A. E. J. B. v. D. G. K.

Opinion

86 September 16, 2026 No. 874

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

A. E. J. B.,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

D. G. K.,

Respondent-Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 25SK02295; A188232

Stephen W. Morgan, Judge. Argued and submitted August 13, 2026. George W. Kelly argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Lindsey Burrows argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was Burrows Appellate Law LLC.

Rachael A. Federico filed the brief amicus curiae for Legal Aid Services of Oregon.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge.

JACQUOT, J. Affirmed.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 353 Or App 86 (2026) 87

JACQUOT, J.

Respondent appeals a judgment entering a stalking protective order (SPO) against him pursuant to ORS 30.866(1). In a single assignment of error, respondent argues that the court erred in finding three qualifying contacts that satisfied the requirements of ORS 30.866(1) and entering an SPO. Because we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support entry of an SPO, we affirm.

To obtain an SPO against a respondent, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the respondent made two or more unwanted contacts with the petitioner or a member of the petitioner’s immediate family or household within the past two years; (2) each contact gave rise to subjective alarm that was objectively reasonable ; and (3) the contacts taken together have given rise to subjective apprehension regarding the personal safety of the petitioner or their immediate family or household member that is objectively reasonable. See C. J. R. v. Fleming, 265 Or App 342, 348, 336 P3d 534 (2014) (so stating); ORS 30.866(1).

When the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an SPO under ORS 30.866 is challenged on appeal—and absent de novo review, which respondent here does not request— ”’we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record is legally sufficient to permit that outcome.’ ” J. D. B. v. Muller, 313 Or App 171, 172, 496 P3d 18 (2021) (quoting King v. W. T. F., 276 Or App 533, 537, 369 P3d 1181 (2016)).

To support the issuance of an SPO under ORS 30.866, a petitioner must establish two or more unwanted contacts in the two years immediately preceding the petition for an SPO. S. A. B. v. Roach, 249 Or App 579, 583, 277 P3d 628 (2012). “A ‘contact’ can include almost any interaction with [a person] and can be categorized as either nonexpressive (physical or visual) contacts or expressive (spoken or written) contacts.” State v. Hejazi, 323 Or App 752, 759, 524 P3d 534 (2023). “[E]ach ‘contact,’ individually, must give rise to subjective and objectively reasonable alarm or coercion.”

88 A. E. J. B. v. D. G. K.

K. R. v. Erazo, 248 Or App 700, 706, 274 P3d 214 (2012). “Objectively reasonable alarm requires that the apprehension regarding the petitioner’s personal safety be objectively reasonable.” E. T. v. Belete, 266 Or App 650, 654, 338 P3d 776 (2014). The contact and its effect are considered in the context of the parties’ history. See Pinkham v. Brubaker, 178 Or App 360, 372-73, 37 P3d 186 (2001) (concluding that the petitioner’s alarm was objectively reasonable when considered in the context of the parties’ entire history).

On appeal, respondent argues that the contacts he had with petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of ORS 30.866(1). We disagree. The trial court determined that respondent engaged in three qualifying contacts: (1) mailing a package to petitioner’s dormitory; (2) traveling to petitioner’s university and contacting him outside the residence hall; and (3) following petitioner into the school cafeteria after petitioner repeatedly told him to leave. The parties dispute whether the second and third contacts are one or two contacts. As explained below, we need not decide that issue in this case.

Petitioner is respondent’s estranged son who recently reached adulthood. Petitioner testified to the difficult divorce between his parents when petitioner was twelve. Petitioner also testified to domestic violence in his family and excessive discipline by respondent in petitioner’s youth, which led the dissolution court to order no parenting time with respondent and limited contact between the two—only if initiated by petitioner or occasional gifts sent through an intermediary.

The first contact within the relevant statutory time period is the package respondent mailed to petitioner at his university residence hall. In November 2024, petitioner received a package from respondent’s Las Vegas, Nevada, address. Petitioner testified that he was frightened to receive this package because he had actively attempted to conceal his location and university from respondent—testimony that the trial court credited. Petitioner testified that he believed he had made a “fresh start” by attending an out-of-state university. Petitioner did not open the package but photographed it, wrote “Please don’t send again” on the

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 353 Or App 86 (2026) 89

package, and asked the university mailroom to return the package and any future mail from respondent, without notifying petitioner that he had received anything.

On appeal, respondent makes three arguments that the package was insufficient as a contact to support issuance of an SPO. First, respondent argues that he could not have recklessly engaged in “unwanted” contact because “previous packages had been sent, and as to none of them was respondent told to stop sending further packages.” Second, respondent argues that petitioner failed to establish that he was alarmed by the contact. Third, respondent argues that it was not objectively reasonable for petitioner to have been alarmed.

First, respondent is incorrect that the record is insufficient to establish that respondent acted with the requisite mental state as to whether the package was “unwanted.” To establish that an SPO respondent acted recklessly, the petitioner must produce evidence that the respondent was “aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the contacts in question are repeated and unwanted by the recipient, and then consciously and unreasonably disregard that risk.” Delgado v. Souders, 334 Or 122, 133, 46 P3d 729 (2002). The court found that petitioner made efforts to conceal his location from respondent. Additionally, when respondent and petitioner’s mother divorced, the court entered a domestic relations judgment, in which the court ordered respondent to refrain from any contact with petitioner or his brother.1 Although the order permitted respondent to send petitioner gifts, respondent was required to follow the designated procedure , which was to send the package to petitioner’s mother or her attorney. Petitioner had refused to accept all prior gifts. It is reasonable to infer from these facts that respondent disregarded a substantial risk that contact and gifts from him were unwanted by petitioner.

Because respondent sent this package directly to petitioner, this contact is qualitatively different from the other

1 Respondent himself testified that the domestic relations judgment prohibited him from contacting petitioner or petitioner’s brother unless they requested contact through their pediatrician. Neither brother ever requested contact with respondent.

90 A. E. J. B. v. D. G. K.

packages respondent has sent petitioner in the past. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition, respondent’s mailing of a package was sufficient to establish that respondent disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that petitioner did not want respondent to unexpectedly send a package to the residence hall of his university.

Second, respondent’s argument that petitioner was not subjectively alarmed by the contact is inconsistent with the record. The trial court credited petitioner’s testimony that he was frightened because he had made efforts to conceal his residential information from respondent and he believed that respondent was legally prohibited from contacting him.

Finally, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that it was objectively reasonable for petitioner to have been alarmed by the contact. We consider the contact and its effect in the context of the parties’ history. See Pinkham, 178 Or App at 372-73 (so finding). The trial court expressly found that respondent had previously and repeatedly abused petitioner when petitioner was a child. The domestic violence took multiple forms, including respondent repeatedly hitting, kicking, and injuring petitioner and his younger brother, dislocating petitioner’s mother ’s shoulder in petitioner’s presence, threatening violence, and telling petitioner that he was responsible for his parents ’ divorce, that petitioner had “darkness in [his] heart,” and that “God is not on [his] side.” Petitioner testified that he was afraid for his physical safety, and he suffered persistent physical and emotional symptoms of the trauma that continued throughout his childhood and young adulthood.

In light of the context of the parties’ history, the trial court reasoned that receiving this package would have alarmed a reasonable person in petitioner’s position. See Boyd v. Essin, 170 Or App 509, 518, 12 P3d 1003 (2000), rev den, 331 Or 674 (2001) (“[C]ontacts that might appear innocuous when viewed in isolation often take on a different character when viewed either in combination or against the backdrop of one party’s assaultive behavior towards the other.”). In support of this finding, the trial court explicitly stated:

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 353 Or App 86 (2026) 91

“[T]he package * * * did cause, in fact, the [p]etitioner alarm, and that alarm was objectively reasonable in this case because of the history of [r]espondent’s violence against both [p]etitioner and the [p]etitioner’s mother. * * * [N]ot only was the [p]etitioner aware * * * [that] * * * [r]espondent was willing to cause violence or harm to him, but also to an adult in the family and that if it’s reasonable for fear then, it certainly would cause reasonable fear and alarm now. * * * The reason why the package is alarming is because there was an order that said the [r]espondent doesn’t contact the [p]etitioner unless the [p]etitioner engages, and the [p]etitioner thought he had kept all of his new movements away from [r]espondent, and [r]espondent sends this package to let the [p]etitioner know I know where you are[.]”

The record supports that determination, and we affirm it.

Regarding the incidents occurring on June 3, 2025, the court concluded that respondent engaged in two contacts on that date: first, respondent’s discovery of where petitioner was living, travel to that state, and showing up on campus without notice and second, respondent following petitioner and cornering him to speak with him. On appeal, respondent argues that these events only amount to one contact and that the trial court erred in deciding otherwise. We need not decide that issue. Here, petitioner reasonably experienced alarm from the events that took place on June 3, and whether the actions respondent took on that day are characterized as two contacts or only one, that June 3 contact and the mailing of the package meet the statutory requirements for a stalking protective order.

On June 3, 2025, petitioner was at his university residence hall. When petitioner was outside, he heard respondent calling his name. Petitioner saw respondent and turned away to avoid confrontation. Respondent followed petitioner through multiple rooms and hallways. Petitioner repeatedly asked respondent to leave. Respondent told petitioner that “he can go where he wants” and that “he’s going to be here [on campus] and around.”

The ORS 163.730(3) definition of a “contact”

includes, but is not limited to, “(a) Coming into the visual or physical presence of the other person[,] (b) Following the other person[,]” and “(c) Waiting outside the home, property, 92 A. E. J. B. v. D. G. K.

place of work or school of the other person.” Regardless of whether we consider the events of June 3, 2025, as one continuous or two or more separate contacts, i.e., coming into the petitioner’s visual presence, following him, and waiting outside of school, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support at least two qualifying contacts that would have caused a reasonable person to have been alarmed, in light of the history of abuse between petitioner and respondent, which meets the statutory requirements to grant an SPO. S. A. B., 249 Or App at 583 (analyzing that under ORS 30.866, a petitioner must establish two or more unwanted contacts in the two years immediately preceding the petition for an SPO). We assume without deciding that the June 3 incident is one qualifying contact.

Given the context and history of the parties’ relationship , it was appropriate for the trial court to grant a permanent SPO. Respondent disregarded a substantial risk that the package he sent would be unwanted by petitioner. And, after he was informed by the return of the package with petitioner’s message not to persist, he then came into petitioner ’s visual and physical presence on June 3. Respondent’s conduct constitutes at least two qualifying contacts. The fact that the communicative content did not amount to threats of imminent physical injury does not disqualify the acts as sufficient contacts. The trial court concluded that they could reasonably cause petitioner to fear for his safety. That conclusion is supported by the record, and we affirm.

Affirmed.