&198tna Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer

95 So. 351, 209 Ala. 77, 1923 Ala. LEXIS 306
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedFebruary 1, 1923
Docket6 Div. 663.
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 95 So. 351 (&198tna Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
&198tna Explosives Co. v. Schaeffer, 95 So. 351, 209 Ala. 77, 1923 Ala. LEXIS 306 (Ala. 1923).

Opinions

MILLER, J.

This is a suit by D. L. Schaeffer, a minor about four years of age, by his next friend, Henry Schaeffer, Jr., against the .Etna Explosives Company, a corporation, for damages for personal injuries sustained by him, which he claims were caus'ed by defendant. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, judgment was rendered thereon by the court, and from it the defendant appeals.

' There was only one count, No. 3, submitted by the court to the jury. It avers the plaintiff, a boy under seven years of age, was in a public highway, and was run over or against by a wagon in the charge and operation of a servant or agent of defendant, named John MeKnight, while he was acting with *78 in tlie line and scope of his service or agency as such; and it charges plaintiff’s injuries were caused as a proxiinate result of the negligence of said servant or agent, John McKnight, while acting within the line and scope of his service or agency as such in negligently operating said wagon.

The defendant pleaded not guilty, and denied each and every allegation therein contained. The general affirmative charge, with hypothesis, in writing, requested in its favor by the defendant, was refused by the court.

The vital issues presented by the pleading and evidence were two: Was John McKnight employed by or an agent or servant of the defendant on the day and at the time the plaintiff was injured, and was he at the time acting within the line and scope of his employment? Was John McKnight guilty of negligence on the occasion complained of, "which caused as a proximate result the injury to the plaintiff? The plaintiff affirms and the defendant denies these alleged facts. The burden of each rests on the plaintiff. _ If 'the undisputed evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom show that John McKnight was not an agent or servant or in the service'or employment of the. defendant at the time the plaintiff was injured, then the affirmative charge with hypothesis, requested by the defendant, should have been given by the court, and it will not be necessary for us .then to consider the other question or the many other errors, assigned and insisted on by the appellant. So we will consider first ■ that question and error assigned.

It is undisputed that the plaintiff was a child under seven years of age, playing in the public highway when, injured on April 13, s 1921, by being struck by the brake beam over the hind wheel of the wagon or by the ,hind wheel of the wagon running over him ■ or both. The injuries were painful and se- . rious, but not necessarily permanent. The : wagon and mules belonged to the defendant; , John McKnight had been an employ® of the ' defendant, and drove a wagon for it for five ', or six years previous to this time, and the wagon at the time of the injury had grass ■ sod in it, and was driven by John McKnight. Henry Schaeffer, father of plaintiff and his witness, testified that John McKnight was ' working for the -Etna Explosives Company . on the day and at the time his son was hurt. On cross-examination he testified:

. “I do not know whether that wagon was loaded or not. When I seen it, he was on his way back to the powder mill; I don’t know what he did in the meantime. I do not know of my own knowledge where John McKnight was taking that stuff on the wa^on; I do not know : where he got that stuff; I do not know what he was going to do with it either. I do not , know who paid John McKnight for that trip. ' I was at the mines when the boy come and brought me word that the boy was run over.” |

The evidence for the defense is clear, posir tive, and undisputed that John McKnight was not' working for the defendant on April' 13, 1922, when plaintiff was injured; he was hired by, working for, and paid by R. S. McGee to haul this sod and grass to the home of R. S. McGee when the injury occurred. The defendant has no interest in the property where the grass sod was being hauled; the defendant loaned .the wagon and team to R. S. McGee, and McGee, and not defendant, hired, and paid McKnight to haul it anfi. to drive the wagon. John McKnight did not work for and was not agent for nor employed by the defendant from the 7th or 8th of April to the 25th of April, 1921. The home of McGee where the spd was being hauled was in North Birmingham, and was not on premises of defendant. The plant of defendant was not in operation, but was shut down at the time of the injury; it was shut down from April 7 or 8 to April 25, 1921, and during this time John McKnight was not in its employment;

When the plaintiff proves the wagon and team belonged to the defendant, and that John McKnight, who was driving it at the time of the injury, had been a driver for and in the employment of the defendant for five or six years prior to the time of the injury, then there will be a presumption of law raised from’ this evidence that John McKnight was an employ® or servant of the defendant at the time of the injury, and was acting in the line and scope of his employment. If this presumption of law is not overcome by some evidence to the contrary, then that issue should be determined in favor of the plaintiff. However, this presumption of law is only prima facie, and can be overcome by evidence; and, if the evidence is strong, clear, and undisputed, then the defendant would be entitled to the general affirmative charge, with hypothesis, when requested in writing. Dowdell v. Beasley, 205 Ala. 130, 87 South. 18; Massey v. Pentecost, 206 Ala. 414, 90 South. 866.

It is true Henry Schaeffer testified that John McKnight was working for the defendant on the day and at the time his son, the plaintiff, was hurt by the wagon; but the evidence shows Henry Schaeffer was at the time of the injury working in the mine, did not see it, did not know of his own knowledge whether the wagon was loaded or not, did not know where the wagon was going with the load, and what he was going to dp with it; and did not know who paid John McKnight for that trip. One or two other witnesses for the plaintiff were permitted to give opinion and conclusion testimony on this subject similar to Henry Schaeffer, but the facts on which it was based did not, as in Henry Schaeffer’s, sustain and support the opinion and conclusion. As this was mere *79 opinion or conclusion testimony, it is not based on facts known to the witnesses, and is characterized in law “testimonial nonentity.”

Xo conflict is raised on that vital issue by such evidence. This testimony of the plaintiff was not sufficient to carry the question of employment of John McKnight vel non to the jury. It was contrary to and irreconcilably opposed to the clear, undisputed facts on that issue, on which it was founded, and such evidence “raised no conflict with the stated facts.” Hicks v. Burgess, 185 Ala. 584, 64 South. 290; Stockburger v. Aderholt, 195 Ala. 56, 70 South. 157.

The plaintiff’s right to recover depended upon the establishment by positive proof or reasonable inferences therefrom that John McKnight was an agent, servant, or employé of the defendant, acting within the line and scope of his employment at the time of the injury of the plaintiff. The plaintiff produced evidence on this issue which created a presumption of law thereon in his favor. This presumption of law was overcome by the evidence of the defendant, which was clear, conclusive, and undisputed that John McKnight at the time of the injury was employed and paid by R. S.

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Bluebook (online)
95 So. 351, 209 Ala. 77, 1923 Ala. LEXIS 306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/198tna-explosives-co-v-schaeffer-ala-1923.