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282, 1296 (7th Cir.
1988))). The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[a]n equivocal response to
an assertion of fact which, if true, a reasonable person would be expected to
deny, is an adoptive admission which may be admitted as evidence tending to
show the truth of the assertion.” Miller v. State, 500 N.E.2d 193, 195 (Ind. 1986)
3 Fowler conceded that his statements in response to Betty’s messages set forth in Exhibit 294 were admissible.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 11 of 18 (citing Robinson v. State, 266 Ind. 604, 611-612, 365 N.E.2d 1218, 1223 (1977)
(holding that “[s]ilence or an equivocal response to an assertion of fact, which,
if true, a reasonable man would be expected to deny, is admissible as evidence
tending to show the truth of the assertion, if the person is not in custody when
the assertion is made, and the person has an opportunity to speak”) (internal
citations omitted)).
[21] Here, Betty stated multiple times in her messages that N.S. was thirteen years
old and that she believed Fowler knew that. Betty also tried to immediately call
Fowler, and he refused to answer. When Fowler did respond to the messages,
he did not deny, disagree with, or refute Betty’s statements regarding N.S.’s
age. Rather, he was silent on that issue and went a step further by telling Betty
she was “right” and apologizing to her stating that he understood her parental
worries. Exhibits Volume IV at 133.
[22] We acknowledge that, generally, adoptive admissions occur in the context of an
in-person communication and there is nuance involved here in that Betty’s
statements were made over instant messaging and not in Fowler’s physical
presence. Indeed, these types of social media or text exchanges do not
necessarily occur in real time, with messages not being read or responded to
immediately upon receipt. Further, individuals may begin a communication
with instant messaging before quickly switching to another form of
communication such as a phone call or in-person meeting. In fact, Betty did try
to switch to phone communication and, if Fowler had answered her calls, his
silence or equivocal responses to her instant messages would be less telling.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 12 of 18 However, these parties continued their communication only through instant
messaging, and when Fowler did respond to Betty’s messages, his responses
indicated that he understood the nature of the accusatory statements and that
they were assertions a reasonable person would be expected to deny. In light of
the circumstances surrounding Betty’s messages and Fowler’s responses, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Betty’s statements regarding N.S.’s age were admissible as adoptive
admissions. 4 See Lancaster, 153 N.E.3d at 1148 (defendant’s failure to deny,
disagree with, or refute his brother’s out of court statement at the time it was
made supported trial court’s finding that the statement was admissible as an
adoptive admission).
[23] Even if Betty’s statements were hearsay, their erroneous admission would not
warrant reversal because any alleged error was harmless. As the Indiana
Supreme Court recently reiterated, our harmless-error analysis is found in
Appellate Rule 66(A):
4 Fowler relies on People v. McDaniel, 251 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019), for the broad proposition that “the logic for applying the adoptive admission exception to the rule against hearsay falls apart when the communications are made via instant messaging.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 8. We find this case factually distinguishable and unpersuasive under the circumstances. See McDaniel, 251 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 530 (observing that there “was no evidence as to whether and when McDaniel read the text message in which his mother suggested he had robbed multiple local stores. To the extent he read it, it was entirely possible he responded to it by calling his mother or talking to her in person. Considering the distinctive nature of text messaging, the instant record provides no basis for a conclusion, in the first instance, that McDaniel, with knowledge of his mother’s statement, in fact failed to deny or respond to it and, in turn, that he thereby adopted it” and further observing “there was not an adequate showing that McDaniel had in fact failed to respond to or deny his mother’s indirect accusation . . . a response or denial was not necessarily warranted under the circumstances . . . [and] there was no other evidence of McDaniel’s reaction to his mother’s statement that showed adoption of it on his part”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 13 of 18 No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 491 (Ind. 2023). “Under this test, the party
seeking relief bears the burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence
in the case, the error’s probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome
of the proceeding below.” Id. at 492. “[W]e consider the likely impact of the
improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light
of all the evidence in the case.” Id. “Ultimately, the error’s probable impact is
sufficiently minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the
outcome is not undermined.” Id.
[24] Here, to convict Fowler of the multiple counts of level 1 felony child molesting
and level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, the State was not required
to prove Fowler knew N.S.’s age. Wilson v. State, 997 N.E.2d 38, 44 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). Rather, it was Fowler’s burden to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that he reasonably believed N.S. to be fourteen years of age or
older (as to the level 1 felony child molesting counts) or sixteen years of age or
older (as to the level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor counts). See
Moon v. State, 823 N.E.2d 710, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (observing that a
defendant’s reasonable belief regarding the victim’s age is a defense under the
specific terms of the child molesting statute that the defendant has the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 14 of 18 Nonetheless, the State bore the ultimate burden of negating beyond a
reasonable doubt any defense the defendant sufficiently raised. Bradford v. State,
675 N.E.2d 296, 300 (Ind. 1996).
[25] Considering all the evidence before the jury, we believe the State negated
Fowler’s defense, and our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.
Specifically, Betty’s statements were cumulative of other evidence on this issue
before the trier of fact. In response to a question posed by the jury, N.S.
testified, without objection, that she told Fowler her age and that her mom had
also told him her age. She also testified that she spoke with him about school
during their very first meeting, and that he knew she attended an elementary
and middle school. The record further reveals that Fowler wished N.S. happy
birthday on her fourteenth birthday in August 2023. There was also ample
evidence in the record that Fowler went to great lengths to hide his relationship
with N.S. from her parents, even going so far as to fabricate a story that his son,
who was younger than N.S., had some kind of relationship with her. Finally,
while incarcerated, Fowler annotated the back of photos of N.S. One photo
says “she was 14 in this one” and the other says “she was 13 in this one”
indicating that he recognized N.S.’s young age at different stages of their
relationship. Exhibits Volume IV at 159-161. As the challenged evidence was
merely cumulative of other evidence, Fowler has failed to show that the
probable impact of the alleged erroneous admission of Betty’s statements—
considered in light of all the evidence—undermines confidence in the verdict.
Any error was therefore harmless.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 15 of 18 II.
[26] We next address Fowler’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
his conviction for attempted obstruction of justice as level 5 felony. When
reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816,
817 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable
inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be
affirmed if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[27] Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-2(b)(1) provides that a person commits obstruction of
justice, as a level 5 felony if “during the investigation or pendency of a domestic
violence or child abuse case” the person knowingly or intentionally:
offers, gives, or promises any benefit to . . . any witness to abstain from attending or giving testimony, or to give a false or materially misleading statement, at any hearing, trial, deposition, probation, or other criminal proceeding or from giving testimony or other statements, including giving a false or materially misleading statement, to a court or law enforcement officer under IC 35-31.5-2-185.
Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1 provides that a person “attempts to commit a crime
when, acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, he
engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of
the crime.” It is well established that a conviction may be sustained on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 16 of 18 circumstantial evidence alone. Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 834 (Ind.
2000).
[28] We observe that the jury here was instructed that to convict Fowler of
attempted obstruction of justice as a level 5 felony, the jury must find that
Fowler “wrote a letter offering to pay someone money to create a false witness
statement.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume IV at 31. The record reveals that
Fowler’s letter that was confiscated in the jail mailroom explained that he was
concerned that “they” believed he, rather than Brewer, wrote Brewer’s witness
statement. Exhibits Volume IV at 154. Accordingly, Fowler asked the letter’s
recipient to pay “Mike,” whom he described as Brewer’s brother, $20 to
authenticate the statement by claiming that he recognized the statement as
being authored in Brewer’s handwriting. Id. Fowler detailed in the letter how
Mike could justify his own relationship with Fowler and why he could confirm
the handwriting was his brother’s and not Fowler’s. The letter went on to
request additional fabrications when it came to the lease for Fowler’s
apartment. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that Fowler was
attempting to use Mike to make a false statement as to the authenticity of
Brewer’s witness declaration. We conclude that the State presented evidence of
probative value from which a reasonable jury could find Fowler guilty of
attempted obstruction of justice.
[29] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Fowler’s convictions.
[30] Affirmed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 17 of 18 Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha Griffin Christopher Taylor-Price Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Jennifer Anwarzai Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1910 | March 27, 2026 Page 18 of 18