07-14 924

CourtBoard of Veterans' Appeals
DecidedJune 15, 2017
Docket07-14 924
StatusUnpublished

This text of 07-14 924 (07-14 924) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Veterans' Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
07-14 924, (bva 2017).

Opinion

Citation Nr: 1722233 Decision Date: 06/15/17 Archive Date: 06/29/17

DOCKET NO. 07-14 924 ) DATE ) )

On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Indianapolis, Indiana

THE ISSUES

1. Whether the character of the Veteran's discharge from service constitutes a bar to Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits based on the period from March 1988 to October 1988, exclusive of health care under 38 U.S.C. Chapter 17.

2. Entitlement to service connection for a lumbar spine disorder, to include as secondary to a claimed left foot disorder.

REPRESENTATION

Appellant represented by: John W. Tilford, Agent

WITNESS AT HEARINGS ON APPEAL

Appellant

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

J. D. Deane, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

The Veteran served on active duty from January 1972 to January 1975, from December 1976 to December 1980, and from March 1988 to October 1988. He was discharged in October 1988 under other than honorable conditions.

These matters come before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2005 administrative decision and an August 2014 rating decision rendered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Indianapolis, Indiana.

The Veteran testified at a Decision Review Officer hearing in February 2007 as well as at a hearing before a Veterans Law Judge (VLJ) in August 2008. Transcripts of those hearings are included in the record.

In March 2009, the Board denied the Veteran's claim, finding that the character of his discharge from service constituted a bar to VA benefits based on the period of service from March to October 1988. The Veteran then appealed the Board's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court). In a November 2010 Memorandum Decision, the Court vacated the Board's March 2009 decision, and remanded the matter to the Board for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.

In April 2011, the Board again denied the Veteran's character of discharge claim. The Veteran appealed the Board's decision to the Court. In a May 2012 Memorandum Decision, the Court vacated the Board's April 2011 decision, and remanded the matter to the Board for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. The Board then remanded that claim for additional development in August 2012.

In April 2014, testified at a hearing before the undersigned VLJ at the RO. A transcript of that hearing is included in the record. The Board again remanded the Veteran's character of discharge claim for additional development in June 2014.

In August 2015, the Board denied the Veteran's claim, finding that the character of his discharge from service constituted a bar to VA benefits based on the period of service from March to October 1988, based on his acceptance of an undesirable discharge to escape trial by general court-martial. The Veteran appealed the Board's decision to the Court. In a January 2017 Memorandum Decision, the Court reversed the Board's August 2015 decision, and remanded the matter for further adjudication consistent with the Court's decision.

The issue of entitlement to service connection for a left foot disorder has been raised by the record in the Veteran's February 2005 claim, but has not been adjudicated by the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). Therefore, the Board does not have jurisdiction over it, and it is referred to the AOJ for appropriate action. 38 C.F.R. § 19.9(b) (2016).

The issue of entitlement to service connection for a lumbar spine disorder, to include as secondary to the claimed left foot disorder, is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the AOJ.

FINDING OF FACT

The Board is bound by the Court's finding that the appellant has met his burden of establishing his status as a veteran for the service period from March 1988 to October 1988 by an "approximate balance of positive and negative evidence".

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Resolving all doubt in the Veteran's favor, the character of his discharge from service is not a bar to eligibility for VA compensation benefits based on the period of service from March 1988 to October 1988. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 5303 (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.12, 3.13 (2016).

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION

With respect to the Veteran's claim herein, VA has met all statutory and regulatory notice and duty to assist provisions under the VCAA. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326 (2016). As the Board is taking action favorable to the Veteran by granting eligibility for VA compensation benefits based on the period of service from March 1988 to October 1988, the decision poses no risk of prejudice to him. See, e.g., Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993); see also Pelegrini v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 412 (2004); VAOPGCPREC 16-92, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,747 (1992).

After two prior periods of honorable active service, the Veteran reenlisted in March 1988 and was administratively discharged in October 1988 under other than honorable conditions. During his service from March 1988 to October 1988, he was absent without leave (AWOL) from June 9, 1988, to July 20, 1988, a period of 42 days. He accepted a discharge under other than honorable conditions in lieu of trial by court-martial. In the August 2015 decision, the Board found that the Veteran's discharge or release from his March 1988 to October 1988 period of service was based on his acceptance of an undesirable discharge to escape trial by general court-martial. It also determined that evidence of record did not support a finding that the Veteran was insane at the time of his AWOL.

In a January 2017 Memorandum Decision, the Court indicated that although the record supported the Board's determination that the Veteran was facing the possibility of a general court-martial, the very same evidence demonstrated that the Veteran was also facing the possibility of a special court-martial. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 819 (a general court-martial has the authority to impose a bad conduct or a dishonorable discharge, while a special court-martial has the authority to impose a bad conduct discharge but not a dishonorable discharge). The Court found that nothing in the Board's August 2015 decision or in the record on appeal demonstrated or suggested that it was more likely that the Veteran would have faced a general court-martial. See Ortiz v. Principi, 274 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (The burden of proving something by a preponderance of the evidence requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.).

The Court further held that the only plausible view of the evidence of record was that the evidence was in equipoise as to the issue of whether the Veteran accepted his discharge to escape trial by general court-martial or by special or summary court-martial. Accordingly, the Court found that the Board's determination that the Veteran accepted a discharge to escape trial by general court-martial must be reversed. See 38 U.S.C.

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Related

Golz v. Shinseki
590 F.3d 1317 (Federal Circuit, 2010)
W Illiam P. B Axter v. Anthony J. Principi
17 Vet. App. 407 (Veterans Claims, 2004)
Gilbert v. Derwinski
1 Vet. App. 49 (Veterans Claims, 1990)
Harris v. Derwinski
1 Vet. App. 180 (Veterans Claims, 1991)
Bernard v. Brown
4 Vet. App. 384 (Veterans Claims, 1993)
Kutscherousky v. West
12 Vet. App. 369 (Veterans Claims, 1999)
McLendon v. Nicholson
20 Vet. App. 79 (Veterans Claims, 2006)

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07-14 924, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/07-14-924-bva-2017.