11-00 108
This text of 11-00 108 (11-00 108) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Veterans' Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Bluebook
11-00 108, (bva 2016).
Opinion
http://www.va.gov/vetapp16/Files4/1630480.txt
Citation Nr: 1630480 Decision Date: 07/29/16 Archive Date: 08/04/16 DOCKET NO. 11-00 108 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Muskogee, Oklahoma THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for a psychiatric disability variously claimed or diagnosed as a nervous disorder, schizoid personality, schizophrenic reaction, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: Robert V. Chisholm, Attorney ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD J. L. Prichard, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active service from July 1972 to July 1974. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal of an October 2009 rating decision of the Muskogee, Oklahoma, regional office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The Veteran's appeal was previously before the Board in July 2014, at which time the Board found that new and material evidence had not been submitted to reopen previously denied claims for service connection for a psychiatric disability. The Veteran appealed the July 2014 Board decision to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In a December 2015 Memorandum Decision, the Court reversed the Board's decision that new and material evidence to reopen the claim had not been submitted. The matter was then remanded for consideration of the Veteran's claim for service connection for a psychiatric disability on the merits. It has been returned to the Board for action consistent with the December 2015 decision. In light of the Court's 2015 Memorandum Decision, the Board has characterized the issue as on the merits and will address such below. The Veteran, through his attorney, submitted additional medical evidence in June 2016. A waiver of initial RO review was included. In any case, as this decision grants the benefit sought, there is no harm to the Veteran. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. During service, the Veteran was seen for what was diagnosed as an acute anxiety reaction. 2. After discharge from service, the Veteran continued to receive treatment for a psychiatric disability that has been diagnosed as a schizoid type personality, schizophrenia, dysthymia, major depression with psychotic features, or a schizophrenic reaction. 3. The Veteran's current psychiatric diagnoses include major depression with psychotic features and paranoid type schizophrenia; the medical evidence as to whether or not the current disability was incurred in or due to active service is in relative equipoise. 4. The Veteran does not have and has never had a diagnosis of PTSD. CONCLUSION OF LAW The criteria for service connection for a psychiatric disability that has been variously diagnosed as schizophrenia, dysthymia, major depression with psychotic features, or a schizophrenic reaction (but not PTSD) have been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1113, 5107(b) (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.03(a), 3.307, 3.309 (2015). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) In this case, the Veteran was provided with complete VCAA notification in a September 2009 letter. He has also been provided with VA examinations, all VA treatment records have been obtained, and there is no indication of any outstanding private records. The Veteran has declined his right to a hearing. The duty to notify and assist has been met. Moreover, given the favorable outcome of this appeal, any failure in the duty to notify or duty to assist was harmless. Service Connection The Veteran contends that the psychiatric examination he received during service was for the initial manifestations of his chronic psychiatric disability. Service connection will be granted if the evidence demonstrates that a current disability resulted from an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by active military service. 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a). Establishing service connection generally requires (1) medical evidence of a current disability; (2) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) medical evidence of a nexus between the claimed in-service disease or injury and the present disability. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. If psychoses become manifest to a degree of 10 percent within one year of separation from active service, it is presumed to have been incurred during active service, even though there is no evidence of psychoses during service. This presumption is rebuttable by affirmative evidence to the contrary. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112, 1113; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307, 3.309. Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza element is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. Continuity of symptomatology may be established if a claimant can demonstrate (1) that a condition was "noted" during service; (2) evidence of post-service continuity of the same symptomatology; and (3) medical or, in certain circumstances, lay evidence of a nexus between the present disability and the post-service symptomatology. Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013). However, this method may be used only for the chronic diseases listed in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309. Walker, 708 F.3d 1331, 1336. In relevant part, 38 U.S.C.A. 1154(a) (West 2002) requires that VA give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim for disability benefits. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Federal Circuit has held that "[l]ay evidence can be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional." Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Buchanan v. Nicholson, 451 F.3d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[T]he Board cannot determine that lay evidence lacks credibility merely because it is unaccompanied by contemporaneous medical evidence"). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the VA shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107(b). The service treatment records show that the Veteran had a normal psychiatric examination upon entering service in June 1972. He denied a history of any psychiatric symptomatology.
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Related
Davidson v. SHINSEKI
581 F.3d 1313 (Federal Circuit, 2009)
Jandreau v. Nicholson
492 F.3d 1372 (Federal Circuit, 2007)
Jerry R. Shedden, Claimant-Appellant v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
381 F.3d 1163 (Federal Circuit, 2004)
Donald Buchanan, Claimant-Appellant v. R. James Nicholson, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
451 F.3d 1331 (Federal Circuit, 2006)
William N. Clemons v. Eric K. Shinseki
23 Vet. App. 1 (Veterans Claims, 2009)
Walker v. Shinseki
708 F.3d 1331 (Federal Circuit, 2013)
Savage v. Gober
10 Vet. App. 488 (Veterans Claims, 1997)
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Bluebook (online)
11-00 108, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/11-00-108-bva-2016.