1915 16TH ST. CO-OP. ASS'N v. Pinkett

85 A.2d 58, 1951 D.C. App. LEXIS 240

• Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 14, 1951
• Docket: 1090
• Status: Published

Opinions

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

A co-operatively owned apartment house sued one of its member-tenants for possession of an apartment, charging that he owed three months rent under his lease. He denied the charge and the trial court ruled in his favor. Plaintiff brings this appeal. No brief has been filed by counsel for appellee, hence we do not know what position he takes on this appeal. But the issues are revealed in the pleadings, evidence, and documentary exhibits, and in a memorandum of the trial judge on which the decision was. based.

Defendant John R. Pinkett, Jr., on July-17, 1950, entered into a “contract to purchase co-operative apartment” from plaintiff at an agreed price of $7950. Under the terms of the contract he made an initial deposit of $90 and agreed to pay $410 more to make up a $500 settlement figure. The agreement provided for payments of $90 per month, made up as follows: $54.50 on account of the deferred purchase money,, $25 for maintenance, and $10.50 on a note of $386.50 which Pinkett gave to complete the settlement. The purchase agreement recited that at settlement Pinkett was to receive a certificate of ownership and a “proprietary lease” under which he was to have the right to “own and use” the apartment “as long as he remains a member of the association and abides by all the terms of this contract.” On the same day a “proprietary lease” was signed by the parties running in favor of Pinkett for 99 years. Among the provisions of the lease was one authorizing the termination thereof “in ■ case the Lessee shall default in the payment of any obligation required hereunder,, or of any installment thereof.” The same article ■of the lease also provided that upon termination the lessor would have the right “to reenter the demised premises and to remove all persons -and personal property therefrom, either by summary dispossess pro■ceedings or by any suitable action or proceeding at law * * * and to repossess the demised premises in its former state as if this lease had not been made.”

Mr. Pinkett took possession and made 'two monthly payments of $90 each for July and August 1950. He has paid no more but has continued in default and in possession of the apartment.

In December 1950, plaintiff-owner 'brought this suit for possession in the Municipal Court alleging that Pinkett was in possession under a leasehold and was in •default of payment of rent for the three months from September 17 to December 16. In his answer defendant denied that he was a tenant of plaintiff and denied being in default.¹ The trial court in a written memorandum found that there was no intent on the part of plaintiff and defendant to create the relationship of landlord and tenant, that the contract was one for the purchase of an apartment and that the monthly sums payable by defendant were not rent but were payments on account of the purchase. The judge .also ruled that there was in form a landlord-tenant relationship but that in substance defendant was the owner of the apartment with the “exclusive right to personal, perpetual use thereof as a dwelling,” and that as between ■defendant and the other occupants in the building the relationship was in effect a partnership for their mutual benefit.

In testing the correctness of these rulings we must look to the transaction as a whole, to the writings between the parties, to the circumstances under which they were made, and to the matters with which they deal, and thereby determine the intent of the parties and the status they created.

The evidence discloses that defendant’s right to possession was based initially on his purchase agreement, but more directly •on his “proprietary lease.” Undoubtedly the purchase agreement vested in him some of the attributes of an owner or landlord. This has been recognized in this jurisdiction, the courts holding that a member of a co-operative apartment house corporation may, when he desires possession for his own use, sue as a “landlord” under the local Rent Act and maintain a possessory action against a tenant who refused to yield an apartment to him. Abbot v. Bralove, D.C.D.C., 81 F.Supp. 532, affirmed 85 U.S.App.D.C. 189, 176 F.2d 64; Glennon v. Butler, D.C.Mun.App., 66 A.2d 519; Hicks v. Bigelow, D.C.Mun.App., 55 A.2d 924. But none of these cases held that the “landlord” status of such a co-operative member was his only legal status. On the contrary, they all were confined to a situation where a cooperative member was suing a tenant in possession.

What then is the status of a .purchaser-lessee like this one who has defaulted in his payments to his co-operative corporation? We think the answer is clearly to be found in the lease between them. There it is provided, as we have already seen, that the lessee’s right to possession is lost if he defaults in the payment of any installments due and that the lessor is expressly given the right of reentry. As applied to the facts of this case, we can think of no practical difference between this and conventional lease agreements. What it amounts to is that the lessee is given the right of occupancy so long as he does not default in his monthly payments, but that when default occurs the co-operative corporation has the right to terminate the lease. This right of termination has been recognized even in New York where some courts have treated such a relationship as in effect a partnership. Tompkins v. Hale, 172 Misc. 1071, 15 N.Y.S.2d 854, affirmed 259 App.Div. 860, 20 N.Y.S.2d 398.

We have concluded that the plaintiff had a right to maintain the suit, that defendant’s right to possession derived from the lease, and that by his default under the lease such right has been lost. Accordingly, the Municipal Court is instructed to enter judgment for plaintiff for possession.

Defendant may still wish to redeem his lost rights by bringing his payments up-to-date. If so we assume that the trial court would entertain an appropriate motion filed by him, accompanied by a tender of all payments in arrears together with interest and costs. See Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., D.C.Mun.App., 54 A.2d 144.

Reversed.

1 . He also filed a counterclaim for overcharges of rent but such claim was disallowed and is not involved on this appeal.