In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 21-1922C (Filed: November 19, 2021)* *Opinion originally filed under seal on November 16, 2021
) 22ND CENTURY TECHNOLOGIES, ) INC., ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) Bid Protest; Motion to Dismiss for ) Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction; THE UNITED STATES, ) RCFC 12(b)(1); Size Determination; ) SBA; OHA; Federal Acquisition Defendant, ) Streamlining Act; FASA and ) ) FIBERTEK, INC., ) ) Defendant-Intervenor. ) )
W. Brad English, Huntsville, AL, with whom were Jon D. Levin, J. Dale Gipson, Emily J. Chancey, and Nicholas P. Greer, Huntsville, AL, for plaintiff.
Mikki Cottet, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, with whom were Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Acting Director, and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, for defendant. Dana Chase and Major Jason Coffey, United States Department of the Army, and Christopher J. McClintock, United States Small Business Administration, of counsel.
Seth H. Locke, Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor. Brenna D. Duncan, of counsel. OPINION FIRESTONE, Senior Judge.
Plaintiff 22nd Century Technologies, Inc., invoking this court’s bid protest
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), 1 challenges the United States Department of the
1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), this court may review “an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a Army’s decision to terminate a task order awarded to 22nd Century as a small business.
The termination followed a determination by the Small Business Administration’s (SBA)
Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) that 22nd Century was not a small business when
22nd Century submitted its proposal for the task order. Following the termination of
22nd Century’s task order award, the Army awarded the task order to defendant-
intervenor Fibertek, Inc. 22nd Century does not challenge the task order award to
Fibertek.
The government and Fibertek have moved to dismiss 22nd Century’s case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction on two grounds: (1) the Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act (FASA), 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(e), 2 bars this court from hearing 22nd Century’s
challenge because it arises “in connection with the issuance . . . of a task . . . order,” and
(2) 22nd Century has alleged not a bid protest but an unripe contract administration claim
that must be brought using the procedures of the Contract Disputes Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C.
§§ 7101-09. For the reasons explained below, the court concludes that 22nd Century’s
protest is barred by FASA, and the government and Fibertek’s motions to dismiss, ECF
Nos. 26, 27, are GRANTED. 22nd Century’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF
No. 3, is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
proposed award or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.”
2 As explained below, FASA bars this court from hearing a “protest” made “in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order,” except under limited circumstances not alleged here. 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(e).
2 I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from 22nd Century’s complaint and appendix unless
otherwise noted. On March 25, 2015, the Army issued Solicitation No. W15P7T-15-R-
0008 for a multiple award indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) contract seeking
to procure knowledge-based support services for requirements with Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance related
needs. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1. The IDIQ contract is an unrestricted procurement under
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code 541712, Research and
Development in Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology), with a
corresponding 500 employee size standard. 3 Id. ¶ 7; id. at A28. Though the IDIQ
contract was not limited to small businesses, by its terms the Army could restrict task
order competitions under the IDIQ contract to small businesses. Id. ¶ 8; id. at A28.
On May 6, 2015, 22nd Century submitted its proposal for the IDIQ contract. Id. ¶
9. At that time, 22nd Century was a small business. Id. 22nd Century was an eventual
awardee of the IDIQ contract. Id.
On December 29, 2020, the Army issued Solicitation No. W9090MY-21-R-D002
for a task order under the IDIQ contract (“Task Order RFP”). Id. ¶¶ 1, 10. The task
order is to provide U.S. Central Command with Near Real Time Identity Operations
services. Id. at A6. The Task Order RFP provided that the task order was “restricted to
3NAICS code 541715, with a corresponding 1,000 employee size standard, has replaced NAICS code 541712. See Compl. ¶ 11 n.1; Def.’s Mot. at 4 n.1, ECF No. 26. NAICS code 541715 applies to the task order at issue in this case. Compl. ¶ 11. 3 small businesses” under NAICS Code 541715, see supra n.3, and required that offerors
represent which category of business they qualified for, including “not a small business
concern.” Compl. ¶ 11.
On February 8, 2021, 22nd Century, Fibertek, and Ideal Innovations, Inc.
submitted initial offers. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15; id. at A29. On May 7, 2021, the Army awarded
the task order to 22nd Century. Id. ¶ 14.
On May 11 and 14, 2021, Ideal Innovations and Fibertek, the unsuccessful
offerors, submitted size protests to the contracting officer, claiming, among other things,
that the Task Order RFP required offerors to recertify their size status with the
submission of their proposal, and, as of the February 8, 2021 proposal due date, 22nd
Century was not a small business under NAICS Code 541715. Id. ¶ 15; see id. at A6,
A15. 22nd Century concedes it was not a small business as of February 8, 2021 but
argued that applicable law made its size on May 6, 2015—the date it submitted its
proposal for the IDIQ contract—determinative. Id. ¶¶ 12, 16. The size protests were
submitted to the relevant SBA Area Office for review. 4
On June 4, 2021, the Area Office made a formal size determination, finding that
22nd Century is an “other than small” business for the Task Order RFP. Id. ¶ 17. The
Area Office concluded that the size status of 22nd Century was to be determined as of
4 Under Subpart 19.3 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Part 121 of Title 13 of the Code of Federal Regulations, an offeror may submit to a contracting officer a protest regarding the small business representation of another offeror in a specific offer. Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 756, 775 (2020). The contracting officer forwards the protest to the proper SBA Area Office to make a formal size determination. Id. The Area Office’s determination may be appealed to OHA. Id.
4 February 8, 2021, the date 22nd Century submitted its offer, at which time 22nd Century
concedes it was not a small business. Id. ¶¶ 12, 17.
After the Area Office made this size determination, on June 7, 2021, the
contracting officer terminated 22nd Century’s task order by issuing a notice of
termination for convenience. Id. ¶ 19; see id. at A21, A24-25.
On June 16, 2021, 22nd Century appealed the Area Office’s size determination to
the SBA’s OHA. Id. ¶ 20; id. at A27. On September 21, 2021, after examining the
language of the Task Order RFP, OHA affirmed the Area Office’s size determination. Id.
¶ 21; id. at A27-A43.
On September 21, 2021, the Army reaffirmed its June 7, 2021 termination for
convenience, and requested that 22nd Century submit its termination for convenience
proposal by September 24, 2021. Id. ¶ 22; id. at A21. On September 27, 2021, the
Army issued the task order award to Fibertek. 5 Mot. to Intervene Mem. at 3, ECF No.
10-1.
22nd Century did not submit to the contracting officer a termination for
convenience proposal. Instead, on September 28, 2021, 22nd Century filed this post-
award bid protest pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Compl. ¶ 4. 22nd
Century asserts two counts. First, 22nd Century contends that OHA’s decision regarding
22nd Century’s size status violated “applicable law” governing the timing of size
5 The facts surrounding the award to Fibertek were not set forth in 22nd Century’s complaint. However, in determining whether a plaintiff has met its burden of establishing this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the court may look “beyond the pleadings and inquire into jurisdictional facts in order to determine whether jurisdiction exists.” SigNet Techs., Inc. v. United States, 154 Fed. Cl. 396, 405 (2021) (quotation omitted). 5 determinations under IDIQ contracts and, therefore, the court should set aside that
decision. Id. ¶¶ 1, 16-17, 26 (citing 13 C.F.R. § 121.404). 22nd Century requests that the
court declare that OHA’s size determination was irrational, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, and contrary to law, and direct the SBA to determine 22nd Century’s size
as of May 6, 2015, the date of its proposal on the initial IDIQ contract. Id., Prayer for
Relief ¶¶ B, C.
Second, 22nd Century contends that the Army’s decision to terminate 22nd
Century’s task order based on OHA’s decision was arbitrary and irrational. Id. ¶ 30.
22nd Century requests that the court preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Army from
terminating the task order and require the Army to proceed with 22nd Century’s
performance of the task order. Id., Prayer for Relief ¶¶ A, D, E. 22nd Century does not,
however, challenge the task order award to Fibertek, and Fibertek is proceeding with the
work under the task order. See Pl.’s Resp. at 19 n.10, ECF No. 28.
Along with its complaint, 22nd Century filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, seeking to enjoin the Army from terminating the task order awarded to 22nd
Century. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 1, ECF No. 3. Following a joint status conference
during which the parties agreed to brief jurisdictional issues first, the court set an
expedited schedule on motions to dismiss. See Scheduling Order, ECF No. 17.
On October 13, 2021, the government and Fibertek filed motions to dismiss,
arguing that 22nd Century’s complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, for two reasons. First, the government and Fibertek argue that FASA bars
this court’s review of 22nd Century’s case because it is a “protest” made “in connection 6 with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order.” Def.’s Mot. at 8-12
(citing 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(e)); Def.-Int.’s Mem. at 7-12, ECF No. 27-1. Second, the
government and Fibertek argue that although 22nd Century styles its complaint as arising
under this court’s bid protest jurisdiction, its allegations concern Army conduct post-
dating 22nd Century’s task order award and are in effect unripe CDA challenges to the
termination of the task order. Def.’s Mot. at 12-13; Def.-Int.’s Mem. at 1, 5-7.
In response, 22nd Century argues that its challenge is not barred by FASA because
it is not a “protest,” nor is it made “in connection with” a task order. Pl.’s Resp. at 10-15.
Rather, 22nd Century contends, it is challenging OHA’s size determination, which is
“obviously discrete and separate from the task order award.” Id. at 10-12. 22nd Century
further argues that this case can be heard under the court’s bid protest jurisdiction
because, despite being a post-award challenge, “22nd Century is suing because it lost a
contract,” and is not seeking to resolve a “post-award, administrative dispute.” Id. at 18.
The government replies that FASA’s unambiguous bar applies here, where
“[n]early every allegation in the complaint demonstrates that OHA’s size determination
was critical to the Army either moving forward with the task order award with 22nd
Century or terminating the award to 22nd Century and issuing the task order to another
offeror.” Def.’s Reply at 6, ECF No. 29 (emphasis omitted). The government further
argues that 22nd Century’s contention that 22nd Century’s challenge is not a “protest”
under FASA is incorrect under the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s precedent. Id. at 4. Fibertek likewise replies that controlling precedent
regarding FASA bars this court from considering 22nd Century’s bid protest, as 22nd 7 Century’s allegations “draw a direct connection between” the task order and OHA’s
decision. Def.-Int.’s Reply at 2-8, ECF No. 30. Fibertek reiterates that 22nd Century’s
allegations are in fact challenges to the Army’s administration of the task order and
amount to an unripe CDA claim. Id. at 8-9.
Oral argument was held on November 9, 2021.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Whether the court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of a case is a threshold
issue. Ultra-Precision Mfg. Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2003). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United States, 805 F.3d 1082, 1087
(Fed. Cir. 2015). “In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
the court accepts as true all uncontroverted factual allegations in the complaint, and
construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Estes Express Lines v. United
States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
III. DISCUSSION
The central question in this case is whether 22nd Century’s challenges to the
SBA’s OHA decision and the Army’s actions made in reliance on that decision are barred
by FASA and thus outside of this court’s jurisdiction. Under the Tucker Act, this court
may review “an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal
agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award
of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a
procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). This court and the 8 Federal Circuit have held that OHA decisions may be reviewed by this court under what
the Federal Circuit has referred to as the last “prong” of the Tucker Act, see SRA Int’l,
Inc. v. United States, 766 F.3d 1409, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 2014): when they are made “in
connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” Palladian Partners, Inc. v.
United States, 783 F.3d 1243, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (finding an OHA NAICS code
determination an action “in connection with a proposed procurement”); Paradigm Eng’rs
& Constructors, PLLC v. United States, 147 Fed. Cl. 487, 494 (2020) (“Because the
OHA’s decision denying Paradigm’s appeal was made ‘in connection with a
procurement,’ the Court has jurisdiction over this claim.”); Team Waste Gulf Coast, LLC
v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 683, 687 (2018) (“This court may review a decision of the
SBA when that decision constitutes an action ‘in connection with a procurement.’”);
Straughan Env’t, Inc. v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 360, 371 (2017).
However, this court’s jurisdiction has been expressly limited by Congress in
FASA, 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(e), 6 which states that:
(1) A protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order except for--
(A) a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued; or
(B) a protest of an order valued in excess of $25,000,000.
(2) Notwithstanding section 3556 of title 31, the Comptroller General of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of a protest authorized under paragraph (1)(B).
6This provision will be moved to 10 U.S.C. § 3406 effective January 1, 2022. See Def.’s Mot. at 8 n.2. The civilian version of this provision of FASA is found at 41 U.S.C. § 4106(f). See Def.’s Mot. at 9. 9 The Federal Circuit has interpreted FASA’s bar on “protests” made “in connection
with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery order” strictly. In SRA
International, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that protests involving
agency actions that are “directly and causally connected” to the issuance of a task order
are barred by FASA. 766 F.3d at 1413. The Federal Circuit reasoned that the “statutory
language of FASA is clear and gives the court no room to exercise jurisdiction over
claims made ‘in connection with the issuance or proposed issuance of a task or delivery
order.’” Id. Although acknowledging that FASA “is somewhat unusual in that it
effectively eliminates all judicial review for protests made in connection with a
procurement designated as a task order,” except in limited circumstances not relevant
here, the Federal Circuit in SRA International nevertheless stated that “Congress’s intent
to ban protests on the issuance of task orders is clear from FASA’s unambiguous
language.” Id.; see also, e.g., Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC v. United States, No. 21-
1704C, 2021 WL 4737455, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 27, 2021) (“The Federal Circuit has
recognized the FASA protest bar as expansive and unyielding.”); OST, Inc. v. United
States, 140 Fed. Cl. 662, 666 (2018).
The court recognizes along with the parties that the FASA bar does not preclude
the court from exercising jurisdiction in every protest involving a task order. For
example, several courts have exercised bid protest jurisdiction despite FASA’s task order
bar where the procuring agency decides to cancel a solicitation and then procure the same
services through the issuance of a task order. See, e.g., BayFirst Sols., LLC v. United
10 States, 104 Fed. Cl. 493, 498, 507-08 (2012); MORI Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 102
Fed. Cl. 503, 510, 525 (2011). In determining whether FASA’s bar applies, the court
evaluates the “connectedness of each challenged procurement decision to the issuance or
proposed issuance of a task order.” BayFirst, 104 Fed. Cl. at 503. In this case, the court
must evaluate whether the OHA decision and the Army actions challenged by 22nd
Century are directly connected to the task order or are “logically distinct” from it; if the
decisions are “logically distinct,” the FASA bar does not apply. MORI Assocs., 102 Fed.
Cl. at 533-34.
Applying these standards, the court concludes that 22nd Century’s challenge is
clearly made in connection with the issuance of a task order and is therefore barred by
FASA. As the government and Fibertek argue, the allegations made and relief sought in
22nd Century’s complaint draw a direct and causal connection between the task order and
OHA and the Army’s challenged decisions. See Compl. ¶¶ 14-30, Prayer for Relief. For
example, 22nd Century bases its standing on its initial award of the task order. Id. ¶ 5.
22nd Century’s complaint describes the terms of the Task Order RFP and the SBA Area
Office’s and OHA’s interpretation of those terms. Id. ¶¶ 10-21. 22nd Century then
challenges OHA’s interpretation, and the Army’s decision to terminate 22nd Century’s
task order award based on OHA’s interpretation. Id. ¶¶ 23-30. 22nd Century’s
challenges, as alleged in its complaint, are plainly connected to the issuance of the subject
task order.
22nd Century claims that this case falls outside of the scope of FASA’s task order
bar because OHA’s size determination is a “discrete and separate” decision temporally 11 distanced from the Army’s task order award to 22nd Century. 7 Pl.’s Resp. at 10-11. The
court disagrees. Even though the size determination here was made by OHA, an entity
different from the procuring agency, there is nothing in FASA that limits its application
to the actions of the procuring agency. As discussed above, OHA decisions may
otherwise be challenged in this court as bid protests under the Tucker Act’s last prong,
but the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act is limited by FASA.
As 22nd Century’s allegations demonstrate, the challenged OHA decision is
“directly and causally” connected to the task order at issue and therefore falls within
FASA’s purview. See SRA Int’l, 766 F.3d at 1413. OHA’s decision arises from size
protests directly related to the task order awarded to 22nd Century. Compl. ¶ 15. OHA’s
decision interprets the Task Order RFP’s terms. Id. ¶ 21. In challenging OHA’s
decision, 22nd Century asks this court to interpret the Task Order RFP’s terms. Id. ¶ 26,
Prayer for Relief ¶¶ B, C. 22nd Century also challenges the Army’s termination of the
task order award based on OHA’s decision, id. ¶ 30, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ A, D, an action
that is indisputably connected to the task order. Because of these direct connections,
22nd Century’s challenge based on OHA’s decision is barred by FASA.
7 22nd Century also suggests that if the court determines that FASA bars its challenge to the OHA decision, the court will be improperly foreclosing judicial review of OHA decisions in all cases involving task or delivery orders that do not otherwise qualify for an exception under FASA. See Pl.’s Resp. at 13. This may be true; however, as the government and Fibertek argue, see Def.’s Reply at 2 n.2; Def.-Int.’s Reply at 6-7, the Federal Circuit has recognized that limiting judicial review of task and delivery orders is the unambiguous intent of FASA’s task order bar. SRA Int’l, 766 F.3d at 1413.
12 For these same reasons, the temporal gap between OHA’s decision and the
issuance of the task order to 22nd Century does not render OHA’s decision unreachable
by FASA’s task order bar, as 22nd Century argues. See Pl.’s Resp. at 7, 10-11. The
Federal Circuit has rejected the contention that the timing of the challenged agency action
is dispositive, stating that “the temporal disconnect” between an agency’s challenged
action and the issuance of a task order does not necessarily “remove [the agency’s action]
from FASA’s purview.” SRA Int’l, 766 F.3d at 1413. Here, the 137-day period, see Pl.’s
Resp. at 10, between the issuance of the task order to 22nd Century and OHA’s decision
does not overcome the fact that OHA’s challenged decision is directly connected to the
issuance of the task order to 22nd Century. See SRA Int’l, 766 F.3d at 1412-13 (holding
that FASA applied, even though the challenged agency action took place 102 days after
the task order award, where the challenged agency action was directly connected to the
issuance of a task order, despite being executed after issuance).
The cases primarily relied on by 22nd Century do not alter this conclusion. See
Pl.’s Resp. at 4-10, 14-15 (citing BayFirst, 104 Fed. Cl. at 502, 507-08; MORI Assocs.,
102 Fed. Cl. at 533; Tolliver Grp., Inc. v. United States, 151 Fed. Cl. 70, 95-96, 99-101
(2020); North Wind Site Servs., LLC v. United States, 142 Fed. Cl. 802, 806-13 (2019)). 8
These cases all involve circumstances distinguishable from the facts of this case. In
8 22nd Century also cites this court’s decision in LB&B Associates Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 765, 770 (2005), where the court determined that it had jurisdiction to consider a challenge to an OHA decision similar to 22nd Century’s here. See Pl.’s Resp. at 14-15. However, FASA’s jurisdictional bar was not briefed before the court in that case, and the case was also decided before the Federal Circuit’s opinion in SRA International.
13 BayFirst, MORI Associates, and Tolliver, 9 the relevant agencies cancelled solicitations
and proposed to procure or procured the services under a different procurement vehicle
involving task orders. MORI Assocs., 102 Fed. Cl. at 510-16; BayFirst, 104 Fed. Cl. at
498-99; Tolliver, 151 Fed. Cl. at 80-83. The plaintiffs in those cases raised challenges to
the agencies’ cancellation decisions and the lawfulness of the replacement procurement
method, separate from any individual task order. MORI Assocs., 102 Fed. Cl. at 510-11;
BayFirst, 104 Fed. Cl. at 500-01; Tolliver, 151 Fed. Cl. at 84. The courts concluded that
these decisions arose during a stage of the procurement process that was logically distinct
from the issuance or proposed issuance of any individual task order, such that FASA’s
bar was inapplicable. See MORI Assocs., 102 Fed. Cl. at 533-34 (holding that the
challenge to the lawfulness of the replacement procurement method, claiming that the
agency failed to comply with the “Rule of Two,” was within the court’s jurisdiction
despite FASA); Tolliver, 151 Fed. Cl. at 93-94 (same); BayFirst, 104 Fed. Cl. at 507-08
(holding that the cancellation decision was within the court’s jurisdiction despite FASA).
Here, in contrast, 22nd Century’s challenge to OHA’s decision is not a challenge to a
9 To the extent that 22nd Century also relies on Tolliver for the proposition that the court may hear any protest involving a task order when brought under the last “prong” of the Tucker Act, because such a challenge is not a “protest” under FASA, see Pl.’s Resp. at 12 (stating that actions that “arise under the [last] prong” of the Tucker Act “are not ‘protests’ barred by FASA”), the court disagrees with this reading. The challenge in SRA International arose under the Tucker Act’s last “prong,” and the Federal Circuit held that this challenge was barred by FASA. 766 F.3d at 1413 (“Even if the protestor points to an alleged violation of statute or regulation, as SRA does here, the court still has no jurisdiction to hear the case if the protest is in connection with the issuance of a task order.”). In addition, as discussed infra, Tolliver involves facts distinguishable from this case, and the court in Tolliver recognized that bid protests arising under the Tucker Act’s last “prong” could be FASA barred under SRA International. See Tolliver, 151 Fed. Cl. at 104, 105 n.48.
14 discrete procurement action entirely distinct from the issuance of a task order. As
discussed above, 22nd Century’s allegations in this case directly and exclusively involve
the subject task order.
This court’s decision in North Wind is also distinguishable. There the protestor,
an unsuccessful bidder, challenged the agency’s decision not to terminate the award of an
IDIQ contract set aside for small businesses after the SBA Area Office and OHA decided
that the contract awardee was not an eligible small business. 142 Fed. Cl. at 809. The
protestor also challenged subsequent task orders issued to the awardee under the IDIQ
contract, even though the awardee was determined to be ineligible. Id. at 809-10. The
SBA Area Office and OHA decisions were not at issue. This court reached the merits of
the protestor’s challenge to the agency’s decision not to terminate the awardee’s IDIQ
contract but decided that FASA barred the challenges to the subsequent task orders. Id.
at 810-13. As 22nd Century recognizes, North Wind involved two separate challenges to
two “discrete” agency decisions: one to a decision related to the award of the underlying
IDIQ contract vehicle, for which the court reached the merits, and another to the task
orders issued under that vehicle, which the court determined was FASA barred. Pl.’s
Resp. at 14-15. In contrast, here, 22nd Century’s challenges relate only to the task order
issued to 22nd Century.
For all of these reasons, the court concludes that 22nd Century’s challenges in this
case are made in connection with the issuance of a task order and are barred by FASA.
15 The court therefore grants the government and Fibertek’s motions to dismiss and
dismisses this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 10
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the government and Fibertek’s motions to dismiss, ECF
Nos. 26, 27, are GRANTED. This case is dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 22nd Century’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 3, is
DISMISSED AS MOOT. Each party shall bear its own costs. The Clerk is directed to
enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Nancy B. Firestone NANCY B. FIRESTONE Senior Judge
10Given the court’s conclusion that FASA bars 22nd Century’s action, the court does not reach the government and Fibertek’s alternative arguments.