00-15 037

CourtBoard of Veterans' Appeals
DecidedApril 27, 2018
Docket00-15 037
StatusUnpublished

This text of 00-15 037 (00-15 037) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Board of Veterans' Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
00-15 037, (bva 2018).

Opinion

Citation Nr: 1826232 Decision Date: 04/27/18 Archive Date: 05/07/18

DOCKET NO. 00-15 037 ) DATE ) )

On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Nashville, Tennessee

THE ISSUES

1. Entitlement to an initial rating in excess of 30 percent prior to June 17, 2017, and in excess of 70 percent thereafter, for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with mood disorder.

2. Entitlement to a total disability rating based on individual unemployability (TDIU) under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(a) due to service-connected PTSD with mood disorder prior to June 17, 2017.

3. Entitlement to a TDIU on an extraschedular basis under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b) due to PTSD with mood disorder prior to May 19, 2014.

REPRESENTATION

Veteran represented by: Daniel Krasnegor, Attorney at Law

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

L. Kirscher Strauss, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

The Veteran served on active duty from February 1976 to August 1976.

This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an October 2013 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Nashville, Tennessee, which effectuated a Board grant of service connection for PTSD with mood disorder and assigned an initial 30 percent disability rating, effective January 8, 1999.

In March 2017, the Board remanded this matter for additional development. At that time, the Board included the issue of entitlement to a TDIU, noting that the Veteran and his attorney had repeatedly contended that the Veteran was unable to work as a result of his service-connected PTSD. Rice v. Shinseki, 22 Vet. App. 447 (2009).

While the matter was in remand status, in an August 2017 rating decision, the RO increased the rating for PTSD to 70 percent and granted entitlement to a TDIU, both effective June 17, 2017. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held that a rating decision issued subsequent to a notice of disagreement that grants less than the maximum available rating does not "abrogate the pending appeal." AB v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993). Consequently, the issue of entitlement to an increased rating for PTSD remains in appellate status.

The issue entitlement to a TDIU on an extraschedular basis under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(b) prior to May 19, 2014 is addressed in the REMAND portion of the decision below and is REMANDED to the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ).

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Prior to July 6, 2012, the Veteran's PTSD was manifested by symptoms that produced an occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks, although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and conversation normal.

2. From July 6, 2012 through September 23, 2012, the Veteran's PTSD was manifested by symptoms that produced occupational and social impairment causing reduced reliability and productivity; occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas was not shown during this period.

3. From September 24, 2012, the Veteran's PTSD has been manifested by symptoms causing occupational and social impairment with deficiencies in most areas.

4. The Veteran's PTSD with mood disorder did not result in total social and occupational impairment during any portion of the period on appeal.

5. The Veteran's PTSD with mood disorder precluded substantially gainful employment as of September 24, 2012.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The criteria for an initial rating in excess of 30 percent prior to July 6, 2012 have not been met or more nearly approximated. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411 (2017).

2. The criteria for an initial rating of 50 percent, but no greater, have been met for the period from July 6, 2012 through September 23, 2012. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411 (2017).

3. The criteria for a rating of 70 percent, but no greater, have been met for the period from September 24, 2012. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5110 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.126, 4.130 Diagnostic Code 9411 (2017).

4. The criteria for a rating in excess of 70 percent have not been met or more nearly approximated at any point during the appeal. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.126, 4.130, Diagnostic Code 9411 (2017).

5. The criteria for entitlement to a TDIU due to service-connected PTSD with mood disorder have been met as of September 24, 2012. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1155, 5107 (2012); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.340, 3.341, 4.16(a), 4.19, 4.25 (2017).

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

I. Duties to Notify and to Assist

Neither the Veteran nor his attorney has raised any issues with the duty to notify or duty to assist. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that "the Board's obligation to read filings in a liberal manner does not require the Board . . . to search the record and address procedural arguments when the veteran fails to raise them before the Board"); Dickens v. McDonald, 814 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (applying Scott to a duty to assist argument). Thus, the Board finds that VA does not have a duty to assist that was unmet. Sickels v. Shinseki, 643 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

II. Initial Rating Claim

Disability ratings are determined by applying the criteria set forth in the VA's Schedule for Rating Disabilities, which is based on the average impairment of earning capacity. Individual disabilities are assigned separate diagnostic codes. 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2012); 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2017). The basis of disability evaluations is the ability of the body as a whole, or of the psyche, or of a system or organ of the body to function under the ordinary conditions of daily life including employment. 38 C.F.R. § 4.10.

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Related

Sickels v. Shinseki
643 F.3d 1362 (Federal Circuit, 2011)
Mauerhan v. Principi
16 Vet. App. 436 (Veterans Claims, 2002)
Sterling T. Rice v. Eric K. Shinseki
22 Vet. App. 447 (Veterans Claims, 2009)
David J. Jones v. Eric K. Shinseki
26 Vet. App. 56 (Veterans Claims, 2012)
Scott v. McDonald
789 F.3d 1375 (Federal Circuit, 2015)
Dickens v. McDonald
814 F.3d 1359 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Billy D. McCarroll v. Robert A. McDonald
28 Vet. App. 267 (Veterans Claims, 2016)
Ferraro v. Derwinski
1 Vet. App. 326 (Veterans Claims, 1991)
Schafrath v. Derwinski
1 Vet. App. 589 (Veterans Claims, 1991)
Fanning v. Brown
4 Vet. App. 225 (Veterans Claims, 1993)
Van Hoose v. Brown
4 Vet. App. 361 (Veterans Claims, 1993)
AB v. Brown
6 Vet. App. 35 (Veterans Claims, 1993)
Francisco v. Brown
7 Vet. App. 55 (Veterans Claims, 1994)
Friscia v. Brown
7 Vet. App. 294 (Veterans Claims, 1994)
Mittleider v. West
11 Vet. App. 181 (Veterans Claims, 1998)
Fenderson v. West
12 Vet. App. 119 (Veterans Claims, 1999)
Kutscherousky v. West
12 Vet. App. 369 (Veterans Claims, 1999)
Bowling v. Principi
15 Vet. App. 1 (Veterans Claims, 2001)

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00-15 037, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/00-15-037-bva-2018.