(a)In general
Not later than 120 days after April 24, 2024, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options—
(1)to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and
(2)to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products.
(b)Elements
The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include
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(a) In general Not later than 120 days after April 24, 2024, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written strategy, and provide to those committees an accompanying briefing, on the role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions imposed by the United States with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products that includes an assessment of options— (1) to strengthen the enforcement of such sanctions; and (2) to expand sanctions designations targeting the involvement of the People's Republic of China in the production, transportation, storage, refining, and sale of Iranian-origin petroleum products. (b) Elements The strategy required by subsection (a) shall include— (1) a description and assessment of the use of sanctions in effect before April 24, 2024, to target individuals and entities of the People's Republic of China that are directly or indirectly associated with smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products; (2) an assessment of— (A) Iranian-owned entities operating in the People's Republic of China and involved in petroleum refining supply chains; (B) the People's Republic of China's role in global petroleum refining supply chains; (C) how the People's Republic of China leverages its role in global petroleum supply chains to achieve political objectives; (D) the People's Republic of China's petroleum importing and exporting partners; (E) what percent of the People's Republic of China's energy consumption is linked to illegally imported Iranian-origin petroleum products; and (F) what level of influence the Chinese Communist Party holds over non-state, semi-independent "teapot" refineries; (3) a detailed plan for— (A) monitoring the maritime domain for sanctionable activity related to smuggling of Iranian-origin petroleum products; (B) identifying the individuals, entities, and vessels engaging in sanctionable activity related to Iranian-origin petroleum products, including— (i) vessels— (I) transporting petrochemicals subject to sanctions; (II) conducting ship-to-ship transfers of such petrochemicals; (III) with deactivated automatic identification systems; or (IV) that engage in "flag hopping" by changing national registries; (ii) individuals or entities— (I) storing petrochemicals subject to sanctions; or (II) refining or otherwise processing such petrochemicals; and (iii) through the use of port entry and docking permission of vessels subject to sanctions; (C) deterring individuals and entities from violating sanctions by educating and engaging— (i) insurance providers; (ii) parent companies; and (iii) vessel operators; (D) collaborating with allies and partners of the United States engaged in the Arabian Peninsula, including through standing or new maritime task forces, to build sanctions enforcement capacity through assistance and training to defense and law enforcement services; and (E) using public communications and global diplomatic engagements to highlight the role of illicit petroleum product smuggling in bolstering Iran's support for terrorism and its nuclear program; and (4) an assessment of— (A) the total number of vessels smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; (B) the total number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products destined for the People's Republic of China; (C) the number of vessels smuggling such petroleum products specifically from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; (D) interference by the People's Republic of China with attempts by the United States to investigate or enforce sanctions on illicit Iranian petroleum product exports; (E) the effectiveness of the use of sanctions with respect to insurers of entities that own or operate vessels involved in smuggling Iranian-origin petroleum products; (F) the personnel and resources needed to enforce sanctions with respect to Iranian-origin petroleum products; and (G) the impact of smuggled illicit Iranian-origin petroleum products on global energy markets. (c) Form The strategy required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified index.
22 U.S.C. § 8574 (Strategy to counter role of the People's Republic of China in evasion of sanctions with respect to Iran) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.
Codification Section was enacted as part of the Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum Act, also known as the SHIP Act, and not as part of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 which comprises this chapter.