832 Oakdale Condominium Ass'n v. McBride

2025 IL App (1st) 240834-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 1-24-0834
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (1st) 240834-U No. 1-24-0834 Order filed October 16, 2025 Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT __________________________________________________________________________ 832 OAKDALE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, an ) Appeal from the Illinois not-for-profit corporation, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) No. 21 M1 702851 BRIDGET McBRIDE and ALL UNKNOWN ) OCCUPANTS, ) ) Defendants, ) Honorable ) Martin Paul Moltz, (Bridget McBride, Defendant-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lyle and Quish concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: In this condominium eviction case, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and its challenged orders where, for the majority of the defendant’s claimed errors, the record on appeal is insufficient for our review and where the record is sufficient, the court did not err. No. 1-24-0834

¶2 Plaintiff, 832 Oakdale Condominium Association (Oakdale), filed an eviction action

against defendant, Bridget McBride, one of its unit owners, claiming that she failed to pay her

proportionate share of the association’s common expenses, including payments toward a special

assessment. In response, McBride raised two counterclaims, including one challenging the legality

of the special assessment. On Oakdale’s motion, the trial court struck both counterclaims. The case

proceeded to trial, where the court found in favor of Oakdale, awarding it $24,434.75 and

possession of McBride’s condominium unit. McBride now appeals and contends that: (1) the court

erred in striking her counterclaims; (2) the court abused its discretion when it limited her ability to

present her case at trial; (3) the court’s judgment following trial was against the manifest weight

of the evidence; (4) the court erred by refusing to consider her mid-trial motion to dismiss; and (5)

the court erred by refusing to transfer her motion for substitution of judge for cause to another

judge for consideration. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Oakdale is a common-interest community association, otherwise known as a condominium

association, located at 832 West Oakdale Avenue in Chicago. McBride was the legal owner of a

unit within that association. Pursuant to Oakdale’s declarations and the Condominium Property

Act (Act) (765 ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 2020)), McBride was obligated to pay her proportionate

share of the association’s common expenses.

¶5 In 2010, Oakdale filed an eviction action against McBride seeking possession of her unit

and to recover amounts owed to the association. During a trial, the trial court dismissed the case

without prejudice because the association’s board of managers did not vote to authorize the

litigation against McBride at an open meeting. Oakdale appealed, and this court dismissed the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 832 Oakdale Condominium Ass’n v. McBride, 2017 IL App (1st)

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151528-U. As a result of the litigation with McBride, Oakdale incurred significant legal fees. In

January 2019, Oakdale’s board of managers voted to pass a resolution authorizing the levy of a

$90,000 special assessment to pay for those legal fees. No unit owners filed a petition challenging

the special assessment in accordance with the Act (see 765 ILCS 605/18(a)(8) (West 2020)).

¶6 In August 2021, believing that McBride had again failed to pay her proportionate share of

the association’s common expenses, Oakdale filed a two-count eviction action against her. Count

I sought possession of McBride’s unit based on her failure to pay the amounts owed. Count II

alleged a breach of Oakdale’s declarations for her failure to pay the amounts owed. In both counts,

Oakdale sought over $6,000 from McBride, including $4,831.37 for the common expenses owed.

Oakdale also sought attorney fees and court costs.

¶7 McBride filed an answer, denying that she owed the amounts claimed by Oakdale, and

raised several affirmative defenses. In her fourth affirmative defense, McBride claimed that the

special assessment was illegal because multiple managers of Oakdale’s board of managers had a

conflict of interest in voting to levy the special assessment. After being granted leave by the trial

court, McBride also filed two counterclaims. Her first counterclaim was a breach of fiduciary duty

claim also challenging the legality of the special assessment adopted by Oakdale’s board of

managers. According to McBride, three payments toward the special assessment were among the

alleged expenses owed by her in the eviction action. McBride posited that, because the initial

lawsuit against her was dismissed and never re-filed, the board of managers could be held

personally liable to reimburse Oakdale for funds taken without legal authority. In turn, according

to McBride, because multiple managers of Oakdale’s board of managers were responsible for the

illegal first lawsuit against her, they had a conflict of interest in voting to levy the special

assessment, resulting in their votes not counting and the special assessment not receiving the

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required majority vote. McBride asserted that, despite missing 3 payments toward the special

assessment, she had made 33 payments toward it in protest, which totaled $3,599.64. In addition

to challenging the legality of the special assessment, McBride sought reimbursement for the 33

payments already made toward the special assessment. In McBride’s second counterclaim, she

alleged that Oakdale violated section 19(b) of the Act (id. § 19(b)), which allows any unit owner

the right to inspect and examine the association’s books and records, by failing to comply with 30

written requests to access its records.

¶8 Oakdale moved to strike McBride’s counterclaims, contending that her first counterclaim

was duplicative of her previously-filed fourth affirmative defense and both were not standalone

claims. In January 2023, following a hearing and argument, the trial court granted Oakdale’s

motion to strike. In the court’s written order, it did not provide an explanation for granting

Oakdale’s motion, but noted it had rendered its ruling on the record. However, there is no transcript

of that hearing included with the record on appeal.

¶9 The following month, McBride filed a motion to reconsider the trial court’s order. She

asserted that the court struck her counterclaims because, although her counterclaims “may be

germane” to the eviction matter, eviction courts were “clogged up” due to the COVID-19

pandemic, resulting in her counterclaims “belong[ing] in another court.” In turn, McBride argued

that her counterclaims were completely germane to the issue of possession because the court could

not fully resolve the eviction action against her without determining whether the special

assessment was lawfully levied. McBride also insinuated that the court struck her counterclaims

based on a newly-enacted policy from the First Municipal District of the circuit court of Cook

County. In March 2023, the trial court orally denied the motion, though there is no transcript of

that ruling in the record on appeal.

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¶ 10 On April 5, 2023, McBride’s attorney attended a virtual meeting of the First Municipal

Advisory Committee moderated by the presiding judge of the First Municipal District. McBride’s

attorney asked if there was a policy in the First Municipal District to refer germane issues to other

courts and only consider true issues of possession. According to McBride’s attorney, the presiding

judge of the First Municipal District denied that there was such a policy.

¶ 11 Two days later, McBride filed a “Motion for Hearing,” highlighting the presiding judge of

the First Municipal District’s response and requesting a hearing to address the inconsistency as

well as to obtain the trial court’s reason for striking her counterclaims in writing. Additionally,

because there had been no order in the record denying her motion to reconsider, McBride requested

the court issue one and authorize her to file an interlocutory appeal. According to the “Case

Summary,” there was a status hearing the following week, but there is no transcript from that

hearing in the record. The case was set for trial on April 28, 2023. The day before trial, McBride

filed a “Motion for Substitution of Judge for Cause,” arguing that she could not receive a fair trial

before the court principally because its claim about a policy in eviction cases had been contradicted

by the presiding judge of the First Municipal District.

¶ 12 The next day, the trial began with Oakdale’s only witness, Bradley Arlen, its treasurer. As

will be discussed later in this order, although a copy of the transcript from this day of the trial is

included in the appendix of Oakdale’s brief, it is not a part of the record on appeal and we cannot

consider it. Following Arlen’s direct examination, the trial court entered a written order denying

“[a]ll pending” motions of McBride’s, which included her motion for substitution of judge, without

explanation. The court continued the trial for two weeks and reiterated a ruling that had been

“stated on the record that” all questions must be “germane to the issue of possession.” Then, on its

own motion, the court limited the remaining questioning by the parties, including McBride’s

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attorney to 10 cross-examination questions of Arlen and 10 direct examination questions of

McBride.

¶ 13 Before the trial continued, McBride filed a “Motion to Dismiss,” which she then amended.

In the amended motion, McBride contended that Oakdale violated provisions of the Act by failing

to vote to authorize the litigation against her at an open meeting and failing to provide the requisite

notice of a meeting of the board of managers. McBride argued that Oakdale’s noncompliance was

established through Arlen’s testimony and two exhibits introduced during his testimony—minutes

of the board of managers’ January 2015 and April 2019 meetings—that she attached to the

amended motion. The trial court apparently struck the amended motion before the trial resumed.

¶ 14 The trial continued on May 12, 2023. As will be discussed later in this order, although a

copy of the transcript from this day of the trial was included as an exhibit to McBride’s posttrial

motion, it is not properly part of the record on appeal, and we cannot consider it. Following the

testimony of McBride and closing arguments, the trial court entered an eviction order, awarding

possession of her condominium unit to Oakdale and ordering her to vacate the unit within 180

days. The court also awarded Oakdale $24,434.75, which, according to the court’s written order,

“reflect[ed] common expenses and attorneys fees [sic] awarded and is reflective of the $5[,]000

reduction in the court’s ruling. Total judgment also reflects $2,092.75 in court costs.” The court’s

order did not indicate what portion of the $5,000 reduction was for common expenses compared

to attorney fees. At some point during the proceedings, McBride had moved out of her unit and

began leasing it. Later that month, the association directed McBride’s tenant to pay all rent to

Oakdale beginning in June 2023.

¶ 15 On June 12, 2023, McBride filed a timely posttrial motion, asking the trial court to

reconsider its striking of her counterclaims and amended motion to dismiss, its denial of her motion

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for substitution of judge for cause, and its judgment following trial. As to the latter argument,

McBride posited that the court should have credited her with approximately $6,000 in payments

made yet not counted by Oakdale, which would have resulted in her having a surplus in her account

rather than being delinquent, and thus, not entitling Oakdale to any attorney fees and costs. Lastly,

McBride sought to have the court stay Oakdale’s ability to collect rent from her tenant so that she

could continue to directly receive those rent payments. Over the next three months, McBride’s

tenant paid rent directly to Oakdale.

¶ 16 On September 7, 2023, the trial court entered a written order denying the majority of

McBride’s posttrial motion, but precluded Oakdale from collecting any additional rent from

McBride’s tenant. As for the rent already collected by Oakdale for June, July and August 2023,

the court reserved ruling on how that money should be handled, either applied to the trial judgment

or returned directly to McBride. Three months later, McBride filed an emergency motion for

clarification of the court’s September order. In response, the court asserted that the only issue

remaining concerned the rent payments. To this end, it ordered briefing on the issue and denied a

request by McBride to file “an interlocutory appeal.”

¶ 17 Thereafter, McBride filed a motion for an extension of time to file her memorandum on

the rent issue. The court denied McBride an extension. Oakdale subsequently filed its

memorandum, arguing that the rent payments made by McBride’s tenant to Oakdale should simply

be applied to offset the amount owed by McBride following trial rather than returned directly to

her. McBride did not file a memorandum. Instead, she filed a motion to continue the hearing and

then, an emergency motion for substitution of judge for cause. On March 15, 2024, the trial court

entered a written order, denying McBride’s motions, ruled that Oakdale was entitled to keep the

rent from McBride’s tenant and ordered that amount to offset the amount owed by McBride

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following trial. The court also ordered that there was no longer any stay of enforcement of the

money judgment or the possession provision of the eviction order. McBride subsequently filed her

notice of appeal.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 A. Jurisdiction

¶ 20 Before addressing the merits of McBride’s appeal, we must first address our jurisdiction,

as Oakdale contends that we lack jurisdiction. We note that, prior to the briefing in this case,

Oakdale filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but a panel of justices from

this court denied the motion. Nevertheless, because we have an obligation at all times to ensure

we have jurisdiction, we may revisit a previous denial of a motion to dismiss. In re Marriage of

Waddick, 373 Ill. App. 3d 703, 705 (2007).

¶ 21 In McBride’s jurisdictional statement, she invoked jurisdiction in this court under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017), asserting that she filed her notice of appeal within 30

days of the trial court’s March 15, 2024, order, which disposed of the rent issue. Conversely,

Oakdale posits that McBride needed to file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the court’s

September 7, 2023, order, notwithstanding the fact that the court reserved ruling on the rent issue.

¶ 22 The only jurisdictional step to an appeal is by filing a timely notice of appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R.

301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., 193 Ill. 2d 186, 189 (2000). Absent a proper

notice of appeal, the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction over the order or orders being appealed.

Schaffer v. Greenview Home Builders & Cabinetry Designers, Inc., 2020 IL App (2d) 190230, ¶

39. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994), every final judgment is appealable

as of right. But under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017), “if a timely

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posttrial motion directed against the judgment is filed,” a party must file its notice of appeal “within

30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed

against that judgment or order.”

¶ 23 In the instant case, because Oakdale’s claims were decided in a bench trial, McBride had

30 days following the entry of the trial court’s judgment to “file a motion for a rehearing, or a

retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.” 735 ILCS

5/2-1203(a) (West 2020). McBride’s posttrial motion included various requests, including

modification of the judgment. As such, her posttrial motion was directed against the judgment for

purposes of Rule 303(a)(1), as it requested one or more of the types of relief specified in section

2-1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code). See Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of

Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461-62 (1990). And there is no question that McBride’s posttrial motion

was timely filed. Given this, McBride had to file her notice of appeal “within 30 days after the

entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against that judgment

***.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 24 On September 7, 2023, while the trial court denied the majority of McBride’s posttrial

motion, it did not dispose of the entirety of that motion because it reserved ruling on the rent issue.

“When a court expressly reserves an issue, its decision cannot be considered a resolution of the

reserved issue.” Save the Prairie Society v. Greene Development Group, Inc., 338 Ill. App. 3d 800,

803 (2003). That is to say, the court’s September 7, 2023, order did not fully dispose of McBride’s

posttrial motion. Only on March 15, 2024, when the court ruled on the rent issue did the court

finally dispose of McBride’s posttrial motion. McBride filed her notice of appeal within 30 days

of March 15, 2024, and therefore, we have jurisdiction under Rule 303(a)(1).

¶ 25 B. Mootness

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¶ 26 Beyond the jurisdictional issue, relying on Circle Management LLC v. Olivier, 378 Ill.

App. 3d 601, 607 (2007), Oakdale asserts that the issue of possession is moot in this case because

McBride was evicted and relinquished possession of her unit. Circle Management, however, is an

inapt comparison, as the case involved a lease (id. at 604), which is a contractual relationship

between a landlord and tenant. Spanish Court Two Condominium Ass’n v. Carlson, 2014 IL

115342, ¶ 20. When a lease expires, the landlord and tenant’s relationship ends. Id. ¶ 22.

¶ 27 Condominium properties are different. They are not primarily creatures of contract but

rather of statute. Id. ¶ 21. When a condominium association prevails in an eviction action, as was

the case here, the association-unit owner relationship does not end. Id. ¶ 23. “A unit owner does

not cease to be a unit owner even if dispossessed of his or her unit, and the obligations of

condominium ownership, including the obligation to pay assessments, continue unabated.” Id.

“[U]nlike an order of possession in favor of a landlord, an order of possession in favor of an

association is intended to be temporary, not permanent, ‘with possession eventually returning to

the unit owner.’ ” Id. (quoting Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 457 (2002)).

While Oakdale has been awarded possession of McBride’s unit by prevailing in the eviction action

against her, because its possession is intended to be temporary, not permanent (see id.), the fact

that McBride has been temporarily dispossessed of her unit does not moot any of her claims.

¶ 28 C. State of the Record on Appeal

¶ 29 Having addressed Oakdale’s procedural challenges to this appeal, we also must address the

state of the record on appeal before addressing the merits of McBride’s appeal. It is well

established that the “appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the

proceedings at trial to support a claim of error.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984).

“Where the issue on appeal relates to the conduct of a hearing or proceeding, this issue is not

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subject to review absent a report or record of the proceeding.” Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d

426, 432 (2001). “[I]n the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order

entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch,

99 Ill. 2d at 392. And “[a]ny doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will

be resolved against the appellant.” Id.

¶ 30 Our supreme court rules provide the procedures for providing the reviewing court with a

complete record on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021); 323, 324 and 325 (eff. July

1, 2017). According to the rules, the record must be arranged into three sections: a common law

record, the report of proceedings and the trial exhibits, and all three must be certified by the clerk

of the circuit court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 324 (eff. July 1, 2017). The common law record includes every

document filed by the parties, and any orders or judgments issued by the trial court. Ill. S. Ct. R.

321 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). Meanwhile, the report of proceedings “may include evidence, oral rulings

of the trial judge, a brief statement of the trial judge of the reasons for his decision, and any other

proceedings that the party submitting it desires to have incorporated in the record on appeal. The

report of proceedings shall include all the evidence pertinent to the issues on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R.

323 (eff. July 1, 2017). Importantly, Rule 323 requires that the court reporter “certify” the accuracy

of a transcript included in the report of proceedings, which then must be “taken as true and correct

unless shown to be otherwise.” Id. Once the record is prepared, the clerk of the circuit court

certifies the record, thus providing authentication to the record on appeal, and transmits the record

to the appellate court. Ill. S. Ct. Rs. 324, 325 (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 31 This case involved a two-day trial with various exhibits being admitted into evidence by

both parties. As to the transcripts of the trial, neither day’s transcript was properly made part of

the record on appeal. The transcript of the first day of trial was included as part of the appendix to

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Oakdale’s brief. As a general matter, a reviewing “court may not consider documents that are not

part of the certified record on appeal.” Kensington’s Wine Auctioneers & Brokers, Inc. v. John

Hart Fine Wine, Ltd., 392 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14 (2009). “Attachments to appellate briefs that are not

contained in the certified record on appeal cannot be used to supplement the record on appeal and

are not properly before a reviewing court.” Id. Applying this rule, the appellate court has refused

to consider a transcript of proceedings attached to the appendix of a brief. See In re Baby Girl F.,

402 Ill. App. 3d 127, 129 n.1 (2008).

¶ 32 The transcript of the second day of trial was only included as an exhibit to McBride’s

posttrial motion. But, “[a] post-trial motion is not a substitute for a report of proceedings.” Altek,

Inc. v. Vulcan Tube and Metals Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 226, 229 (1979). There is nothing in Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. July 1, 2017) that allows a party to rely on a copy of a transcript

contained in the record on appeal by virtue of being an exhibit to a motion in lieu of that transcript

being part of a properly authenticated report of proceedings. “Certification is designed to assure

the accuracy of the record.” Ray v. Winter, 67 Ill. 2d 296, 302-03 (1977). “A properly authenticated

report of proceedings is essential to the presentation of a record of sufficient completeness to

permit a challenge” to issues at trial. W.E. Mundy Landscaping and Garden Center, Inc. v. Hish,

187 Ill. App. 3d 164, 166 (1989). As a result, neither trial transcript is properly before this court,

and we cannot consider either of them.

¶ 33 Turning to the trial exhibits, none of them were properly authenticated and included in the

record on appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 324 (eff. July 1, 2017). While a copy of minutes of an April

2019 meeting of Oakdale’s board of managers—apparently a critical exhibit at trial—was attached

as an exhibit to McBride’s posttrial motion, this cannot replace the exhibit being properly

authenticated by the clerk of the circuit court and being made part of the record on appeal in

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accordance with our supreme court rules. Additionally, it appears that McBride introduced a bevy

of exhibits at trial purporting to detail various checks that she sent to Oakdale that were cashed yet

never credited to her account. But instead of including those exhibits as part of the record on

appeal, McBride merely included a summary of them and attached the summary as an exhibit to

her posttrial motion. A summary of exhibits is not a suitable replacement for the actual exhibits.

See In re K.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832-33 (2000). As a result, none of the exhibits are properly

before this court. With that discussion of the record on appeal, we turn to the merits of McBride’s

contentions on appeal with the caveat that, under Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392, “[a]ny doubts which

may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against” her, as the appellant.

¶ 34 D. Striking of Counterclaims

¶ 35 With those preliminary issues addressed, we now turn to the merits of McBride’s appeal,

beginning with her contention that the trial court erred by striking her counterclaims because they

were both true counterclaims, as opposed to affirmative defenses, and germane to the eviction

proceedings.

¶ 36 McBride’s first counterclaim, entitled “Plaintiff’s Special Assessment was Illegally Levied

Against Defendant-Counter-Plaintiff,” challenged the legality of the special assessment related to

the 2010 lawsuit filed by Oakdale against her. But in addition to challenging the legality of the

special assessment through claiming the board of managers breached their fiduciary duty, McBride

raised claims that the board of managers had a conflict of interest, engaged in a campaign of

harassment against her, retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the First Amendment

of the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., amend. I), performed other illegal actions and a

claim about res judicata.

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¶ 37 Under section 2-603(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-603(a) (West 2020)), “[a]ll pleadings

shall contain a plain and concise statement of the pleader’s cause of action, counterclaim, defense,

or reply.” Moreover, “[e]ach separate cause of action upon which a separate recovery might be

had shall be stated in a separate count or counterclaim, as the case may be and each count,

counterclaim, defense or reply, shall be separately pleaded, designated and numbered, and each

shall be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each paragraph containing, as nearly as

may be, a separate allegation.” Id. § 2-603(b). The purpose of the requirements in section 2-603

“is to give notice to the court and to the parties of the claims being presented.” Smith v. Heissinger,

319 Ill. App. 3d 150, 154 (2001). Additionally, under the Code, a party “may plead as many causes

of action [or] counterclaims *** as they may have, and each shall be separately designated and

numbered.” 735 ILCS 5/2-613(a) (West 2020). But “separate theories of relief must be pled in

separate counts; neither the court nor the parties should be placed in the position of trying to

decipher a count to determine if there is more than one theory of relief in the count and, if so, how

many.” (Internal citation marks omitted.) In re Estate of Yanni, 2015 IL App (2d) 150108, ¶ 28.

¶ 38 In the instant case, McBride’s first counterclaim commingled multiple causes of action

within a single count that rendered it nearly impossible to discern her true cause of action against

Oakdale. Because her first counterclaim did not state one cause of action, but rather raised multiple,

the counterclaim violated the pleading requirements under the Code (see 735 ILCS 5/2-603(b);

613 (West 2020)) and could have been struck by the trial court on that basis. See Rubino v. Circuit

City Stores, Inc., 324 Ill. App. 3d 931, 938 (noting that, under section 2-603 of the Code, “[a]

complaint may be dismissed for failure to meet statutory pleading requirements”). Although it does

not appear that the court struck McBride’s first counterclaim on this basis, we review the striking

of a counterclaim de novo (CIRAS, L.L.C. v. Borja, 2023 IL App (1st) 221212-U, ¶ 18) and can

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affirm on any basis supported by the record. Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 177 (1993).

Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s decision to strike McBride’s first counterclaim.

¶ 39 We now turn to the trial court’s striking of McBride’s second counterclaim, which alleged

that Oakdale violated section 19(b) of the Act (765 ILCS 605/19(b) (West 2020)) by failing to

comply with 30 written requests to access its records. In Spanish Court, 2014 IL 115342, ¶ 12, our

supreme court addressed whether a condominium association’s alleged failure to maintain

common elements was germane to an eviction proceeding based on unpaid assessments. The court

concluded that “a unit owner’s liability for unpaid assessments is not contingent on the

association’s performance.” Id. ¶ 26. To this end, “[t]he unit owner cannot ‘avoid’ the duty to pay

assessments, i.e., the duty cannot be annulled, vacated, defeated, or invalidated [citation], and the

association cannot refrain from enforcing that obligation.” Id. “Accordingly, a unit owner’s claim

that its obligation to pay assessments was nullified by the association’s failure to repair and

maintain the common elements is contrary to the [] Act and is not a viable defense.” Id. In other

words, the unit owner’s claim that the association had failed to maintain common elements was

not germane to the eviction proceeding. Id. ¶ 35.

¶ 40 Turning back to the present case, the Act provides that it is the duty of the board of

managers to keep detailed records about the operation of the association and to make those records

available to a unit owner upon request. See 765 ILCS 605/18.4(i), 19 (West 2020)). Under Spanish

Court, McBride’s counterclaim alleging that Oakdale violated the Act by failing to abide by its

recordkeeping obligations, an issue about whether Oakdale performed its obligations in

accordance with the law, is not germane to this eviction proceeding based on unpaid common

expenses. See Hickory Heights Condominium Unit No. 1, Inc. v. Okoye, 2023 IL App (1st) 221023-

U, ¶¶ 5, 20 (concluding that, in an eviction action for unpaid common expenses, a unit owner’s

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affirmative defense that the association’s board of managers was not elected in accordance with

its bylaws and Illinois law was not germane to the eviction action because the issue was “not

pertinent to [the unit owner’s] duty to pay assessments”). As noted, we review this issue de novo

(CIRAS, 2023 IL App (1st) 221212-U, ¶ 18) and can affirm on any basis supported by the record.

Messenger, 157 Ill. 2d at 177. Consequently, we find that the court properly struck this

counterclaim.

¶ 41 E. Limiting The Questioning

¶ 42 McBride next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited her ability

to present her case at trial. As noted, while we do not have the transcripts from the two days of

trial, we do have the court’s written order following the first day of trial where, on its own motion,

it limited the remaining questioning by the parties, including McBride’s attorney to 10 cross-

examination questions of Arlen and 10 direct examination questions of McBride with the caveat

that the questioning must be “germane to the issue of possession.”

¶ 43 Based on the record, we cannot find any error. There is nothing inherently improper with

the trial court limiting the parties’ questioning at trial. See Ill. R. Evid. 611(a) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015)

(“The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses

and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the

ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from

harassment or undue embarrassment.”); Neal v. Nimmagadda, 279 Ill. App. 3d 834, 840 (1996)

(“The extent of cross-examination is left to the broad discretion of the trial court.”). Moreover, in

an eviction trial, the court must limit the matters presented to only those “germane to the distinctive

purpose of the proceeding.” 735 ILCS 5/9-106 (West 2020). Together, the court had discretion to

limit the extent of the parties’ questioning in number and content. But that is not to say the court

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has carte blanche to do so. The court can abuse its discretion if its limitation resulted in manifest

prejudice to the opposing party. McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 533 (2000). But without

the trial transcripts to know what McBride was able to present in her case and what questions her

attorney asked of Arlen during cross-examination, we cannot discern what prejudice, if any, she

suffered. In turn, we have no basis to find that the court abused its discretion in limiting McBride

at trial. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.

¶ 44 F. Trial Court’s Trial Judgment

¶ 45 McBride next contends that the trial court’s judgment in the amount of $24,434.75 was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. “In a bench trial, the trial court must weigh the

evidence and make findings of fact.” Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 251 (2002). A reviewing

court defers to the trial court’s findings of facts “unless they are against the manifest weight of the

evidence.” Id. “A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite

conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on

the evidence.” Id. at 252.

¶ 46 In arguing that the trial court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence,

McBride notes that, based on the testimony of Arlen, Oakdale claimed that she owed $3,836.40 in

common expenses. However, according to McBride, based on her exhibits and testimony, she

made payments that Oakdale never credited to her account and Oakdale levied other improper

amounts against her. McBride posits that, based on her testimony and exhibits, she actually had a

positive balance in her account ledger, meaning she did not owe any common expenses. Thus,

McBride asserts that Oakdale should not have prevailed in the litigation against her and not been

entitled to any attorney fees. See 735 ILCS 5/9-111(a) (West 2020) (providing for the award of

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“reasonable attorney’s fees” and costs if the trial court finds that a condominium association is

owed unpaid common expenses in an eviction action).

¶ 47 In making this argument, the chief evidence McBride relies upon are her exhibits. But, as

discussed, the actual exhibits are not included in the record on appeal. Rather, there is only a

summary of the exhibits, which she attached to her posttrial motion. In order for this court to

conclude that the trial court’s findings, namely its failure to credit her thousands of dollars in

payments, was not based on the evidence or unreasonable, we axiomatically need to be able to

review that evidence. A summary of the exhibits is not a suitable replacement for the actual

exhibits for this court to properly provide the deference required under the manifest-weight

standard of review. See In re K.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 832. Likewise, as discussed, none of the trial

transcripts are properly a part of the record on appeal. Given this, we must assume that the trial

court’s judgment was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. See Foutch, 99 Ill.

2d at 391. Consequently, we cannot find the court’s judgment was against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

¶ 48 G. Mid-Trial Motion to Dismiss

¶ 49 McBride next contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it refused to

consider her mid-trial motion to dismiss. As an initial matter, although McBride titled her motion

as one to dismiss, it would have been more accurately titled as one for a directed finding (see In

re Estate of Coffman, 2023 IL 128867, ¶ 51), as she sought a judgment in her favor and dismissal

of the action against her based upon Oakdale’s evidence or lack thereof. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1110

(West 2020). But even if the court did refuse to consider her motion, merely because the court

might have erred in handling it, that does not mean the court would have committed reversible

error. See Orbeta v. Gomez, 315 Ill. App. 3d 687, 690 (2000) (where the trial court applied the

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wrong standard to a motion for directed finding, the error was not automatically reversible). And,

based on the record on appeal, we cannot find reversible error. In McBride’s motion, she argued

chiefly that, based on Arlen’s testimony and Oakdale’s exhibits introduced through him, Oakdale

violated provisions of the Act by failing to vote to authorize the litigation against her at an open

meeting. However, as previously discussed, without the trial transcripts and the exhibits, we have

no basis to find that the court erred in failing to enter a directed finding in McBride’s favor. See

Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391.

¶ 50 H. Substitution of Judge for Cause

¶ 51 McBride lastly contends that the trial court erred when it failed to refer her pretrial motion

for substitution of judge for cause to another judge for consideration.

¶ 52 We briefly note that, when McBride filed her request for a substitution of judge for cause,

she titled that request as a “[m]otion.” Section 2-1001(a)(3) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3)

(West 2020)), which details a request for a substitution of judge for cause, refers to a “petition” as

the proper vehicle, not a “motion.” See In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039, ¶ 28. Because

the proper vehicle for McBride’s request was a petition for substitution of judge for cause, we refer

to that request as a petition hereafter. Under section 2-1001(a)(3)(iii) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-

1001(a)(3)(iii) (West 2020)), “[u]pon the filing of a petition for substitution of judge for cause, a

hearing to determine whether the cause exists shall be conducted as soon as possible by a judge

other than the judge named in the petition.” Although the statute provides that the petition should

be heard by a different judge (id.), this right is not automatic. In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d

519, 553 (2010). Instead, to be entitled to a hearing before a second judge, the movant must “bring

himself or herself within the provisions of the law.” Id. To this end, the movant must make the

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substitution request through a petition verified by affidavit, which sets “forth the specific cause for

substitution.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3)(ii) (West 2020).

¶ 53 While our supreme court has observed the threshold statutory requirements of a petition

for substitution of judge for cause that must be met before the petitioner is entitled to a hearing

before another judge, the court has also noted that the judge named in the petition may deny such

a request based on the circumstances, namely the petition’s timeliness and whether it was made in

good faith. In re Estate of Wilson, 238 Ill. 2d at 556-57. As to the timeliness factor, though no

deadline is imposed by statute, the petition “must be asserted at the earliest practical moment after

the cause for the request has been discovered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 556. As

to the motives factor, the judge “may take cognizance of the circumstances surrounding a motion

for substitution of judge and inquire into the good faith of the motion.” Id. at 557. “Where it is

apparent that the request is not made in good faith but for purposes of delay,” the denial of such a

petition without a hearing before a second judge “does not constitute error.” Id.

¶ 54 Turning to McBride’s petition, based on the record properly before us, all we know is that

the trial court denied the petition without referring it to another judge for consideration. But we do

not know why the court did so, as the transcript from the first day of the trial and when the court

denied McBride’s petition is not properly in the record on appeal. However, the absence of the

why here does not preclude our review because we review whether the petitioner made a threshold

showing for her petition to be referred to another judge de novo (Shachter v. City of Chicago, 2011

IL App (1st) 103582, ¶¶ 22, 30), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See

Peerless Enterprise Inc. v. Kruse, 317 Ill. App. 3d 133, 141 (2000). Moreover, whether that

threshold showing has been made is based entirely on the petition and the surrounding

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circumstances, all of which are contained in the common law record. See In re Estate of Wilson,

238 Ill. 2d at 553-57.

¶ 55 In the instant case, regardless of whether McBride met the statutory threshold requirements

for a petition for substitution of judge for cause, her petition was not timely. McBride filed her

petition on April 27, 2023. Yet the cause she claimed formed the basis for the petition occurred

weeks earlier when her attorney participated in the virtual meeting of the First Municipal Advisory

Committee, when the court refused to give her “permission to take an interlocutory appeal” from

its striking of her counterclaims and when the court offered allegedly legally untenable reasons for

striking her counterclaims. McBride offered no explanation as to why she waited until the eve of

trial to file her petition. Under these circumstances, McBride’s petition was untimely.

Consequently, the trial court’s denial of McBride’s petition was proper.

¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 57 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 58 Affirmed.

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