A.If applicable statutory or common law, an order, or an agreement fixes, defines, extends or tolls a period within which the insurer may commence an action, and this period has not expired before the date of the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding as defined in Section 1901 of Title 36 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the receiver shall not by reason thereof be barred from commencing such an action if the receiver does so on or before the later of: 1. The end of the period, including any suspension of the period occurring on or after the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding; or 2. Four (4) years after the entry of the order commencing a delinquency proceeding or entry of a subsequent order granting a different form of relief in a delinquency proceedi Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
A. If applicable statutory or common law, an order, or an agreement fixes, defines, extends or tolls a period within which the insurer may commence an action, and this period has not expired before the date of the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding as defined in Section 1901 of Title 36 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the receiver shall not by reason thereof be barred from commencing such an action if the receiver does so on or before the later of: 1. The end of the period, including any suspension of the period occurring on or after the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding; or 2. Four (4) years after the entry of the order commencing a delinquency proceeding or entry of a subsequent order granting a different form of relief in a delinquency proceeding. B. Except as provided in subsection A of this section, if applicable law, an order or an agreement fixes, defines, extends or tolls a period within which the insurer may file any pleading, demand, notice, or proof of claim or loss, or cure a default in a case or proceeding, or perform any other similar act, and the period has not expired before the date of the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding, the receiver shall not by reason thereof be barred from filing, curing or performing, as the case may be, if the receiver does so on or before the later of: 1. The end of the period, including any suspension of the period occurring on or after the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding; or 2. One hundred eighty (180) days after the entry of the order granting the initial petition in the delinquency proceeding, or within such further extension thereof granted by the court which is shown to the satisfaction of the court not to be unfairly prejudicial to the other party. C. If applicable law, an order or an agreement fixes, defines, extends or tolls a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than the receivership court on a claim against the insurer, and the period has not expired before the date of the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding, then the period does not expire until the later of: 1. The end of the period, including any suspension of the period occurring on or after the filing of the initial petition in a delinquency proceeding; or 2. Thirty (30) days after termination or expiration of a court ordered stay with respect to the claim. D. An allegation by the receiver of improper or fraudulent conduct against any person shall not be the basis of a defense to the enforcement of a contractual obligation owed to the insurer by a third party, but the third party is not barred by this section from seeking to establish independently as a defense that the conduct was materially and substantially related to the contractual obligation for which enforcement is sought. E. No prior wrongful or negligent actions of any present or former officer, manager, director, trustee, owner, employee or agent of the insurer may be asserted as a defense to a claim by the receiver under a theory of estoppel, comparative fault, intervening cause, proximate cause, reliance, mitigation of damages or otherwise; except that the affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement may be asserted against the receiver in a claim based on a contract and a principal under a surety bond or a surety undertaking shall be entitled to credit against any reimbursement obligation to the receiver for the value of any property pledged to secure the reimbursement obligation to the extent that the receiver has possession or control of the property or the insurer or its agents misappropriated such property. Evidence of fraud in the inducement will be admissible only if it is contained in the records of the insurer. F. No action or inaction by the insurance regulatory authorities may be asserted as a defense to a claim by the receiver. G. A judgment or order entered against an insured or the insurer in contravention of any stay or injunction under the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, or at any time by default or collusion, shall not be considered as evidence of liability or of the quantum of damages in adjudicating claims filed in the estate arising out of the subject matter of the judgment or order. H. The provisions of subsection G of this section do not apply to guaranty associations’ claims for amounts paid on settlements and judgments in pursuit of their statutory obligations.