A. J. Conroy, Inc. v. Weyl-Zuckerman & Co.

39 F. Supp. 784, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3054
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJuly 8, 1941
Docket4186
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 39 F. Supp. 784 (A. J. Conroy, Inc. v. Weyl-Zuckerman & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
A. J. Conroy, Inc. v. Weyl-Zuckerman & Co., 39 F. Supp. 784, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3054 (N.D. Cal. 1941).

Opinion

ROCHE, District Judge.

This is an appeal from a reparation award made by the Secretary of Agriculture. It is taken under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930, hereafter referred to as the P.A.C.A., 7 U.S.C. A. § 499g. The P.A.C.A. provides for a trial de novo upon appeal, with the findings of fact and orders of the Secretary of Agriculture standing as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Appellant, a licensed Stockton corporation dealing in vegetable products, seeks to set aside an award of the Secretary of Agriculture in favor of appellee, a licensed Milwaukee corporation which purchased a carload of carrots from appellant. In an action before an examiner of the Department of Agriculture, appellee alleged that the carrots arrived in a decayed condition, contrary to the terms of the contract of sale. Appellee further alleged that such decayed condition constituted a failure of delivery in accordance with the terms of the contract without reasonable cause on the part of appellant, in violation of Section 2 of the P.A.C.A., and that therefore appellee was entitled to be reimbursed for the loss which it had suffered under the contract. Section 2 reads in part as follows :

“It shall be unlawful in * * * any transaction in interstate * * * commerce * * * For any dealer to * * * fail to deliver in accordance with the terms of the contract without reasonable cause any perishable agricultural commodity * * * sold * * * in interstate * * * commerce by such dealer.” 7 U.S.C.A. § 499b(2).

The examiner found that appellant had violated this section by failing to deliver carrots which met the contract requirements. Accordingly, the Secretary of Agriculture made a Reparation Award from which the shipping dealer now appeals.

The following facts, as established at the trial and as found by the Secretary of Agriculture are not subject to dispute:

On June 29th, 1937, appellant sold to appellee one carload of topped carrots to be U.S. No. 1 grade, % inch minimum, 85% 1 inch or larger, at $1.25 per 50 pound bag, f.o.b. shipping point, Stockton, California, icing extra. The sale price totaled $750. The parties entered into this contract of purchase by a series of telegrams sent on June 28th, 29th, and July 1st.

Appellant shipped the carload of carrots under “initial ice” from Stockton, California on June 30, 1937. Before loading the carrots, appellant had them inspected by a Federal Inspector, who found them to be graded U.S. No. 1, % inch minimum, with defects within grade tolerance. On the following day, appellant wired appellee that the carrots were shipped under initial icing only. Neither party ordered more ice while the car was in transit.

The carrots reached Milwaukee, the place of destination, on July 7th. Appellee examined the carload and discovered that the carrots had begun to spoil. On the following day a federal inspection showed that decay existed in all sacks, ranging from 4% in some to practically the entire contents in others.

Upon arrival of the carrots, appellee paid appellant the agreed purchase price and settled freight and icing charges of $341.38. After disposing of the 12,345 pounds of carrots which were salvaged, appellee presented a claim for damages in the sum of $770.12, this representing the loss to appellee caused by the decayed carrots. It was appellee’s position before the Secretary of Agriculture that the carrots failed to meet the terms of the purchase contract without reasonable cause, as required by Section 2 of the P.A.C.A. The Secretary sustained appellee and made the reparation award which has given rise to the present appeal.

Appellant contends that its carload of carrots complied with the requirements of Section 2, that the Secretary of Agriculture was in error in finding that the carrots failed to meet the terms of the contract without reasonable cause, and that the reparation award must be set aside. Appellee denies that the shipment of carrots com *786 plied with the provisions of Section 2 of the P.A.C.A. The joinder of issue by the parties gives rise to the question: Is there a violation of the P.A.C.A. by a dealer whose product appears to satisfy the terms of the contract of sale at the point of shipment (as found by a federal inspector), in an f.o.b. shipping point contract but fails to meet the contract requirements at the point of destination (as found by a federal inspector), by reason of decay which has occurred en route ?

Under the terms of the contract, title and risk passed to appellee when the carrots were shipped from Stockton, California. Thereafter, normal deterioration losses, arising en route to Milwaukee would fall upon appellee. If the decayed sacks of carrots were the result of improper refrigeration under the seasonal weather conditions, then appellee would bear the loss. But if the carrots contained a latent defect, which only made itself manifest in the course of shipment, then appellee must prevail.

The evidence discloses that during the two-week period from the thirtieth of June, when appellant’s carrots were shipped, up to the thirteenth of July, appellant dispatched some thirteen carloads of carrots to various parts of the country. Appellant’s witness testified that these carloads moved under packing and icing conditions which were similar to those under which appellee’s carrots traveled. All of the carrots which made up these carloads were picked from the same acreage. In no case, except that of appellee, did any purchaser register a complaint about the condition of the carrots upon arrival at point of destination. But decay struck at appellee’s carloayl. This decay could have been caused by sweating, brought about by improper refrigeration during the hot weather •of July; or it could have been caused by “watery soft rot”, a disease of field origin. Which of^these causes does the record establish ?

The inspector of the carrots at Milwaukee, after an examination of the decay, concluded that it was caused by watery soft rot. The Secretary of Agriculture concurred in this opinion. He then took judicial notice of the fact that watery soft rot is a disease of field origin, as shown by a pamphlet published by his Department. 1 It is a disease which remains latent within the carrots until one, two, or several days after they have been picked. The speed with which it manifests its presence and causes decay depends in part upon the temperature under which the carrots are kept. It works most rapidly at warm temperatures. Based upon the report of the examiner and the information contained in the Department’s pamphlet, the Secretary made his ruling in favor of.the appellee.

As opposed to the evidence set forth in the preceding paragraph that the carrots decayed because of an inherent defect in the form of watery soft rot, the Court has the cross-examination testimony of appellee’s expert witness to the effect that the carrots may have spoiled because of sweating, brought about by improper refrigeration. This latter evidence is purely conjectural, as against the eye-witness diagnosis of the decayed carrots made by a trained federal inspector. The Court will accept the findings of the Secretary of Agriculture, based on the careful examination of the destination inspector, that appellee’s carrots were suffering from watery soft rot, which was brought out in the course of shipment across the country.

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Bluebook (online)
39 F. Supp. 784, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3054, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/a-j-conroy-inc-v-weyl-zuckerman-co-cand-1941.