89-09 Sutphin Corp. v. Scarinzi
This text of 187 Misc. 536 (89-09 Sutphin Corp. v. Scarinzi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Terms of the Supreme Court of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Memorandum The landlord did not terminate the tenancy by any notice. Summary proceedings, therefore, could not be instituted (Civ. Prac. Act, § 1410).
No new ground for summary proceedings is created by subdivision (b) of section 8 of chapter 314 of the Laws of 1945. Before the statute, a landlord’was required to establish a.contractual right to terminate the tenancy for a breach (Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381, 389) and was obliged to exercise that right before instituting summary proceedings. (Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure Orange Brink Co., Inc., 132 Misc. 435; Janes v. Paddell, 67 Misc. 420). Subdivision (b) of section 8 simply lifts the ban against summary proceedings by a landlord having a contractual right to terminate a lease for a breach, and who has terminated it, provided there was continuance after notice of a breach of a substantial obligation.
The final order should be unanimously reversed on the law, with $30 costs to tenant, and proceedings dismissed.
MacCrate, Smith and Fennelly, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, etc.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
187 Misc. 536, 67 N.Y.S.2d 216, 1946 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/89-09-sutphin-corp-v-scarinzi-nyappterm-1946.