29SC Four Pointe LP v. Jessica Brown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

29SC FOUR POINTE LP,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-243 Judge Algenon L. Marbley Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura JESSICA BROWN,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION On February 12, 2026, Plaintiff, 29SC Four Pointe LP, filed a Petition in Forcible Entry and Detainer against Defendant, Jessica Brown, in the Municipal Court of Franklin County, Ohio. See 29SC Four Pointe LP v. Jessica Brown, Franklin County M.C. No. 26 CVG 008106. The petition sought possession of the premises in question due to Defendant’s failure to pay rent in violation of the lease agreement. The Municipal Court issued a writ of restitution and setout on March 4, 2026, requiring Defendant to vacate the premises, but the writ was stayed after Defendant appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. (See docket Municipal Court docket entries of March 4, 2026, and April 1, 2026.) In the meantime, on February 27, 2026, Defendant, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel, filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. (ECF No. 1.) This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which is GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This matter is also before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Permission to File Electronically (ECF No. 5), which is GRANTED. Defendant may participate in e-filing only as to this particular case and conditional on her compliance with all applicable e-filing

requirements. If she has not already done so, Defendant is DIRECTED to create a PACER account, and then complete the electronic filing registration for the Southern District of Ohio, as explained at https://pacer.uscourts.gov/register-account/non-attorney-filers-cmecf. Defendant is REMINDED that failure to adhere to all applicable e-filing requirements will likely result in the revocation of permission to participate in e-filing. Defendant is specifically CAUTIONED that failure to update her email address and monitor her email account (including her “junk mail” or spam folder) for court filings may result in the Court’s dismissal of the action. Cf. Yeschick v. Mineta, 675 F.3d 622, 630 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s denial of motion for relief from judgment where counsel’s neglect in failing to check docket until more than a month after

he learned that he was not receiving notice of electronic filings because he failed to update his email address on file with the district court); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Indi’s Fast Food Rest., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00590, 2016 WL 7473130, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 28, 2016) (noting that defense counsel represented that “he did not receive any Court-related notices or emails because they were all sent to his ‘junk mail’ folder” and finding that “[d]efense counsel’s non- receipt of emails does not relieve his responsibility to monitor the Court’s docket and keep apprised of developments within his active cases, which he failed to do here”). Defendant is further CAUTIONED that her electronic filing access may be revoked at any time. This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Defendant’s Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court REMAND this action to the Franklin County Municipal Court. Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e), which provides in pertinent part as follows: (2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— * * * (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . . 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

When the Notice of Removal provides no basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court may dismiss an action as frivolous and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urb. Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)). Defendant’s Notice of Removal fails to provide a basis for a claim over which this Court has jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for federal-question jurisdiction, and § 1332,

which provides for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006) (cleaned up). Federal-question jurisdiction is implicated when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under” the federal laws or the United States Constitution. Id. For a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(a), complete diversity of citizenship must exist (which means that each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant) and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires a pleading to contain “a short plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, “a [party] seeking

diversity jurisdiction [must] set forth the factual basis on which that jurisdiction is predicated.” Farmer v. Fisher, 386 F. App’x 554, 556 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (“[I]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court’s] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”). Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). Here, Defendant has not identified any claims arising under federal laws or the United States Constitution to establish subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To the contrary, the claims against Defendant for eviction under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1923 are creatures of state law. Defendant briefly references a federally funded rental assistance program under which she was entitled to, but did not, receive several months’ worth of rental payments. But Defendant’s assertion of defenses or counterclaims involving federal programs or statutes does not create a basis for jurisdiction. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,

535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (holding that “a counterclaim—which appears as part of the defendant’s answer, not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising under’ jurisdiction”). Nor can Defendant rely on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to establish this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendant neither alleges that the parties are citizens of different states nor alleges the citizenship of the parties at all. Nor does Defendant allege that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Defendant therefore has not plausibly alleged that § 1332’s diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy requirements are satisfied. Further, to the extent that Defendant seeks to overturn the March 4, 2026 Writ of

Restitution and Set Out, those claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the notion that appellate review of state-court decisions and the validity of state judicial proceedings is limited to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). The undersigned therefore concludes that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court REMAND this action to the Franklin County Municipal Court. It is further RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Hearing (ECF No. 6) and Motion for Injunction (ECF No. 8) be DENIED AS MOOT.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura CHELSEY M. VASCURA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE