14-30 313

CourtBoard of Veterans' Appeals
DecidedMay 25, 2018
Docket14-30 313
StatusUnpublished

This text of 14-30 313 (14-30 313) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Veterans' Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
14-30 313, (bva 2018).

Opinion

Citation Nr: 1829327 Decision Date: 05/25/18 Archive Date: 06/12/18

DOCKET NO. 14-30 313 ) DATE ) )

On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Houston, Texas

THE ISSUES

1. Entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depressive disorder.

2. Entitlement to compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 for residuals of a left eye procedure.

REPRESENTATION

Veteran represented by: Texas Veterans Commission

WITNESS AT HEARING ON APPEAL

The Veteran

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

M. C. Wilson, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

The Veteran served on active duty from July 1979 to May 1982.

This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a June 2013 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Jurisdiction over the present matter has since been transferred to the RO in Houston, Texas. In August 2017, the Veteran testified at a videoconference hearing before the undersigned Veterans Law Judge.

In November 2017, the Board remanded the present matter for further development. Review of the record shows substantial compliance with the remand directives with regard to the claim for compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1151. However, the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ) has not complied with the remand directives with regard to the claim for service connection and additional development is required; thus, another remand is necessary with regard to this issue. Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268 (1998) (a remand by the Board confers on the Veteran, as a matter of law, the right to substantial compliance with the remand).

This appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2017). 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(2) (2012).

The issue of the Veteran's entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric disorder, to include PTSD and major depressive disorder is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the AOJ.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The competent evidence does not show that the Veteran sustained additional disability as a result of VA carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance of fault; or an event not reasonably foreseeable.

2. The competent evidence does not show that VA delayed treatment of the Veteran's eye condition.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Compensation benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1151 for residuals of a left eye procedure are not warranted. 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 3.361 (2017).

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Under certain circumstances, VA provides compensation for additional disability resulting from VA medical treatment in the same manner as if such disability were service-connected. See 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). For a claimant to qualify for such compensation, the additional disability must not be the result of the veteran's willful misconduct, and such disability must be caused by hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination furnished to the veteran under any law administered by the Secretary, either by a Department employee or in a Department facility. 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a). For a claimant to be entitled to compensation when additional disability is caused by VA hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination, the proximate cause of the additional disability must be: (A) carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance of fault on the part of VA in furnishing the care, treatment, or examination; or (B) an event not reasonably foreseeable. 38 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1); 38 C.F.R. § 3.361 (2017).

To determine whether a veteran has additional disability, VA compares the veteran's condition immediately before the beginning of the hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination upon which the claim is based to the veteran's condition after such care, treatment, or examination is completed.

To establish actual causation, the evidence must show that VA hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination resulted in the veteran's additional disability or death. Merely showing that a veteran received care and has an additional disability does not establish cause. 38 C.F.R. § 3.361(c)(1).

The proximate cause of disability or death is the action or event which directly caused the disability or death, as distinguished from a remote contributing cause. 38 C.F.R. § 3.361(d). To establish that carelessness, negligence, lack of proper skill, error in judgment, or similar instance of fault on VA's part in furnishing hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination proximately caused a veteran's additional disability or death, it must be shown that the hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination caused the veteran's additional disability or death, and that (i) VA failed to exercise the degree of care that would be expected of a reasonable health care provider; or (ii) VA furnished the hospital care, medical or surgical treatment, or examination without the veteran's, or in appropriate cases, his representative's, informed consent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.361(d)(1).

Whether the proximate cause of a veteran's additional disability or death was an event not reasonably foreseeable is to be determined based on what a reasonable health care provider would have foreseen. The event need not be completely unforeseeable or unimaginable but must be one that a reasonable health care provider would not have considered to be an ordinary risk of the treatment provided. In determining whether an event was reasonably foreseeable, VA will consider whether the risk of that event was the type of risk that a reasonable health care provider would have disclosed in connection with the informed consent procedures of 38 C.F.R. § 17.32. 38 C.F.R. § 3.361(d)(2).

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Related

Roberson v. SHINSEKI
607 F.3d 809 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
Barney J. Stefl v. R. James Nicholson
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21 Vet. App. 303 (Veterans Claims, 2007)
Angel S. Nieves-Rodriguez v. James B. Peake
22 Vet. App. 295 (Veterans Claims, 2008)
Gilbert v. Derwinski
1 Vet. App. 49 (Veterans Claims, 1990)
Layno v. Brown
6 Vet. App. 465 (Veterans Claims, 1994)
Stegall v. West
11 Vet. App. 268 (Veterans Claims, 1998)
Kutscherousky v. West
12 Vet. App. 369 (Veterans Claims, 1999)

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14-30 313, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/14-30-313-bva-2018.