89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy

318 N.E.2d 776, 35 N.Y.2d 213, 360 N.Y.S.2d 612, 1974 N.Y. LEXIS 1290
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedOctober 8, 1974
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 318 N.E.2d 776 (89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
89 Christopher Inc. v. Joy, 318 N.E.2d 776, 35 N.Y.2d 213, 360 N.Y.S.2d 612, 1974 N.Y. LEXIS 1290 (N.Y. 1974).

Opinion

Chief Judge Breitel.

This appeal involves rent-controlled apartments under State and local legislation following the close of World War II affecting then existing buildings.' It does not involve rent-stabilized buildings or vacancy-decontrolled apartments subject to different laws and regulations.

Petitioner-appellant brought an article 78 proceeding, on behalf of itself and similarly situated landlords of some 30,000 rent-controlled apartment buildings in New York City, to establish their right to collect a 7%% annual rent increase under the City Rent Control Law (Administrative Code of City of New York, § Y51-1.0 et seq., as amd. by Local Laws, 1970, No. 30 of the City of New York, July 10, eff. Jan. 1, 1972). Since their actual collectible rents were lower than their maximum base rents (MBRs) as computed in 1972, these owners were heretofore permitted a 7%% annual rent increase until they reached their 1972 MBR (§ Y51-5.0, subd. a, par. [5]). Respondent rent commissioner contends, however, that any [216]*216further annual increase must he predicated on qualification for a new 1974 MBR, for which the statute mandates biennial recalculation (§ Y51-5.0, subd. a, par. [4]).

The principal issue is whether the landlord is entitled to the annual rent increase towards its 1972 MBR, despite the fact that its 1974 MBR had not yet been calculated by the city and may not be until early 1975. Also at issue is whether this annual rent increase is conditioned on the landlord’s showing an expenditure of at least 90% of the total cost index for operation and maintenance assigned to its building, this being a statutory requirement for obtaining the 1974 MBR. Finally, if the 90% expenditure is prerequisite, it is disputed whether the formula for qualification should reflect discrepancies between actual collectible rents and the MBRs.

The courts below reached different results on both issues. Special Term held that the 7%% annual rent increases were unrelated to and not conditioned on the biennial readjustment of the MBRs. Moreover, the court ruled that a showing of 90% expenditure for operation and maintenance was not a prerequisite for the annual rent increase, but suggested that, as a condition subsequent to the rent rise, the landlord would have to make up any expenditure deficiency in the following year. The Appellate Division, unanimously reversing, held that the statute contemplated á biennial “ disestablishment ” of the old MBRs and the recomputation of current MBRs for which the landlords would have to qualify anew. The 7%% rent increase for 1974 could not be taken as of right, but rather, only in conjunction with obtaining a 1974 MBR showing a 90% operation and maintenance expenditure. The Appellate Division did, however, construe the 90% expenditure requirement as incorporating the ratio between the actual collectible rent and the maximum base rent.

The order of the Appellate Division should be modified. In view of the rent control law’s purpose of preserving the city’s existing stock of rent-controlled apartments, and given the rent commissioner’s tardiness in promulgating the 1974 MBRs at a time of financial exigency for the landlords, the rents in 1974 should be allowed to rise by 7%% towards the ceilings represented by the 1972 MBRs. These increases must, however, be conditioned on a showing of 90% expenditure for operation and [217]*217maintenance, albeit under the modified formula accepted by the Appellate Division.

The City Rent Control Law, as amended in 1970, was designed to cope with the problem of ‘ ‘ disinvestment ’ ’ and abandonment of rent-controlled buildings. Its aim was to allow for gradual decontrol of rents in a manner that would take into consideration the landlords’ interests in making their enterprises profitable and the tenants’ interests in continued upkeep of their buildings without precipitous rent rises. To this end a maximum base rent was established for January, 1972 as a ceiling towards which the rents of each building could rise at a rate of no more than 7%% each year. Moreover, beginning in January, 1974, the MBRs were to be revised biennially to accommodate to changes in operating expenses.

The provision for biennial recalculation of the MBR is mandatory in terms (see Administrative Code, § Y51-5.0, subd. a, par. [4]). There is nothing to support the landlord’s contention that MBR readjustments are optional at landlord’s discretion. If the statutory mechanism is followed correctly, the 1974 MBRs should replace the 1972 MBRs, and the latter would become inoperative.

The 7%% annual rent rise must at minimum be interrelated with this mandatory biennial readjustment of the MBRs on the possibility, albeit unlikely, that a downward adjustment of the MBR would forestall the 7%% rent rise anticipated under the prior MBR. Conceptually, at least, the 7%% annual increases in every second year should await the formulation of the new MBRs, and to this -extent the Appellate Division was correct (but see its later memorandum opn. in Bedford Bldg. Co. v. Beame, 45 A D 2d 950 seemingly allowing increases by complying ” landlords without delay due to the agency failure to promulgate new 1974 MBRs).

As a practical matter, however, this court cannot ignore that the rent commissioner may delay issuing the 1974 MBRs over a year beyond the date fixed by statute. To deny landlords their annual rent increases in the interim, on the basis of a strict statutory reading, would impose an unjust hardship at a time of financial exigency far beyond that foreseen by the statute’s draftsmen.

[218]*218The 1974 MBBs were to have been ready by December 31, 1973. The city now hopes that they will be issued by the end of 1974. The 1972 MBBs, however, were delayed a full 15 months, a delay which then impelled the courts to issue an interim order permitting the landlords to collect the 7%% rent increase (see Benson Realty v. Walsh, 71 Misc 2d 339, app. dsmd. 40 A D 2d 592).

The history of the City Bent Control Law of 1970 clearly shows the legislative intention to allow rents of rent-controlled buildings to rise gradually but consistently towards the MBB ceiling.

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Bluebook (online)
318 N.E.2d 776, 35 N.Y.2d 213, 360 N.Y.S.2d 612, 1974 N.Y. LEXIS 1290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/89-christopher-inc-v-joy-ny-1974.