750 Old Country Road Realty Corp. v. Exxon Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

750 Old Country Road Realty Corp. v. Exxon Corp.

229 A.D.2d 1034, 645 N.Y.S.2d 186, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9170

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 12, 1996

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 229 A.D.2d 1034 (750 Old Country Road Realty Corp. v. Exxon Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

750 Old Country Road Realty Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 229 A.D.2d 1034, 645 N.Y.S.2d 186, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9170 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996).

Pincite

Opinion

—Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied that part of defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing as untimely the first cause of action, which alleges a violation of Navigation Law § 181. That statute imposes strict liability for the improper discharge of petroleum. Liberally construed, the complaint states a cause of action for indemnification to the extent that it seeks recoupment of cleanup costs expended by plaintiff (see, 145 Risco Ave. Corp. v Dufner Enters., 198 AD2d 482). Thus, the first cause of action was timely commenced within the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see, State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83).

The court erred, however, in denying that part of defendant’s motion dismissing the second cause of action for common-law strict liability. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the storage of gasoline does not constitute an ultrahazardous activity for which strict liability for contamination will attach (see, Snyder v Jessie, 164 AD2d 405, 412, lv dismissed 77 NY2d 940; see also, DeFoe Corp. v Semi-Alloys, Inc., 156 AD2d 634). In any event, because the action was not commenced within three years of the contamination or plaintiff’s discovery thereof, any claims arising from an alleged injury to property are time-barred (see, Rose v Grumman Aerospace Corp., 196 AD2d 861, 862; P.B.N. Assocs. v Xerox Corp., 141 AD2d 807, 808, rearg granted after remand 176 AD2d 861).

We therefore modify the order by granting in part defendant’s motion and dismissing the second cause of action, and otherwise affirm. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Nassau County, Yachnin, J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Pine, J. P., Fallon, Callahan, Balio and Boehm, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court properly denied that part of defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing as untimely the first cause of action, which alleges a violation of Navigation Law § 181. That statute imposes strict liability for the improper discharge of petroleum. Liberally construed, the complaint states a cause of action for indemnification to the extent that it seeks recoupment of cleanup costs expended by plaintiff (see, 145 Risco Ave. Corp. v Dufner Enters., 198 AD2d 482). Thus, the first cause of action was timely commenced within the six-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) (see, State of New York v Stewart’s Ice Cream Co., 64 NY2d 83).

The court erred, however, in denying that part of defendant’s motion dismissing the second cause of action for common-law strict liability. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the storage of gasoline does not constitute an ultrahazardous activity for which strict liability for contamination will attach (see, Snyder v Jessie, 164 AD2d 405, 412, lv dismissed 77 NY2d 940; see also, DeFoe Corp. v Semi-Alloys, Inc., 156 AD2d 634). In any event, because the action was not commenced within three years of the contamination or plaintiff’s discovery thereof, any claims arising from an alleged injury to property are time-barred (see, Rose v Grumman Aerospace Corp., 196 AD2d 861, 862; P.B.N. Assocs. v Xerox Corp., 141 AD2d 807, 808, rearg granted after remand 176 AD2d 861).

We therefore modify the order by granting in part defendant’s motion and dismissing the second cause of action, and otherwise affirm. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Nassau County, Yachnin, J.—Summary Judgment.) Present—Pine, J. P., Fallon, Callahan, Balio and Boehm, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

229 A.D.2d 1034, 645 N.Y.S.2d 186, 1996 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/750-old-country-road-realty-corp-v-exxon-corp-nyappdiv-1996.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack